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INTRODUCTION 
1. Aim. 
The problem of knowledge bas a major place in con-
temporary philosophical thought. It is a complex problem 
and once its study is begun, it is possible to set out in 
all sorts of directions. Not all problems can be answered 
at once, and this is especially true of epistemological 
issues •1 Yet the problems and their solutions are inter-
dependent and when one is dealt with, implications for the 
others appear. 
This dissertation strives to isolate one problem in 
the area of epistemology, the nature of the given. Its; 
overall objective is to clear away soma of the difficulties 
found in the knowledge situation. Its specific aim is to 
investigate certain contemporary theories of the given, nota 
their implications, and evaluate them. Four contemporary 
theories will be considered, the essence theory, the sense-
data theory, the phenomenalist view, and the datum self 
theory. 
No claims are made that this is ~ fUndamental prob-
lem of knowledge, but many philosophers would be willing 
to admit that 1t was ~ fundamental problem. However, 1t 
1. Ledger Wood has said: "The array of problems is bewil-
dering and one is certain to become lost in the maze of 
epistemology unless one restricts the area of explora-
tion or adopts some leading thread to guide his steps 11 
(AK,9.). 
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must be confessed that some c~ntemporary thinkers do not 
think it is an issue at all. Their views will be consi-
dered, but the primary puspose of the dissertation is to 
investigate the views of eminent thinkers who h~ld that 
there is a problem concerning the nature of the given and 
that some solution is possible. 
2. Previous Literature on the Problem. 
So far as is known to the present writer, an extended 
investigation of the theory of the given in recent episte-
mology has not been undertaken before, nor have the views 
herein considered been previously related in any systematic 
way. The work most closely approximating the present enter-
prise in subject, though not content, is Robert D. Mack's, 
1 The Appeal to Immediate Experience. Mack's published 
dissertation describes and compares the theories of imme-
diacy in Bradley, Whitehead, and Dewey, coming to the con-
clusion that. all three, though initially searching for an 
ultimate given, "push their philosophies ••• beyond the nalve 
2 quest for such a datum." The metaohysi cal theories of 
Bradley, Wbi tehead, and Dewey are not considered in any 
special way in this dissertation. 
Charles W. Morris's work, Six Theories of Mind, 3 is in 
1. Robert D. Mack, The Appeal to I!llmediate Experience, New 
York: King's Crown Press, 1945,(a doctor's thesis at 
Columbia University). 
2. Mack, AIE, 8. 
3. Charles w. Morris, Six Theories of Mind, Chicago: The 
University of Chicago Press, 1932. 
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some ways similar to this dissertation for six contrast-
ing theories of mind are carefully investigated and some 
attention is paid to the nature of the given on several 
views. The implicit theories of givenness in Neo-Realism, 
Critical Realism, and Pragmatism are referred to, though 
no extensive investigation is made of them. The sense-data, 
phenomenalist, and datum self theories are not referred 
to. 
In hie A Philosophy of Ideals, 1 E. s. Brightman has 
called attention to the existence of recent varying theories 
of the given. The views of the Realists, Critical Realists, 
Pragmatists, and Personalists are defined and briefly dis• 
cussed, but there is no systematic treatment. 2 
Though there is a paucity of material referring to 
theories of the given in books, w:l.tll but one book 3 deallng 
with it specifically, several important articles about the 
epistemic given have appeared in the philosophical journals. 
Most of the available arttblee criticize or develop one of 
the specific theories dealt ~h in this dissertation and 
these will be noted in the ensuing chapters. Those of a 
more general, comparative character are fewer in number 
and must be noted here. 
J. Loewenberg's article, "Pre-Analytical and Poet-
1. Edgar s. Brightman, A Philosophy of Ideals, New York: 
Henry Holt and Company, 1928. 
2. Brightman, POI, 14-16, and 14n. (The note appears on 
220:&), The Personalistic view is presented in Chapter I. 
3· Mack, AIE. 
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Analytical Data,"1 distinguishes two senses of the term 
data, 'pre-analytical' being what is given for analysis 
and 'post-analytical' what results • from analysis. The 
conclusion is that the given is not a gift, but a problem, 
there being no finality to it. B. W. Brotherston's article, 
"Immediate Empiricism and Unity, "2 traces the problem from 
Rousseau through Wbi tehead to the conclusion that the gi van 
consists of two poles, unity and process. John Laird in-
vestigates the logical credentials of the theory and notes 
some of the relevant problems directly affiliated with it. 
His article is entitled "The Given." 3 In his "Report of 
the Tenth Annual Meeting of the Pacific Division of the 
American Philosophical Association," D. A. Piatt notes a 
lively discussion on the problem of the given led by P. 
A. Schijlpp.4 Sob1lpp publ1ebed an article, "Tbe Nature 
of tbe G1ven," tbe following year,5 which attacked the 
logical positivists and concluded that the given is real-
ity as it confrants men. 
A. C. Benjamin's article, "The Concept of the Varia-
ble Given,"4 seeks to solve the controversial problem of 
the given by reducing presumed differences in kind to dif-
ferences in degree. But this is not so easily done, and 
Benjamin virtually restates the problem. o. Martin in his 
1. In Jour. Phil., 24(19Z7), 5-14. 
2. Jour. Phil., 30(1933), 141-149. 
3. In Mind, 43(1934), 298-314. 
4. See Piatt, Art. (1934), 124f. 
5. In Ph11~ of Science, 2(1935). 
6. In Jour. Phil., 33(1936), 225-230. 
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"The Given and the Interpretative Elements in Percept1on," 1 
analyzes perception into three elements and concludes with 
an ep1stem1c monism. John Wild's article, "The Concept of 
2 the Given in Contemporary Philosophy," is an analytical 
survey of the problem and a cri t1que of any lim! ted theory 
of the given. It helped to stimulate this dissertation. 
E. W. Schipper's article on "Experience as G1ven," 3 cites 
the historical beginnings of the problem and contrasts the 
views of Lewis 
and Perceptual 
and Dewey. C. Baylis!> article, "The Given 
4 Knowledge," notes the complexity of the 
problem and compares the views of the Cr1 tical Realists, 
Russell, Lewis, and Price. 
The numerous articles which touch on the problem of 
the given incidentally or very briefly, cannot be listed 
here, but they will be dealt with where relevant in the 
body of the dissertation. 
Other scholars, though not dealing with theories of 
the given in any specific way, have isolated the problem 
and occasionally called into question its significance. 
Woodbridge objects to the search for an ultimate given as 
a fruitless endeavor.5 But R. W. Sellars says: 
I do not think that my statement 1s too strong 
when I assert that the refusal to distinguish 
1~ In Jour. fUll., 35(1938), 337-345. 
2. In Phil. and Phen. Res., 1(1940), 70-82. See also Read, 
Art. (1941) and Wild, Art. (1941). 
3. In Jour. Phil., 39(1942), 385-389. 
4. In Farber, PTFUS, 443-461. 
5. Art. (1921) •· 
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between datum and object is at the founda-
tion or all the vagaries of modern philo-
sophy. 
On the other hand, Schiller2 and Loewenberg agree with 
Woodbridge that the problem is fruitless. Loewenberg says: 
"I find the 'given' as bewildering a notion as the notion 
of the 'ultimate.'"3 Hallett too wonders whether it is 
correct and possible for philosophers to lay clown a cri-
4 terion of givenness. Yet, Read suggests that the problem 
of substance "is one of a large number of controversies all 
of which revolve around the question of whether or not 
something or other is given in experience."5 And J. s. 
Moore writes that "it is on the question of the nature of 
the datum that most of the recent controversy ~n episte-
6 
mology) bas centered." Bernh~dt has implied the relevance 
of a theory of the given in these words: 
If one accepts as data only that which points 
to or is expressive of a realm of subsistent 
objects, he has by that choice determined in 
advance the general character
7
or the conception 
of God which he will develop. 
Hinshaw, writing on Lewish view, has noted also the impli-
8 
cations which may well follow from one's view of the given. 
1. Sellars, EN, 27. 
2; Schiller, Art. (1933), 493. 
3. Loewenberg, Art. (1930), 59. 
4. Hallett, Art. (1938}, 170. 
5. Read, Art. (1941), 405. 
6. J. s. Moore, Art. (1949), 62. 
7. Bernhardt, Art. (1951), 12. (Italics added.) 
8. See Hinshaw, Art. (1949), 182. 
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3. Reasons for the Present Inyestigation. 
The subject of this dissertation was initially selec-
ted because of its relevance for a host of contemporary 
problems, particularly the theory of the self. The prob-
lem of the nature of what is given in the knowledge situa-
tion cuts across a large number of modern philosophic 
systems, including those which deny the problem. And it 
has important historical rootages. To examine the extensive 
implications of various theories would be a life's work, 
but it would clarify one's views on any number of more 
immediate questions, such as the nature of the good. 
Another reason for the present investigation was to 
make relations between theories that had not heretofore been 
related with a view toward discovering possible overall 
similarities or agreements. 
The present investigation was also undertaken for the 
purpose of discerning whether there was ~ problem of any 
significance regarding the given and. what the problem meant 
for the whole of epistemology. Investigation has shown 
that those who deny the problem, have not really thor-
oughly investigated the work or astute, critical minds 
in the field, in some cases accepting a ·view akin to naive 
realism. 
Again, the problem was undertaken to clarify the dif-
ficult and confusing terminology so prevalent in episte-
mological theory. As Laird says, the metaphors "pile up" 
XV 
once the term 'given' is used. 1 This dissertation has sought 
to lay bare the basic meanings of the views treated and dis-
pense with metaphors. Semanticists, however, would proba-
xvi 
bly not be appeased, because they are concerned with the nature 
of all signs not with their referents. 
One further reason for the present investigation was 
to discover whether there is an unchallengeable starting 
point for philosophic inquiry. Basically, all theories of 
the given are seeking for a certainty with which to begin 
speculation and reflection. But the quest for certainty 
cannot be satisfied so easily, particularly when philoso-
phers disagree about what is certain. Disagreement about 
the given is a disagreement about facts. But even if the 
facts were agreed upon, metaphysical and other conclusions 
would not follow from them necessarily. 
4. Limitations and Method. 
This dissertation is considerably limHed in topic. 
The theory of the given is but one aspect of the whole 
theory of epistemology~ The other limitations are somewhat 
formal and "external," though not without reason. The sub-
ject matter is limited temporally and, in a sense, terminolo-
gically. The terminus a guo for the material investigated 
is 1920. The terminological limitation was to thinkers 
who had emnloyed the term, "g1 ven" or its synonyms in a 
significant way in their theories. The date 1920 was chosen 
1. Laird, Art. (1934), 301. 
because it was the year in which Essays in Critical Real-
ism was published. It seemed to the present writer that 
with the publication of this joint volume, a host of ques-
tions relating to the given arose. For examnle, some 
vigorous exchanges are to be found in the journals for 
some years following the publication of this book. The 
preceding cooperative volume on Nee-realism did not nro-
voke a similar concern for the given. 
The terminological limitation was invoked to avoid 
broadening the subject beyond human limitations of time 
and energy, though it must be confessed that the initial 
plan was to survey all views of relevance. When this am• 
bitious program was begun, the working bibliography was so 
extensive that several years of constant reading would 
have been required, and the organizational problem alone 
would have been an overwhelming one. 
The phenomenological movement is with reluctance omit-
ted from all but casual treatment in this dissertation not 
because it is irrelevant, but because the type of analysis 
it engages in and its unique and special terminology are un-
like that employed in the more traditional enistemic theories. 
It is hence not suitable for fruitful comparison herein. In-
deed, it may be noted that phenomenology as founded by Hus-
serl is itself a whole philosophy rather than a branch of 
epistemology.1 It seeks to define the subjedt matter of 
1. Cairns, Art. (1942), 231. 
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philosophy. As Farber has said: 
It endeavors to 'fo,md' philosophy as an auto-
nomous discipline, and to formulate the nrocedure 
which makes it not only the fundamental 'root 
science,' but also e~ables it constructively to 
serve all knowledge. 
It must be admitted that the phenomenologist's concern for 
pre-conceptual experience is similar to the concern for the 
epistemic given here investigated, but the phenomenological 
reduction overtly avoids a descriptive analysis of psycholo-
gical evidence in a knowing subject. The theories of the 
given here investigated do not. The more recent developments 
of Husserl's views have, accordingly, tended to stress "the 
freedom of phenomenology from all presuppositions of actual 
individual existence-particularly, psychic existence."2 
It is interesting to note that references to phenomenol-
ogy as such are acarce in the sources dealing with the theory 
of the given as such.3 Then again, the term "given" seldom 
appears in phenomenological 11 terature and when it does it 
is used in a sense not significantly comparable to its use 
in epistemic theory. Furthermore, the fundamental ground-
work of the phenomenological movement was laid by Husserl 
and Brentano before 1920, the limiting date adonted in this 
1. Farber, Art. 1947 , 34 • 
2. Cairns, Art. 1942 , 232. 
3. For example, there are none in Drake, MPN, Lovejoy, RAD; 
Broad, STand MPN; Stace, TKE; Wood, AK; Brightman NV and 
POR; Werkmeister, BSK. There are a few references in 
Price, PER, Blanshard, NT, and a fairly substantial treat-
ment in Morris, STM. There is a brief comment on Husserl 
in the postscript of Santayana's ROE. 
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dissertation. A brief discussion of phenomenology and its 
relation to phenomenalism will be found in the opening pages 
of Chapter !V. 
It will be seen that the modern positivistic movement or 
Logical Empiricism has ·also been excluded from specific and 
detailed treatment in this dissertation. The reason for this 
is not because it is irrelevant, but because it goes at the 
problem of the epistemic given by way of a logical analysis 
of language rather than with reporting the introspective evi-
dence available. It studiously avoids anything with ~eta­
physical implications and somewhat dogmatically disposes of 
metaphysical problems by calling them "verbal." It draws 
upon modern mathematics, physics and the reforms of behavior-
istic psychologists, concurring with this last group 
that all of the scientific content of psychology 
can be formulated in the fhysical lan,o;uap:e and 
that the assumption of a something more ;• a sur-
plus of factual meaning atta£hed to a mentalistic 
terminology, is an illusion. 
But the theories of the given herein investigated are more 
cautious in their conclusions and less hasty in their dis-
missal of historic problems. Telling criticisms of the po-
sitivistic approach and concept of meaning can be found in 
recent literature.2 It is a fundamentally barren disci-
pline for it attempts to provide~ true method by an aprtort 
1. Feigl, Art. (1947), 378. 
2. For example, Blanahard, NT,II, 399-427 and ~erkmeister, 
BSK, 40-48 and 145-147. 
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limitation on the data for investigation before any investi-
gation has taken place. Nevertheless, some small attention 
is paid to positivism in this dissertation and there is a 
brief comparison of it with phenomenalism in Chapter IV. 
The method of the dissertation is as follows: A brief 
history of the problem as it manifests itself in thinkers 
from ancient times to the present will be set forth. This 
will be followed by an investigation of four major theories 
of the gi van. comprising the bulk of the dissertation. Each 
view will be stated and its essential characteristics noted. 
Where variations are to be found, they will be pointed out. 
Implications and criticisms follow the exposition of each 
view. The conclusions of the dissert~tion will be found in 
the final chapter. Here certain comparisons will be made 
and relevant general implications drawn. No attempt has been 
made to state conclusions at each chapter's end. The basic 
primary sources used in the exposition of the four theories 
will be cited in the introductions to their respect! ve chap-
ters. The bibliography used in the writing; of the whole 
dissertation, together with a key to the abbreviations in the 
footnotes will follow the final chapter. 
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CHAPTER I 
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND 
The problem of the theory of the given is of rather 
recent origin, though it has been, perhaps, implicit ever 
since man began to raise questions about how knowledge took 
place. It may be said that the problem came to the fore-
front in philosophical thought with Descartes. But the 
historical background of the problem gees behind Descartes 
into early Greek thought. In contemporary times,the prob-
lem has realized many restatements and solutions. Only 
the significant ones can be noted in the historical study 
which follows. 
1. Ancient and Medieval Philosophy. 
In Presocratic days there is little reference to 
problems of epistemology, let alone the precise problem of 
the given. This does not mean that the early Greeks never 
raised the question, but if they did, there is scant evi-
dence of it. A perusal of the fragments as Burnet 1 has 
edited them, yields little concerning the epistemological 
prob~em of the given among the early Greeks. 
One generalization that Windelband has made suggests 
a touch with the problem. He proposes that the first 
1. CT. Burnet, EAG. 
1 
observations the Greek philosophers made on human knowledge, 
concern the "contrast between experience and reflection." 1 
fhe implication is that what is presented to the senses is 
illusion and requires the work of reason to clarify. This 
would be characterized by the thought of Parmenides. It is 
not a theory of the.given, bUt suggests a concept approaching 
it. Empedocles' view that perceptual knowledge is possible 
through the sensing of like by lik~ is striking for his 
time. 2 Lewis points out the implication of subjectivism 
here, for on Empedocles' view, sense-qualities are relative 
to the perceiver.3 But there is no development on the 
status of the sense-qualities. 
On the basis of one fragment, plus reference to his 
allopathic perception theory, a suggestion of the given is 
to be found in Anaxagoras. The fragment is: "What appears 
is a vision of the unseen."4 Things which are seen give 
one the power of seeing the invisible. Is this the same 
as saying that given presentations are a source for knowl-
edge of the external world? One must tread lightly here. 
It may be noted that Democritus is said to have quoted ap-
provingly, the fragment of Anaxagoras ci~ed above,5 
Sophistic thought was primarily anthropocentric and 
put a great deal of stress on the knowing subject, for their 
1. Windelband, HP, 58. 
2, Note Theophrastus' treatment as reported in-Burnet, EAG, 
246. 
3. Lewis, MWO, 156. 
4. Burnet, EAG, 261, Burnet follows Dial's text. 
5. Burnet, EAG, 348, 
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cri t1que of the disagreements among theilir predecessors led 
them to seek reasons for the disagreement in the nature of 
individuality. As Thilly has said: "The truth begins to 
dawn on the Sophist that the mind of man is an important 
factor in the process of knowing. " 1 This stress on the im-
portance of the individual mind does not entail, however, 
an analysis of how individual minds acquire knowledge, but 
it does mark out an area in which the theory of the given 
might be developed. Windelband suggests that the term 
"phenomenalism" is in part anpl1cable to the Sophist Pro-
tagoras' view, though he admits that scepticism is the 
more accurate designation. 2 
With Plato, we find philosophy becoming systematic and 
the theory of knowledge is granted a place of some impor-
tance. But one looks long to find any view resembling the 
theory of the given. One wonders what passa~es in Plato 
Price had in mind when he made the statement: "And I think 
that all past theories have in fact started with sense-data. 
The Ancients and the Schoolmen called them sensible species." 3 
As Lewis has brought out, Plato's theory of the constructive 
mind in knowledge would seem to exclude any independent 
given such as sense-data. "The data of sense are, for him, 
not relevant to true knowledge because only the transcendent 
ideas are fully real."4 Wild, in wri t1ng of the theory of 
1. Thilly, HP, 57. 
2. Windelband, HP, 93. 
3. Price, PER, 19. 
4. Lewis, MWO, 45. 
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the given, similarly points out that 1t is no part of 
Plato's theory, for Plato was "aware of the infallible char-
acter of immediate sense-data."1 Lamprecht also denies 
any theory of the given in Plato when he says that there is 
no suggestion in Plato "that sensations are a new sort of 
entity which half conceals and half discloses the world 
which the organism faees •••• Sensations are not eognitive."2 
Then appearing and perceiving coincide in the 
ease of hot and cold, and in similar instances; 
for things appear, or may be supposed to be, 
to each one as he perceives them •••• Then per-
ception is always of existence" and being the 
same as knowledge is unerring~-' 
Like Plato, Aristotle also was a systematic philoso-
pher and included in his system, refer.ence to epistemologi-
cal problems, though there is no special work on the theory 
of knowledge. AristOtle does not hold to a theory of the 
given from which knowledge may be inferred, He rejects the 
implicit dualism of such a view. This has been succinctly 
put by Windelband: 
Not satisfied to adopt the old theory that 
perception consists in a eo-operation of 
object and subject, he,pointed to the unity 
of consciousness (_p~croT.,s), with which the 
animal soul unites what is given in the in-
dividual perceptions or the individual 
1. Wild, Art. (1940), 74. 
2. Lam~recht, Art. (1922)1, 171. Of, J, W. Yolton's arti-
cle, "The Ontological Status of Sense-Data in Plato's 
Theory of Perception," in Rev. Meta., 3(1949), 21-58. 
See also, Morrow, Art. (1929). 
3. Plato, Tbeaetetus, 152. 
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senses to form collective perceptions ••• and 
in so doing grasps also the1relations of num-ber, situation, and motion. 
The immediate data of the senses, are for him, infallible, 
though they may yield confused awareness of that which is 
perceived. 2 Hawkins brings out that for Aristotle, the 
thinking mind, in a certain way, is all things. This means 
that in the nature of knowing, there is "no limit to the 
range of reality which may be mentally embraced and assi-
milated."3 There is no theory of the given because every-
thing is given and can be grasped by the mind. MacPartland 
has 
and 
also brought 
4 Aristotle. 
this out in an article commenting on Dewey 
The whole of Greek thought does not reveal the intense 
concern for epistemology that characterizes modern philoso-
phy • and one looks hard to find anything resembling a theory 
of the given. R. D. Mack has said: 
The modern 'problem' of how knowing is pos-
sible would have been thought meaningless by 
Plato and Aristotle. For them, knowing is 
a fact with certain implications; tracing out 
these implications was one of their fundamental 
tasks.5 
Tbtsia~ber strongly put, but it does indicate the minor 
1. Windelband, HP, 150. 
2. This bas been brought out by Wild, Art. (1940), 74. A 
relevant reference to Aristotle hare is De Anima, II, 6. 
3. Hawkins, COE, 12. A relevant reference in the De Anima 
is III, 8, 43lb, notes Hawkins. 
4. See MacPartland, "Aristotle and the Spectator Theory of 
· Knowledge," in Jour. Phil., 42(1945), 291-293. 
5. Mack, AIE • 2. 
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note of epistemic theory in the thought of these men as 
we have it. 
Little can be found of epistemological relevance in 
the philosophers immediately following the two giants, of 
ancient thought. The Epicureans accepted Democ:ri tus' view, 
and the Stoics ware chiefly concerned with problems of 
practical ethics, though they did hold to a theory that 
perception consisted of the impression of outer things 
upon the soul. According to Windelband, they compare 
this soul to a blank tablet upon wbicb the outer world 
imprints its signs. 1 In a sense, this is a description 
of what is given. 
The Skeptics •ere much concerned with knowledge, but 
spent their efforts in denying its possibility. Arcesilaus 
and Carneades criticized the Stoic doctrine of irresistible 
2 impressions, and in a very limited sense, were anticipa-
tory critics of H. H. Price's view of the indubitability 
of sense-data.3 Sextus Empiricus' views on epistemology, 
which stress 
cussed by J. 
experience over against reason, have been dis-
4 Lindsay. Little of the remainder of Ancient 
philosophy bas much to do with epistemology. 
In the so-called Patristic Period which links Ancient 
and Medieval thought, there was similarly little concern 
1. Windelband, HP, 203. 
2. See Fuller, HP, I, 274-275. 
3. Price's view is discussed in Chapter III of this disser-
tation. 
4. See J. Lindsay, "Sextus Empiricus and the Modern Theory 
of Knowledge" in Phil. Rev., 31(1922), 58-63. 
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for the theory of knowledge. Men were busy defending 
Christianity and relating it to previous thought. Augus-
tine is an exception, though his theory of knowledge does 
not involve the technical problem of the given. It should 
be noted that his stress on the indubitable certainty of 
self existence as a starting point for obte,ining eternal 
and immutable truth, foreshadows the Cartesian dualism 
which suggests the problem of a given. Windelband notes 
that as a philosopher, Augustine "makes all his ideas 
centre about the principle of the absolute and immediate 
certainty of consciousness."1 
The beginnings of Medieval thou~ht show a concern with 
logical and theological questions, but the theory of knowl-
edge is undeveloped. With Thomas Aquinalj, there is a re-
newal of interest in the epistemology of Aristotle, but 
that epistemology is hardly separated from metaphysics. 
The knowing act is not inferential, as would be the case 
on a theory of the given, though "genuine knowledge ••• has its 
basis in sense perception, in experience, and we can know 
only what we experience. "2 Maritain has clarified Aquinas' 
view in these words, which indicate a denial of the uroblem 
of the given, for no theory of the given can ad~it that 
existence is immediately present: 
1. Windelband, HP, 276. 
that Augustine's view 
datum self theory. 
2. Thilly, HP, 229. 
Bri~htman in POI, 221, points out 
bas 'obvious relations" with the 
7 
The senses actually reach existence, without 
knowing that it is existence. They give 1t 
to the intellect as an intelligible treasure, 
which they themselves do not know as intelli-
gible, but which the inte!lect does knov1 and 
calls by its name_.Being. 
According to Hawkins, medieval scholastics contributed to 
the theory of percept ion; Suarez, for exa'!lple, holding 
that the act of knowing is essentially an assimilation of 
the subject to the object.2 But one must search far to 
find any semblance of a theory of the given in Aristote-
lians. 
In Renaissance thought, Galilee stressed that sensi• 
ble qualities are subjective, and interpreted the world 
in terms of quantitative characters.3 His contemporary, 
Campanella, like Augustine before him and Descartes after 
him, bases philosophical reflection on immediate self-
knowledge. He "finds in consciousness the pivot of cer-
tainty: whatever else we may doubt, we cannot doubt that 
we have sensations and that we exist. " 4 There is a sug-
gest1on of a theory of the given here, though it is not 
developed. Epistemic theory does not come into its own 
as an isolated philosophic problem until some years later. 
And even then the problem of the given is not delineated 
for some time. 
1. Maritain, Art.(l943), 298. 
2. Cf. Hawkins, COE, 144f. Valuable also is Picard, ECSS. 
3. Hawkins, COE, 34. 
4. Thilly, HP, 272. 
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2. Descartes' Revolution and the Rationalists. 
The philosophers immediately preceding Descartes of-
fered no significant epistemological theories. Bacon 
stressed induction, and Hobbes noted that knowledge baa 
ita origin in sense impressions. Neither thinker raised 
the question of tbe nature of the starting point, or the 
given, in knowing. Hobbes bad a metaphysical theory of 
sensations rather than an epistemological one. 
With the appearance of Descartes, a clear-cut break with 
past methodology is found. Though his epistemological theory 
is not worked out in detail, it is a viewpoint which shook 
the foundations of previous methods of inquiry. Descartes 
sought a starting-point for knowledge, which could not be 
questioned, which was certain, thinking thereby to arrive at 
conclusions which would resolve some of the conflicts and die-
agreements of his time. The one infallible starting point, 
be held, was the fact of self-existence. 11 Qog1to ergo sum." 
In any act of thinking, the self is assumed. Its existence 
is not so much an inference as a direct appeal to intuition. 
This fact of self-existence, Descartes treated as the given. 
W. T. Stace maintains that Descartes has a significant 
insight here, and just before discussing his own theory of 
the given, he has a chapter entitled, "Back to Descartes." 1 
In it he says that Descartes 
I. In Stace, TKE, Chapter II. 
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realized that every philosophy ~ust begin 
from the I and work outwards. But unfor-
tunately he at once became entangled in 
unjustified metaphysical assumptions about 
the nature of the ego and fallaiious argu-
ments about the external world. 
Later he says that his method is the same as that of Des-
2 
cartes. J. s. Moore calls attention to the fundamental 
character of Descartes' view and apnroves of it.3 And 
Fulton shows the relation ~f Descartes' view of the given 
to phenomanology.4 
The influence of Descartes bas been profound and can-
not be developed hare. Hawkins maintains that Descartes' 
view gave a. whole new direction to philosophical inquiry. 
He says: 
Although the greater part of the Cartesian 
system bas perished, the new direction which 
its author gave to philosophical inquiry re-
mains •••• It is dominant in the classical line 
of philosophers writing in English--Locke, 
Berkeley, Hume, in Reid and Hamilton and ••• 
in G. E. MQore and thinkers of similar in-
spirat1on.5 
Spinoza, Descartes' successor, did not emphasize that 
knowledge must begin with the self as given. In place of 
the given of immediate experience, Spinoza sought a "given" 
in sun-clear axioms. Though Spinoza distinguished three 
levels of knowledge, his epistemological theory is not 
1. Stace, TKE, 17. 
2. Stace, TKE, 20. 
3. J. s. Moore, Art. {1941), 316. 
4. Fulton, Art. {1940). 
5. Hawkins, COE, vi. 
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developed and includes no view resembling a theory of the 
given. 
Leibniz's theory of knowledge is somewhat more akin 
to Descartes 1 • Monads are the ultimate realities and 
maintain their identity, for they are windowless. Conse-
quently, since the human monad is an independent being, 
knowledge must arise from within. It cannot be a blank 
tablet, in the sense that impressions are made upon it from 
without. Leibniz is not clear on the exact nature of the 
starting-point for knowledge and holds to a doctrine of 
innate ideas, which in a way, could be called the ~iven, 
but yet may exist in the mind in an unconscious state. 
Describing Leibniz's view, Thilly says: 
Experience is necessary to stir un the soul 
but it cannot create ideas. The soul is not 
a piece of wax on which impressions are 
stamped •••• sensations are obscure and con-
fused ideas, while the objects or the under-
standing are clear and distinct. 
There is an implicit epistemic dualism here, and some im-
plications for a theory of the given, but that is the most 
that can be said on this. 
3. British impiricism. 
The primary concern of Locke, Berkeley, and Hume is 
with the theory of knowledge, though at their time, 
1. Thilly, HP, 396. 
11 
epistemology was not sharply sundered from metaphysics. 
Their basic question dealt with what was present in ex-
perience. Their answers varied. At the risk of some over-
statement it could be said that the British Empiricists 
fundamentally sought to define what was given in the know-
ing s1tua t1on, though they d1d not use that term. 
Locke begins his investigation of how knowledge takes 
place by questioning the existence of innate ideas. Upon 
an examination of consciousness, none are to be found, so 
Locke concludes that the mind at first is a tabula rasa upon 
which ideas are impressed. This tabula rasa, or "blank 
tablet" amounts to a theory of the given, for 1t is the 
starting point of knowledge. However, it is an abstrac-
tion for it is contentless. Our knowledge comes from 
experience in the form of simple ideas which may be com-
bined in various ways. We have knowledge of out own con-
sciousness by intuition. It is the most certain of all 
knowledge. On this, Locke echoes Descartes' stress on the 
certainty of the immediate experience of the self. Windel-
band says: "Locke presents this doctrine of t'Qe certainty 
of knowledge of self with an almost verbal adherence to 
Descartes." 1 The relation between the self intuitively 
known and the tabula rasa is not clear, however. It is 
difficult to say which one could be construed as the given. 
Locke didn't define the problem accurately. 
1. Windelband, HP, 467. 
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Berkeley inherited Locke's problems and sought an~ 
ewers to them. He not only denied innate ideas, but also 
any abstract ideas, such as the concept of matter for which 
there was no conscious evidence. He failed to distinguish 
the epistemological pl"oblem from the metaphyeical one and 
concluded that the only being one can call real is knowable 
being. Primary and secondary qualities are both found 
within the mind. Indeed the mind is the key which can un-
lock the door to reality. It is the one given situation, 
and contains ideas (sensations) of varying kinds and de-
grees. A theory of the given is evident in his view and is 
perhaps most clearly suggested by this quotation from his 
Principles of Human Knowledge: 
When in broad daylight I open my eyes, it is 
not in my power to choose whether I shall see 
or no, or to determine what particular objects 
shall present themselves to my view; and· so 
likewise as to the hearing and other senses, 
the ideas ijprinted on them are not creatures 
of my will. 
Ideas are given to finite spirits and are the basis for knowl-
edge of the outside world. But Berkeley does not expand 
this imp11ci t theory further, though he "brought the ascend-
ing of inner experience to complete dominance, by putting 
an end to the wavering posi t1on which Locke bad taken upon 
the question as to the knowledge of bodies." 2 Wild holds 
1. Berkeley, PHK, Paragraph 29. 
2. Windelband, HP, 469. 
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that Berkeley's view of the given is "an arbitrarily nar-
row construction."1 
From the beginnings of modern philosophy in Descartes, 
there is "a superiority attributed to inner experience 
by virtue of which knowledge of the outer world becomes 
problematical," Windelband suggests. 2 The epistemic theory 
of Hume illustrated this dichotomy better than his predeces-
lora. Hume is so concerned with inner experience and its 
analysis, that he becomes sceptical of the external world. 
Building on the thought of locke and Berkeley, Hume not 
only denies innate ideas as Locke did, and material being 
as Berkeley did, but also the self as a knower;; Indeed, 
the given, for him consists of impressions and ideas, which 
are copies of impressions. 3 Outward impressions arise 
from unknown causes. Inward impressions may be caused by 
ideas. Knowledge, then, amounts to the compounding, rear-
ranging or transposing of impressions. There is no self 
to be found among the impressions and no self is empiri-
cally verifiable. Hume's sensationalistic empiricism has 
been a very important influence in much of recent Bri t1sh 
thought about knowledge and about the theory of the given 
in particular. H. H. Price, whose view will be examined 
• in Chapter III,adrnits a great debt to Hume and, in many 
ways, his sense-data theory of the given grows out of 
1. Wild, Art. (1940), 75. 
2. Windelband, HP, 466. 
3. Schipper in Art. (1942), 385, has called this Hume' s 
given. 
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Hume's analysis. 1 
4. Kant's Critical Analysis. 
In Kant's thought, the problem of knowledge is set 
forth in the clearest light. Seeking to do justice to the 
findings of both the rationalists and the empiricists, Kant 
is faced with the problem of synthesizing the valid em-
phasis of each movement. Furthermore, he seeks to provide 
an epistemological theory which would support Newtonian 
physics. The presuppositions of knowledge are his concern. 
His analytic method precludes any systematic view of the 
self as a given totality or a starting point,2 for he wants 
to solve the question of how knowledge of anything whatever 
is possible. He accepts no indubitable starting point. 
Yet he opens the Introduction to his Critique of Pure Reason 
with the sentence: "Dass alle unsere Erkenntniss mit der 
Erfahrung anfange, daran 1st gar kein Zweifel." This term 
experience, however, is notably vague, and does not imply 
a theory of the given. Kant does not say "my experience," 
nor bow much experience is involved. 
His analysis of knowing begins with a section on sen-
sory objects and the presuppositions necessary for their 
l. See Price 1 a article, 11 The Permanent Significance of Hume' • 
Philosophy," in Phil., 15(1940), 7-37. ' 
2. This is noted carefully by Paulsen, IK, 212. Paulsen 
adds: "The unity of self-consciousness is given solely in 
the act of relating the manifold of inner experience." But 
what is it given to? 
3. Kant, Kr v, Bl. 
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presence in the knower. The data of knowledge are intui• 
tions received by the "sensibil1 ty" (Sinnl1chke1t). But 
the sensibility is a faculty or capability knowers have and 
cannot be known immediately. Yet 1t, together with the 
forms of space and time, must exist in order for sensory 
impressions to be received. It may be said that sensations 
are given for Kant. But this is not all, for the sensory 
intuitions must be related in some way. This relating 
according to apriori laws or categories is done through the 
faculty of the understanding (Verstand). External objects 
may be known because given sensations are organized by the 
' 
categories of the understanding into meaningful entities. 
Can it be concluded that only sensations are given for Kant? 
Or are objects themselves given? Or categories? 
It may be said that the raw material of knowledge, is 
sensation, but that there is no pure given, since the pres-
ence of sensation in a knower presupposes some faculty for 
receiving it. Furthermore, the knowledge of objects pre• 
supposes some faculty for acting on the given sensations. 
Calkins has pointed out that sometimes Kant is not 
very clear on just what is given and is occasionally 
disposed to admit that some objects are merely 
given--in other words, that uncategorized, purely 
sensational objects of exp!rience do occur, 
though they are not knowu. 
In any case, the problem of epistemology, including the 
1. Calkins, PPP, 205n. In support of her contention, Miss 
Calkins calls attention to A90 and Bl23. 
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prOblem of the nature of the given received a very fresh 
and fructifying treatment by Kant, for it stimulated en-
deavor along many lines of inquiry. On the contrary, Haw-
kins thinks that the phenomenalism implicit in Kant's view, 
was a serious mistake in the history of thought. Sensa-
1 tiona are not merely appearances, he says, but are real. 
Nevertheless, the Kantia.n formulation stands as a major 
epistemic problem. 
Kant's successors, Ficbte and Schelling, were not so 
prOfoundly analytic as their master, though both of them 
implied theories of the given which were more clear than 
Kant's. Fichte held that the absolute and unconditioned 
basic principle of all human knowing is the self. It is 
the ground on which knowledge is founded. But Fichte does 
not offer an analysis or psychological account of this 
given self. Schilling, disagreeing with Fichte's view of 
the Ego, nevertheless maintained that the starting point 
in knowing is without a doubt, self-consciousness. 
Schopenhauer must be mentioned here also, though ·be 
does not follow chronologically. His views diverge from 
Kant 1 s to the point of attacking Kant's scepticism about 
things in themselves. Schopenhauer thinks that the nature 
of the real world is suggested by the nature of conscious-
ness itself. Given in the fact of conscious selfhood, is 
the clue to reality, will. The external world is the 
1. Of. Hawkins, COE, 20. 
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objectification of will even as one's body is the expres-
sion of his own will. The theory of what is given plays 
an important part in Schopenhauer's thought, Indeed, his 
metaphysics is directly derived from it. 
5. Hegel's Phenomenology. 
There is no explicit distinction made in Hegel's 
thought between theory of knowledge and theory of being. 
Indeed, for a philosopher who maintains that the true is 
the whole, it is difficult to isolate a specific problem 
such as the theory of the given. Nevertheless, Hegel had 
a primary concern for the foundation of knowledge. Bright-
man has called attention to Prof. Theodor Haering's charac-
terization of Hegel as "the grea.t empiricist of conscious-
ness."1 An examination of his Die l'hiinomenologie des 
Geistes will reveal this. He,:el seeks to find a sui table 
starting-point for reflection' and holds that it is conscious-
ness, but consciousness is no resting place. Thou~ht is in 
the process of development. The Phenomenology traces the 
growth of consciousness from bare immediacy, to self-con-
sciousness to social consciousness and finally to the Abso-
lute mind in which all selves and institutions are realized. 
Hegel bas a theory of the given. It consists of the 
whole of consciousness, It can never be marked off 
1. Brightman, Art. (1932)2, 174. (Haering made this statement 
in a Seminar at 688 Boylston Street, Boston, Massachusetts.) 
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precisely, thou~ stages in it can be recognized. One 
stage leads to another. The first stage is that of sense-
certainty. It is the stage of mere apprehension and must 
be kept free from conceptualizing. 
The knowledge, which is at the start or 
immediately our object, can be nothing else 
than just that which is immediate knowledge, 
knowledge of the immediate, of what is. We 
have, in dealing with it, to proceed too, in 
an immediate way, to accept what is given, 
not altering anytiing in it as it is pre-
sented before us. 
The degree of certainty stressed resembles Descartes' 
given, but the object rather than the subject is present. 
I, this particular conscious I, am certain 
of this fact before me ••• the I here does not 
think •••• Rather, the thlng, the f!l.ct, is; and 
it~ merely because it ~ ••• the2individual consciousness knows a pure this. 
Emphasis is placed on the fact that the sense object is 
found, not made. 
This is the ultimate indubitable given for Hegel. 
The self is, in a sense, given, but it is given on a dif-
" ferent level~ or as the result of naive immediacy reaching 
outside of itself. As Baillie summarizes: 
We are left with the result that conscious-
ness does and must find itself in unity with 
its object, a unity which implies identity of 
nature between consciousness and its object: 
1. Hegal, POM, 149. 
2. Hegel, POM, 149f. 
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consciousness ·b!comes 'certain of itself 
in its object.' 
Hegel does not differentiate between immediacy, or the 
given and knowing. In fact, his whole theory goes on to 
assert that nature and all that is, is given to the develop-
ing, knowing mind. Meaning can be found on this basis. 
6. Some Modern Developments. 
A large number of thinkers may be included under this 
beading. By modern is specifically meant those thinkers 
who succeeded Hegel and developed ei tber the theories of 
Kant or Hegel, or offered new views. 
1. Continental thought. 
Thought on the continent after Kant and Hegel is 
abundant, and it is not always easy to select the leading 
figures. Several who seem to contribute most to the theory 
of the given will be mentioned, though this survey is bard• 
ly exhaustive. 
In so far as Herbart stressed dualism in epistemology 
and denied that direct experience of reality was possible, 
be made room for a theory of the given, though be did not 
develop 1 t. 
Lotze, a pupil of Herbart's, may be included here by 
virtue of his empirical account of the self. Though he 
1. Hegel, POM, 217n. 
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held to the term "soul, 11 his view stressed the self as 
conKdous experi~nce, the starting point for knowledge 
and metapbys1cs, 1 and that which alone bas direct exnerience 
or itself. Lotze's view preceded the idea of the datum ser 
by two generations, and though be did not develop a theory 
of the given, one ts suggested by his view. 
Volkelt, who was indebted to Scbonenbauer, 2 set up 
a dual1 ty of experience and thought • He no ted that ex-
perience, when not thought, is the equivalent of conscious 
states. Knowledge then, consists of the elaboration of 
_experience by thought. One's immediate awareness is indu-
bitable, certain knowledge, and knowBdge of the objective 
world must begin on this basis. "Transubjective" objects 
may be known through the necessity of thought .3 Or as 
R. B. Winn bas described Volkelt's view:· "Knowledge may 
be described as the product of rational operations on the 
4 
material of pure experience." This view, like Lotze's, 
though not technically stating it, would support a theory 
of the given akin to the datum self view. 
Two other important German thinkers in the field of 
epistemology at this time were, Krnst Mach and Richard 
Avenarius. Both emphasized an empirical approach, Mach 
1. For an examination of Lotze's view of the self which bas 
implications for the theory or the given, see r· Thomp-
son's unpublished doctoral dissertation, Lotze s Concep-
tion of the Self, Boston University, 1950. 
2. So notes Macintosh, POK,63. 
3. The term "transubjective" is Macintosh's translation. 
POK, 64. 
4. Winn, Art. (1942), 333. 
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taking essentially a Humian view. For him, the starting 
point for knowledge was "pure experience." Science should 
aim at 'describing the facts of immediacy. Beyond that, 
neither it nor philosophy can go. His view is close to 
phenomenology tnd implies a theory of the given, though 
the meaning of "pure experience" would need some investi-
gation. His thought influenced Bertrand Russell. 1 
Avenarius developed further the doctrine of "pure exper-
ience" in his Kri tik der reinen Erfahrung. But this 
"pure experience" is not a theory of the given in the 
sense in which it is studied in this dissertation. It is 
that from which all subjective taint has been removed. 
It resembles the theory of the given in so far as it is a 
necessary starting point for knowledp;e. Macintosh has 
significantly remarked: 
But it is easily seen that his whole philo-
sophy rests upon the fallacious inference, 
that, sinca it is only through experience 
that we can know that anything exists, ~here­
fore, 'nothing exists save experience.' 
Nevertheless, it ~ust be said that the views of Avenarius 
have influenced the radical empiricism of James as well as 
American Neo-Realism and B. Russell's realism.3 
Vaihinger does not develop a theory of the given as 
suoh, but speaks of sensations as the starting point for 
1. See B. Russell, AM, 144, for an imuortant reference to 
Maoh. 
2. Macintosh, POK, 112. 
3. Tbilly, HP, 587. 
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knowledge. Tbis is narrower than the "pure experience" 
view. Vaihinger's view has certain ties with American 
1 Pragmatism as Morris has brought out. 
In France, Renouvier helped develop some of the im-
plications of Kant's view arriving at a view which stres-
sed the metaphysical central! ty of persons. It is based . 
on a subjective idealism which Macintosh says is an 
example of "the fallacy of reasoning from the egocentric 
predicament. "2 A theory of the given is implied here, 
though not precisely stated. 
Poincar' was more influential, developing the theory 
of Mach, but investigating the nature of unverifiable hy-
potheses at greater length. Tbe facts of experience may 
prompt a number of constructions on the part of the mind. 
Tbe construction accepted is accepted for reasons of con-
venience. Poincare's view is worthy of mention here, 
primarily because of its influence in the thought of 
3 W. T. Stace. Stace goes into far greater detail on the 
nature of the given facts, but the idea of construction is 
~. 4 
very similar to Poincare s. 
Bergson wrote a work specifically dealing with the 
theory of the given. Its French title is more meaningful 
than the English one: Essais sur lea donn~es immediates 
1. Morris, STK, 279f. 
2. Macintosh, POK, 189. , 
3. In his TKE, vi, Stace reports a kinship with POincare. 
4. Of. Stace, TKE, Chapter VI, "Tbe. Construction of the 
External World." 
de la conscience. 1 But Bergson does not treat the given 
in a limited epistemic sense. The given is not a starting 
point for knowledge, but is that in which reality may be 
found. In other words, Bergson is an 1mmediat1st of a 
mystical sort. One feels reality immediately, one does 
not infer it from fundamental given facts. This same 
point of view is presented in his essay, An Introduction 
to Metaphysics, which appeared after the work mentioned 
above. Two sentences from it summarize hi• view: 
There is a reality that is external and yet 
given immediately to the mind. Commonsense 
is right on this point, as against the ideal-
ism and realism of the pbilosophers.2 
His concern is not with the theory of the given as inves-
tigated later in this dissertation.3 
ii. British views. 
Among British thinkers of the last generation, two 
stand out as theorists of the given, F. H. Bradley and 
James Ward. Immediacy is one of the key words of Brad-
ley's thought. For him, knowledge of reality is felt 1m-
mediately, not derived by rational inference from sense-
data or essences. This view is not only found in his Au-
pearance and Reality, but also in an important chapter in 
1. Published in Paris: Alcan, 1908. The English title is 
Time and Free Will, translated by P6gson. 
2. Bergson, ITM, 49. 
3. For a discussion of Bergson's view, see Chapter IV, 
Section 2, i, of this dissertation. 
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his Essays in Truth and Reality entitled, "Our Knowledge 
of Immediate Experience." Philosophical investigation 
must begin with what is given and this consists neither 
of mere qualities nor of relations, but of, what Cunning-
bam has called "a simply felt manifold in which there are 
no distinctions among qualit1es."1 From this given, a meta-
physics may be derived. 
A recent study and 
the given has been made 
evaluation of Bradley's view of 
2 by R. D. Mack. Bradley's view is 
epistemically monistic, and there is no sharp distinction 
between givanness and knowledge. 
James Ward holds a different metaphysical view and 
also a theory of the given somewhat like the datum self 
theory examined in this paper. Ward calls the given, "the 
presentational continuum." And in describing it, he says: 
At any given moment we have a certain whole 
of presentations, a 'field of cons~iousness' 
psychologically one and continuous. At the 
next we have not an entirely new field' but 
a partial change within the old field. 
N. K. Smith appropriates the terminology of Ward in pre-
senting his theory of knowledge and devotes one chapter of 
him Prolegomena to an Idealist Theory of Knowledge to 
"The Presentational Cont1nuum,"4 in which Ward's vie'" is 
L Cunningham, IAP, 81. 
2. Mack, AIE. See also, Ward's article, "Bradley's Doc-
trine of Experience," in Mind, 34(1925). 
3. Ward, PP, 17. (This reference was suggested by Metz, 
HYBP, 401.) 
4. It is Chapter VI in Smith's PITK. 
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criticized and modified.1 
Some of the other British thinkers who dealt with 
problems of epistemology, must be mentioned here. J. F. 
Ferrier held that the starting point for knowledge was 
not an empirical given, but necessary truths. 2 T. H. 
Green benefitted from both Kant and Hegel in his theory 
and made the self not only the seat of value but the 
starting point of knowledge.3 A. E. Taylor is not es-
pecially friendly to epistemology and speaks of'meta-
physics as "dealing with a reality which is in the end 
simply 1 g1 ven,' and not to be explained away ."4 Shadworth 
Hodgson held to an epistemic monism but admitted that 
sense-data are evidence for a reality not of the nature 
of consciousness.5 G. D. Hicks' theory opposes any theory 
of the given, calling it a pseudo-problem, and an unem-
6 pirical view. 
analysis of the 
G. F. Stout stresses a psychological 
data.7 G. E. Moore was one of the most 
influential thinkers in British epistemology. He made an 
important distinction between the act of awareness and 
the object of awareness. He also developed a theory of 
1. On Ward1 s view, see Leroux, Art. (1926). 
2. For _a summary treatment, see Cunningham, IAP, 24-33. 
3. See Green, PTE. 
4~ Taylor, Art. (1924), 272. See also his EM. 
5. Cf. Macintosh's treatment, POK, 30f, 
6. See his CR. Hicks's criticisms are dealt with in 
Chapter IV, 5, ii. 
7. For a statement on Stout's views see Metz, HYBP, 748ff. 
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the status of sense-data. 1 His view shines through the 
pages of Price's Perception, which is dealt with in 
Chapter III of this dissertation. Bertrand Russell bas 
contributed much to epistemological theory, but has no 
single point of view on how knowledge takes place. In 
his most recent work in epistemology, Human Knowledge, 
Russell holds to a view of the given much like Price's, 
though it resembles the phenomenalist account2 in some 
respects also. 3 
iii •. American contributions. 
C. s. Peirce was one of the most influential af 
American thinkers in the field of epistemology and re-
lated problems. He has been the inspiration for much in 
pragmatism, but also has affinities with phenomenology 
because of his concern for the problem of the given. His 
historical influences have been well brought out in the 
recent revision of Thilly's History of Philosophy,4 and 
T. A. Goudge has written an instructive article entitled: 
"Peirce's Doctrine of the Given in Experience." 5 
William James elaborated on some of the views of 
Peirce, developing a "radical empiricism 116 and then went 
1. See G. E. Moore, PS. See also Schilpp, PGEM, for a 
series of articles expounding and criticizing Moore's 
important views. 
2. This view is dealt with in Chapter IV of this dissertation. 
3. See Russell, HK, 170f. 
4. See 597.;.601. 
5. In Jour. Phil.( 32(1935), 533-544. See also a criticism 
by Dewey, Art. 1935), and Goudge's answer, Art. (1936). 
6. See James ERE. 
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1 
so far as to deny the existence of consciousness. Get-
ting at the roots of experience, finding out what was 
immediate and unshakeable was one of James'S main purposes. 
In discussing radical empir1eism he says that philosophy 
"must neither admit into its constructions any element 
that is not directly experienced, nor exclude from them 
any element that is directly experienCBI!l.. "2 Of course, 
the question is, what is directly experienced? ~either 
the self nor sense-data are, according to James. 
In commenting on the significance of James's view of 
the given, Tower bas said: 
By his Cartesian return to immediate exper-
ience, James cut beneath the dualistic pre-
suppositions that "Underlay most of the phil-
osophies of nearly three centuries.3 
Schluetz has pointed out the relation between James5 funda-
mental concept of the stream of consciousness.4 
Josiah Royce, another American thinker of some note, 
took an epistemological view quite removed from that of 
James. It is closely affiliated with his monistic ideal-
ism. Fundamentally, all knowledge is direct. The know-
ing self is identical with the large or deeper self which 
is metaphysically ultimate. Immediacy is but an abstract 
aspect of experience. There is no clear theory of the 
given for that would make for an artificial dualism between 
1. See J~es, Art. (1904). 
2. James, ERE, 42. 
3. Tower, Art. (1931), 593. 
4. Schluetz, Art. (1940). 
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knower and the known. Nor does Royce hold that the self 
is given. He says, for example: "In our present form 
of consciousness, the true Self of any individual is not 
a datum, but an ideal."1 
Borden ¥. Bowne, a contemporary of both Royce and 
James holds to an epistemological view which combines 
Kant and Berkeley. For him, the life of sense, which is 
at the base of thought life "is something given," 2 though 
the self is the clue to all reality and organizes the 
given data of sense into knowledge and meaning. Funda-
mentally, it is the self which is the starting point for 
knowledge. Bowne speaks of "the knowing self--which is the 
primal reality in knowledge, and the only reality of which 
we have proper consciousness."3 This view has been de-
veloped and modified by E. s. Brightman and will be con-
sidered at length in Chapter Five of this dissertation: 
"The Datum Self as Given." 
7. Contemporary Views. 
One view which may still be classed as contemporary 
is American Neo-Realism, though it bas few if any defenders 
at the present time. It would deny a theory of the 
1; Royce, WAI, II, 287. 
2; Bowne, TTK, 37. 
3. Bowne, MET, 331. Werkmeister in HPIA, 105, treats 
Bowne's view of knowledge under the caption: "The self, 
an indispensable presuppoei t1on of knowledge." 
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epistemic given as a starting potnt for knowledge and 
maintain that knowledge is directly given, or is imme-
diate. It will be seen that this view is criticized vi-
gorously by the Critical Realists whose essence theory 
of the given is discussed in the next chapter of this 
dissertation. 
Whitehead is an important comtemporary theorist, 
though be does not develop any thoroughgoing definition 
of the given in his theory and, indeed, does not concern 
himself with epistemological problems, as such. Morris 
bas studied Whitehead's implicit theory of givenness in an 
article of some years ago.1 More recently, R. D. Mack 
bas made a study of Whitehead's doctrine of immediate ex-
perience and its implications. 2 His conclusion regarding 
Whitehead's view, is worthy of statement here. 
Whitehead in his early works appeals to im-
mediate experience to find there what is given 
for experience as ultimate data or as ultimate 
principles of explanation--while in his philo-
sophy of organism he actually appeals to imme-
diate experience both as part of the reformu-
lated philosophy of nature appearing in Adven-
tures of Ideas and Process and Reality, and as 
a part of his metaphysical method, a method of 
criticism wherein a highly meritorious task is 
accomplished, that of analyzing the factors of 
experience in such a way as to contribute to 
the growth and development of systematic pbil-
osophy.3 
1. C. w. Morris, 11Mind in Process and Reality," in Jour. 
Phil., 28(1931), ll4ff. 
2. Mack, AIE, This work also studies the same problem in 
Bradley and Dewey. See also Morris, STM, 187-190. 
3. Mack, AIE, 30. 
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Dewey proposes a philosophical view which is not 
especially concerned with problems of epistemology. He 
denies any theory of the given which would imply epistemic 
dualism, and holds to a broad view that knowledge of all 
things is given immediately within the context of experience. 
In many places in this dissertation, Dewey's view will be 
noted as one criticizing any limited theory of the given. 
His view Of immediacy, or the given bas been ably inves-
tigated by Mack1 and c. w. Morris. 2 
Two British contemporaries who have developed mania-
tic epistemological views are John Laird and R. I. Aaron. 
Laird opposes Humian atomism, maintaining that facts are 
charged with meaning, and he attempts to discover the na-
ture of immediacy.3 In ene place he says: 
Anything we perceive is perceived w1 thin a 
horizon. Its grosser components, its conti-
guous partners, its immediate surroundings 
and connexions, are given along with it, not 
always, indeed, with the same clearnlss of 
outline ••• but given notwithstanding. 
Aaron's view is somewhat similar to Laird's. All knowledge 
is given. In summing up his view be says that throughout, 
the knowing act "is an immediate apprehension of the real."5 
He maintains that no distinction in kind of knowing can be 
1. Mack, AIE, 31-68. 
2. Morris, STM, 290-330. 
3. See Laird, SIR, KBO, and Art. (1934). 
4. Laird, Art. (1924), 219. 
5. Aaron, NOK, 121. 
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made in sensing, discursive reasoning, and intuiting. 
They are all instances of knowing, not types of knowing. 1 
The remainder of this dissertation will investigate 
other important contemporary views concerning the given. 
The thought of the following thinkers will be dealt with 
in varying degrees of comprehensiveness. They are listed 
in the order of their appearance: Drake, Strong, Santayana, 
Lovejoy, Pratt, Rogers, Price, Broad, N. K. Smith, Elan-
shard, Hahn, Ayer, Wood, C. I. Lewis, Stace, Wild, Bright-
man, Werkmeister, J. s. Moore, and Williams. 
1. Aaron, NOK, 151. For a critical review of Aaron's view 
see Robinso~Art. (1932). 
I. Introduction 
CHAPT!m II 
ESSENCES AS GIVEN 
The view that essences are given is one of the identi-
fying aspects of that American uhilosouhical movement known 
as Critical Realism. A few introductory words about the 
whole movement are in order. Though there is evidence that 
the term Critical Realism was used earlier,1 it came into 
its widest most significant usage with the publication of 
2 
the ~perative volume Essays in Critical Realism in 1920, 
Durant Drake served as editor of the joint volume beginning 
his efforts in 1917. Those who worked with him were Arthur 
0, Lovejoy, James B. Pratt, Arthur K. Rogers, George Santa-
yana, Roy W. Sellars, and Charles A. Strong. From the first 
there were differences among these men, but there was ini-
tial concord in opposition to na1ve realism, nee-realism, 
and idealism. (Most of the opposition was directed against 
nee-realism as it had been presented eight years earlier in 
1. According to Victor E. Harlow, there has been no published 
statement as to the origin of the term. Sellars used it in 
1916, in a volume Critical Realism. C. M. Perry reports 
Sellars's use of the term in seminars as early as 19(1)8, in 
which year Sellars also published an article in the Journal 
of Philosophv "CPi tical Realism and the Time Problem. 11 
Though D. C. Macintosh used the term in 1913, "Sellars, it 
seems likely, first gave 1t publicity and probably created 
it." (BGSAR, 73n). For a more comnlete history of the 
term which traces its first usage to Aloia Rieh~ in 1887, 
see Edgar Henderson's unuublished doctoral thesis, Critical 
Realism: An Historical Study.(Harvard University, 1937), 
2, New York and London, Macmillan and Company. Republished 
in 1941. New York: Peter Smith. 
another co~operat1ve volume entitled the New Real1sm.) 1 
'fbere was turtber agreement 8111ong tbe Cr1 tical Realists 
tbat tbe1r study should deal exclusively w1tb tbe struc-
tural probl .. 1n epistemology, specifically, seeking tbe 
irredUcible factors 1n cognition. 
Row 1t 1s at tb1s point of defining tbe irreducible 
factors 1n cognition tbat disagreements among the Or1t1cal 
Realists may be noted. Tbe preo1se character of tbese 
variations will be noted below. 'fbe salient difference 
regards tbe centrality of tbe essence dcotr1ne 1n tbe ep1• 
stemology of Or1t1cal Realism. Four ot tbe men Santayana, 
Strong, Drake and Rogers bold that the virtual key to Crt-
tical Bealism 1s found 1n tbe concept ot essence. Tbe 
others, Sellars, Lovejor and Pratt view the concept ot es-
sence as a minor aspect of the total view and choose not to 
make use of the term. ll'rom tbe beginning the essence group 
dominated and cr1t1cs spent their time attacking essences 
and 1nqu1r1ng as to their meaning. Ralph B. Perry main-
tained 1n b1s review of Essaxs 1p Or1t1cal Realifl that 
"tbe corner stone of structure 1s the conception or 'essences' 
or 'character complexes!"2 AndXary w. Calkins 1n her care• 
tul analysts of tbe cooperative study, held tbat one of the 
1. Pllbllsbed 1n Kew York by the Macmillan Company, 1912.. Tbe 
collabOrators were: Edwin B. Holt, Walter T. Marvin, W11• 
llu :r. Montague, RalpJ:I B. Perr,., Walter B. P1tk1n, and 
Edward G. Spauld1ne;. 
2. Perry, A.rt. (1920J, 394. 
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three main characteristics of it was "the doctrine of es-
sence on which the writers base their claim to a distinc-
tive type of realism."1 Subsequent expositors and critics 
have similarly stressed the essence doctrine as the chief 
characteristic of the view.2 However, in an article in 
1927, entitled, "Wbat is the Correct Interpretation of Ori• 
tical Realism?", R. w. Sellars said: 
I have the impression that the reputation of 
two of the contributors to J:saars in QrUioal 
Rtalism baa had undue weigbt and baa directed 
attention to the doctrine of essence, a doc-
trine held in its extreme form by an actual 
minority of the contributors and4 even then, 
not central to Critical Realism.~ 
In commenting on the article written by Miss Calkins, be fur• 
ther points out that Rosera, Pratt, Lovejoy, and himself 
•never stood for the strict essence doctrine,•4 and be adds, 
"I deny that the doctrine was regarded as 
ture of Critical Bealism.•5 Nevertheless 
the central tea• 
' despite Sellars 
denials, the theory of essences as regards epistemology bas 
been directly associated with Critical Bealism and probably 
will be tor some time to come. Incidentally, Durant Drake 
in a later article admits the validity of Sellars' criticisms, 
but then goes on to say, "For·~ part, the doctrine baa 
seemed of increasing value as I have thought out its impli• 
1. Calkins, Art. (1926), 701. . 
2. For example, Lewis, MWOl 60; Blanshard, NT,I, Chapter XII. 
3. In Jour. Pbil., 24\19271, 238. 
4. Sellars, Art. (1927), ~39. 
5. Sellars, Art. (1927}, 239. 
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cations; and far from minimizing it, I should like to spon• 
sor 1t asain."1 
Tbe strong words of Sellars cited above represent the 
cleavage which took place as Critical Realism developed and 
wbicb was foreshadowed in some initial differences noted 1n 
two footnotes of Easays ip critical Realism, (on pages 4 and 
20). 
!here are at least three views on the nature of the dif• 
ferences which one finds among tbe Critical Realists. Some 
critics say that the differences are verbal, some that they 
are tactical, and others that they are quite basi~. Durant 
Drake maintained that the differences were largely verbal, 
and be is, historically, the chief defender of the view, 
though not ita moat well-known exponent. In 1928, be wrote, 
Perhaps there are actually variant forms of 
it. I incline to believe, boweTer, that the appar-
ent variations are merely so many desperate ef• 
forts to express from various angles a single 
doctrine, which seems to be extraor42Darily elu• 
sive tor even philosophers to grasp. 
A page or two later be says, "I cling to the hope that tbe 
difference between us 1s a mere misunderstanding."' Again, 
"To me, 1t appears obyious that the doctrine 1n 1ts general 
form is true."4 Five years later, interestingly enough, 
Drake affirmed that the doctrine was "a difficult theory to 
grasp."5 
1. Drake, Art. 4. Drake, Art. • 2. Drake, Art. 5. Drake, ·ITP, 
3. Drake, Art. 
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Henderson, who made a careful study of Critical Realism, 
says; "It is probably safe to say that these split-ups have 
been largely tactical."1 However, he does go on to divide 
the Critical Realists into two groups-"The Essence Wing," and 
"The Reference Wing. "2 
A cr1 tic such as A. W. Moore 1n his article "Some Logi-
cal Aspects of Critical Realism" says that there are "numer-
ous and important differences which make 1t difficult to 
reach a common doctrine." 3 And Dorward4 and Perry also sug-
gest that the differences are fundamental. The latter pro-
poses as a reason for this fact that the authors did not 
find it pose! ble to supnress their somewhat different onto-
logical views.5 
However significant or insignificant these differences 
are, they turned on the point of the relative 1mnortance 
and centrality of the essence doctrine. The exposition which 
follows will be the view represented by Santayana, Strong, 
Drake, and Rogers-"the essence men" according to Harlow.6 
Theirs was the view which brought about most controversy 
and which prompted a whole host of articles in the various 
philosophical journals. They uniformly stress, in the early 
1. Henderson, CRHS, 16. 
2. A careful study of the distinctions among these views can 
be found in Chapter IV of F. H. Parker's unpublished doc-
toral dissertation, (Harvard University, 1949). "Identity 
of Percept and Gbject in Recent American Realism." It must 
be noted that the "Essence Wing" does not necessarily pre-
clude any element of reference in the knowing situation. 
Santayana's doctrine of "animal faith" is a type of refer-
ence. 
3. In Jour. Phil., 19(1921), 589. 
4. In Mind, 30(1921), 344. 
5. Perry, Art. (1920), 408. 
6. BGSAR, 72. 
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stages of their thinking, that the concept of essence is 
the key to their view and they elabora~e on the meaning of 
essences as given. As time went on, Strong changed his 
view somewhat and said that he !'>referred to be judged by 
his Essays on the Natural Origin of Mind and by a brief ar-
ticle "Is Perception Direct, or Representative" in Mind, 1931 
rather than by his earlier works such as The Origin of 
Consciousness, o.P his essay in the cooperative volume of 
1 
1920. Rogers ceased defending the view, and Santayana, 
2 
though "not much inclined toward disputation" held to the 
view with little deviation. As Henderson puts it, he "deep-
ened and thickened the conception of essence around which 
his Critical Realism originally centered." 3 In 1923, however, 
Santayana :nade the statement that his system was "no phase 
4 
of any currant m ovem en t • " 
Durant Drake was the untiring protagonist of the view, 
answering critics and debating with them up until the time 
of his death in 1933. It cannot be said th"l t there were 
any re,al changes in his view since he first announced it in 
1920, nor was there any wa,vering in his loyalty to it up 
through the time of his last published work, 5 Invitation to 
1. This is brought out by Morris in his treatment of Strong 
in STM, 217n, which treatment Strong himself read and ap-
proved of. 2 2. Drake, Art. (1927) , 570. 
3. Henderson, CRHS, 17. 
4. In SAF, viii. 
5. D. C. Macintosh says of him, there was "not 
shifting of base, but a change in tactics." 
of Drake's MPN, ~J~ou~r!;..,L, ~P~hi:i..=l., 24 ( 1927) , 131.) 
a radical 
(In a Review 
• 
Philosophy in 1933 where the view was restated. 
Santayana was by far the most conspicuous representa-
tive of the group and it is to him that the modern use of 
the term essence is due. When first propounded, the as-
sense view "was hailed by Strong and Drake as a veritable 
gospel of philosophical salvation."1 And Strong, one time., 
went so far as to call Santayana's idea of essence "a pre• 
cious conception. "2 Strong may be cred.1 ted with first using 
the term essence in connection with perception in his Origin 
ot Consciousness.' 
Besides the co-operative volume, Esaavs in Critical Real• 
1sm, (1920), tour important books have developed the doctrine 
of essence. The first was Santayana~s Scepticism and Animal 
Faith (1923). Then came Drake's Kind and its Place in Nature 
(1925)4 , followed by Santayana's The Realm of Essence (1927), 
and b1s Realm of Matter (1930). In addition, there have. 
been an unusually large number of articles in the various 
journals dealing with the view, a bigb percentage by DUrant 
Drake. 
2. Exposition of the Central Yiew 
To pro7i~ a pattern for expaunding the central view of 
1. Macintosh, Art. (1927), 129. 
2. ECR, 224n. (Strong). 
3. See 36n in oc. 
4. In the Preface, xiii, Drake says concerning his book, 
"Mr. Strong authorizes me to say that it represents his 
present view." 
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critical realism, that eaaenoea are given, the initial chap-
ter in Esaaxa in Critieal RealiJI_may be employed. A aome• 
what different method of expoa1 t1on appears elsewhere •1 
In the opening linea of this first essay, "Tbe Approach 
to Critical Realism", Drake, the writer, maintains that both 
naive and neo•realiam are unsound and must be rejected. 
Tbe reason for this is to be found in their respective start• 
ing points. Indeed, their starting points "lead to an i~­
pasae".2 Balve realism supposes that data are physical exia• 
tents; neo•realism that the data of perception are paycholo• 
gical existents. "Beither starting point correctly describes 
wbat we bave to start with, what is 'given' (what appears, 
what is apprehended) in immediate experienoe.•3 Tbe way to 
solve the epistamic and ontological problema raised by naive 
and neo•realism is, then, to give an accurate account of the 
given or starting point for knowledge. Once "the given" is 
adequately described, some of the fundamental questions of 
the theory or knowledge approach solution. Now the given 
cannot be understood in psychological terms, as a mere des• 
cription or subjective phenomena. Rather, the view is ex• 
pressed that: 
Our data-the character complexes 'given' in 
conscious experience .. are simply character com-
1. See Hen4erson4 ORBS, 202, where Santayana's view ia taken aa furniahing an abiding pattern w1 th which we may compare 
the views of the others, for merely expository and not eval• 
uative ~poses." 
2. J:CR, 3 (Drake). 
3. J:CR, 4 (Drake). 
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plexes, essences, logical entities, which are 
irresistibly taken to be the characters1of the existents perceived or otherwise known. 
This view is defended initially in a negative fashion. First 
subjectivism or epistemic idealism is dismissed, ("casually" 
according to Calkins2 ) and, granting realism, naYve and nee-
realism are examined for their failings. Neo-realism is 
treated as a type of naive realism, and British and American 
Nee-Realists come in for the same criticisms. 3 The diffi-
culties in all these views are solved in Critical Realism 
and particularly in the view that essences are given. 
i. Subjectivism rejected and realism aPfirmed. 
The 'spectre of pure subjectivism' which might appear 
as a result of the psychological starting point is rejected 
by the Critical Realists, for there is 11 t tle probability 
that anyone considers experience in the psychological sense 
as equal to existence. Accordingly, those who believe that 
existence is "far wider than experience-that objects exist 
4 in and for themselves, apart from experiencing them" are to 
be called realists. 
But how can external objects be believed in or taken as 
real if data are character complexes? The answer is p;iven 
that belief in the external world as apart from our exper-
1. ECR, 5 (Drake). 
2. Calkins, Art. (1926), 701. 
3. Such Nee-Realists as G. E. Moore and Russell. 
4. ECR, 5 (Drake). 
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• 
ienoe ia praa-atioally justifiable. Perceivers instinc-
tively reel that the appearances are the characters or the 
real objects. "Everything is as it realism were true; and 
tbe as it ia so strong tbat we may consider our instinctive 
and actually unescapable belief justitied."1 Santayana en• 
largea on this view later in bis Scepticism and Animal Faith. 
Drake, in his Kind and ita Place in Nature, further supports 
tbe view by the statement that "realism ••• is what our bodies 
have learned ••• "2 Those who make the assumption that exia• 
tence is similar to mental states because data are so des-
cribed rail to realis. that the raot that we are abut up to 
mental existence gives us no warrant ror maintaining there is 
no otber·kind or existence.' It is further argued that 
tbougb tbe rest or existence could be understood as basically 
like our experience, it migbt not ~ experience or experi• 
enced. Rot onlJ, then, is the belief in the existence or 
physical objects close to common sense and the practical 
lite, "but it is ••• rar tbe simpiest and most sensible hypo• 
thesis to account ror the peculiarities or wbat appears."4 
1. EaR, 6 (Drake). 
2. llJ'N. 157. 
3. This is the point or Perry's well•known "egocentric pre-
dio-ent" which will be discussed In th12 d1ssertat1QD:> in 
another connection. 
4. B:CR, 7 .· (Drake) • 
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ii. Criticism of naive realiam.and neoMrealism. 
In examining naive realism, it is noted that either one 
must bold tbat the various sense•qualities exist rather pe~ 
aauently in tbe object whether or not it is perceived, or 
be must bold that "the qualities sensed by various percei~ 
•rs .6!1 there at the moment of percept1on."1 It it be held 
that sense•data are produeed b.1 the organism and proJected 
into the object upon perception, "the perceiver literally 
clothes that outer physical existent with bis sense•data, 
which thereupon, tor tbe time, really exist in the object."2 
But there is no evidence tor any such mental mecbanism.3 
It may be said tbat "tbere is perception but it is not an 
existent process"~ or possibly, "projection is merely the ~­
terring of character complexes to a certain position in 
space. n5 Ptircept1on proceeds from tbe outer object to the 
organism in a one--way fashion. If one holds that the var-
ious sense•qualities exist with relative permanence in the 
object, and that only selected qualities enter into any sin• 
gle consciousness, be runs into like problems. "We do not 
select different bits or existence to affect our several 
organ1ams; we are simply affected differently by the same 
bits of existenoe."6 !bere is no reason why I should se-
lect one datum and you another when perceiving an object. 
1. J:CR, 9, (Drake). 
2. Loc. cit. 
3. Drake obviously has in mind here tbe vi- of D. C. Mac in• 
tosh, though he does not mention him. Ct. Macintosh's POK, 
313 and 3~3. 
~. Drake, I'fP, 180. 
5 • Drake~, MPN, 1~2. 6 • ECR, 10 (Drake) • 
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'fbe difference in perception is to be explained by some ab-
normality or perversion in our respective perceptual or!an• 
isms. 
Eacb datum baa equal claims to validity ••• Tbe 
differences are differences produced primarily 
in our qrsapism by tbe same outward causes. 
But if this is true, our differing sense•data 
do not exist out there in tbe physical objects. 1 
It may be said then, that the view or naive realism in any 
sense "falsifies tbe nature or the mechanism or percept1on.• 2 
Another difficulty in naive realism is its inherent 1m• 
plication that contradictory qualities are present at the 
same point in space. Various att .. pts to justify this stand 
have been made by such thinkers as G. E. Moore, T. P. Hunn, 
E. B. Bolt, B. Russell, and E. B. McGilvary. 'fbe critical 
real1st!s criticisms may be here summarized in two points. 
(1) 'fbe telescoping or all qualities together goes against 
both CCI'IIlltllt sense and science "which view physical existents 
as having a definite shape, size, color, etc., and not as 
consisting or a chaos or mutually exclusive qualities s1mul• 
taneously occupying the same po1nta.•3 (2) Tbe view seem• 
1ngly makes error impossible. Wby is A's judgment as to the 
nature or the object truer than B'at 
A further complication or nalve realism is "the tempo-
Ril•apat1al dislocation of Appearance trom Reali ty.•4 In the 
1. EOR. 11 4. :S:CR, 1 
2. ECR, 12 
3. ECJlt, 15 
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case of stars, tor example, if tbe data we bave in percep-
tion are existents, tbey can't be identified witb thoae from 
wbicb the mesaas- came, tor tbey obviously have a different 
temporal•apatial location. 
•aive realism gives us ••• a world reduplicated 
not only by tbe infinite ditterences in quality 
wbich different obaervera see in objecta, but 
also by the temporal-spatial dislocation that 
occurs 1n a single act of perception. 
!be results of the Critical Realists' attacks on sub• 
ject1T1am and naive and neo""l"ealln, may now be summarised. 
(1) Our knowledge is not confined to our mental states; 
we can so be7ond subjective experience to existence outside 
ot it. 
(2) Sense qualities are not projected into the object, 
but are round. 
(3) !be diversity of qualities perceived by various ob-
servers is not due to the selectivity of the observer, but 
upon differences or abnormalities in the obserTers tbemselTes. 
(4) HOr ia the diversity of qualities perceived by var-
ious observers due to. the existence or contradictory quali• 
ties at the same point in apace, for qualities do not so 
exist. 
(5) !be temporal-spatial dislocation of perceived qual1• 
ties and objects is further support tor the view that quali• 
1. SaR, 16t. In this connection the view of Morris Cohen ia 
considered. Cohen seeks to answer this problem by claiming 
that qualities are relational. He notes that the relation 
is not a quality "but a truth about qualities. It could 
not ~unless there were qualities to be related "(1St.). 
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ties have no actual existence. 
(6) Three factors are always present in true perception, 
the outer physical event, the mental event, and the appearance 
1 or datum •. 
iii. Data do not exist, but are present as appearances. 
The essential point for the Critical Realists seems then 
to be that appearances, or data, do not exist in any sense 
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of the word. They are not existents. Santayana remarks that 
"the notion that the datum exists is unmeaning. "2 Something 
may be given but that does not imply its existence. But if data 
do not exist, bow may they be understood? What is their sta-
tus? The answer to this has perhaps been implied all along. 
Our data of perception are not actual portions, 
or selected aspects of the objects perceived. 
They are character-complexes (essences), irre-
sistibly taken, in the moment of perception, to 
be the characters of existing outer objects.3 
The character-complexes or essences are the vehicles by 
which the objects they apparently represent as existent are 
affirmed. The belief in the existence of the object to 
which the character-complex refers may be mistaken, but the 
essence which appears does really appear.4 The datum is the 
logical essence of the real thing. The term essence ~eans 
"the ~ divorced from the !h!i• its entire concrete nature, 
1. The three factors are dwelt upon at some length by Drake 
in MPN, Chapter I, 11 Tbe fhree Categories of Cognition. 11 
2~ Santayana, SAF, 45. 
3. Drake, ECR, 19f. 
4. Compare the method of phenomenology on this. 
1 including its sensible character, but not its existence." 
There is never a guarantee at the moment of perception that 
these essences really are the characters of any outer axis-
tent. "There is always the theoretic possibility that they 
are merely imaginary 
as a whole, is never 
or hallucinatory data •••• 'Nhat annears 
2 quite what exists." As Santayana puts 
it later, "existences then, from the point of view of knowl-
edge, are facts or events affirmed, not images seen or topics 
merely entertained."3 That which exists and that which is 
given must be diff&rentiated. "Thus givenness does not con-
fer existence on that which is given."4 Santayana's view 
apparently overlooks psyvhological existence. 
Is the Critical Realist then, manufacturing another type 
of existence for data or essences? Indeed, Santayana speaks 
of a "Realm of Essence" and devotes a whole book to that 
idea. But as Drake puts it: 
We are not giving data some queer ontological 
status. But on the contrary, the very point of 
our doctrine is that there is nothinp: whatever 
sui generis about data except the fact that they5 are data •••• One could say that data are neutral, 
It is further, incorrect to confuse essences with mental 
states.6 They are character complexes which are imagined, 
not mental states, "Essences are not active ideas, sensations 
l. ECR, 223 (Strong), 
2. ECR, 20 (Drake), l 
3, Santayana, SAF, 47. 
4. Santayana, Art.(l940),.529, 
5, Drake, Art.(l928) , 57. 
6, On this point the Critical Realists 
The differences here will be pointed 
this chapter, 
are not in agreement. 
out somewhat later in 
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or thoughts." 1 When data appear, mental states always exist, 
but the given in perception is "the essence such and such a 
physical obJect, not the essence such and such a mental 
state. "2 In cases of dreamed-of racoons, ghosts, or centaurs, 
' 
the dream-states or mental states exist, but their data "the 
appearances they yield me, are to be distinguished from the 
mental states themselves." 3 However, it must be recognized 
that essences are tied to mental states for they are imme-
diate obJects of-intuition. Even in veridical perception our 
data, as data, are simply 
character-complexes which we take to exist (except 
in cases of recognized illusion, imagination, etc.) 
but which have no existence, exceut as some of the 
traits of the physical obJects perc~ived, and some 
are traits of the perceiving state. 
An ess•nce may also be defined as "a describable somewhat."5 
If terms are employed loosely, essences could be said to have 
"mental existence," but it is more advantageous to reserve 
the term "mental states" for what does exist, namely those 
mental existents which make the appearances of essences pos-
sible. Furthermore, 1f one should say that a datum exists 
"mentally," there would be the temptation to locate it 
where it appears to be, but this leads to the difficulties 
of naYve realism noted above, (i.e., the coexistence of 
contradictory qualities at the same point in space) •6 
1. Santayana, RE, 40. 
2. ECR, 21 (Drake). 
3. ECR, 21 (Drake). 
4. ECR, 22 (Drake). 
5. Drake, Art. (1927) 2 , 573 
6. ECR, 22 (Drake). 
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iv. All data have the same status. 
Data w'bich can be imagined or dreamed to exist. 'bave 
the same status apart from the question or w'bether or not a 
datum be the essence or an actually existing object. Per-
ception involves "in a sense, imagining character-complexes 
out there in the world, together with an implicit attribuM 
tion ot ex1stenoeMW~rhich may conceivably be, and is occasion• 
ally, entirely m1staken.~1 Otten some ot the traits of the 
charaoter•complex are real, some "merely imaginary." They 
are never found there but are "imagined there" by a mind. 
They are not projected by the organism, and it not there ~ 
tore the organism was affected they do not ever get there. 
Paroept1on then, unlike imagination, occurs regardless ot 
our wishes, the messages which reach our brains partly de-
termining the nature or what we shall imagine. These "1m• 
ag1ned character-complexes (have) a vividness and tang ot 
reality which our centrally excited states or imagination 
seldom have."2 When we get accurate knowledge through per• 
ception, the actual characteristics or objects are caused 
to appear to us. The objects in themselves never enter into 
our consciousness. No one existent (such as mind) can go 
beyond itself and include another existent. We perceive 
what is there 1n the form or the character or the objects.' 
Tbe same analysis holds true for conception, memory, 
1. EOR, 2:5 (Drake). 
2. ECR, 2:5. ComR-re Berkeley's differentiation between an 
imagined "idea and a tactual "idea". 
3. EaR, 24 (Drake). 
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and 1ntrospeot1on. For axa111ple, when we remember a past 
avant, 
tbe datum that appears, tba character-com• 
plex remembered or thought ot, is not, qua 
datum, an existent, but is simply a charac-
ter-complex pow 'g1ven' ... but which ••• waa 
or is tbe actual cbaraot•r ot the object re• 
m8111berad or thought ot. 
Appearances, or what may be called data, are logical entities 
or charaoter-complexas. They are not to be viewed as another 
set ot existing beings needing a place in the world ot axis• 
tenoe. They can be viewed aa comprising all possible axis• 
tents.2 Indeed, "every term intuited or defined is an as• 
senoe."' They may be said to belong to a realm, a realm 
which is infinite and "Platonic but not sentimental."4 Tbe 
only "reality" which can be ascribed to essences is a "log!• 
cal and aesthetic charactar.•5 
v. Tba appearance ot data dependant on our mental states. 
According to Critical Realism, mental states exist and 
bava tba qualities which make our data appear. This thesis 
is proposed to solve tbe problem ot bow data can appear at 
all. Since the central and dominant group of Critical Real• 
ists do not identity essences with mental states, the means 
ot their appearance must be disclosed. "It is, certainly, 
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only it they influence a brain that outer objects causa tba 
appearance ot their characteristics as our data."6 Tbe maoba~-
1. EaR, 25 (Drake). 
3 • . Santayana, Rl, 3. 
5. EaR, 182, (Santayana). 
2 • Santayana, SJll' , 77. 
4. Santayana, SAP', 11. 
6. EaR, 25 \Drake). 
nlsm whereby this occurs is manifestly an involved one, and, 
indeed, an obscure one, for the characteristics or brain• 
states differ from the characteristics or data. Perhaps, 
the exposition continues, tbe brain "is a good deal more 
than we commonly think it to be" or perhaps there is "a 
series of mental states, those existents which can be intro• 
spected, in addition to the brain."1 
vi. Data may be identical but mental states are separate. 
Aa essence or a logical entity which comprises the datum 
or one person in perception may be the same essence as that 
given to another person and "even the very essence, or char-
acter, of the existing object perceived or conceived by ••• 
botb.•2 But bow does a "given" essence differ from an essence 
which is not given? On this Nee-Realism is hazy. But the 
Critical Realist bas an answer. 
'l'be essence could not be given to either ••• 
(person) ••• unless each had•ental states which 
are existents aDd therefore d1ffeFent exis• 
tents ••• ~ existing mental l1f, is never iden• 
tical, our minds never overlap. . 
In order that the datum of person A and the datum of person 
B may be, for example, the identical shade or color, there 
must be a similarity or mental states, but there are two 
cases of existence each having a different locus. Epistemic 
monisa 1s unaccep~ble for 1t contradicts the uniqueness of 
1. EOR, 26 
2. EOR, 27 
3· ECR, 27, 
(Drake). 
(Drake). 
(Drake). 
= 
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individual states. 
We must make room in our picture of the 
universe for the separate mental states of 
all conscious beings in it, each group1of mental states forming a separate mind. 
If mental states, then, do exist and indeed are signi-
ficant in the perceiving situation one might conclude that 
data are then the qualities of these mental states. If this 
be so, a form of idealism seems to be suggested. But it 
"is not an accurate statement of the f'acts" 2 to say that data 
are qualities of' mental states. Mental states do not acquire 
the shape of physical objects seen. Nor do essences acquire 
shape. In the case of a moving wheel, the qual! ties of' the 
mental state by means of' which the essence is given are 
an elongated oval shape of' greyish color, 
vaguely revived tactile sansations, sensa-
tions of eyeball movements, convergence and 
accomodation of eyes, together with all sorts 
of slightly aroused mental elements .3 
It is the function of the mental state which serves as the 
implied affirmation of physical existence, not the relation 
of the essence to the mental state •••• It can be said that a 
certain datum has been "given" or has "appeared" when a com-
plex mental state exists as well as a readiness of the or-
ganism to act in a certain way. "This is all there is to 
'givenness.'"4 The characters 
l. ECR, 28 (Drake). 
2. ECR, 29 (Drake). 
which go to make up the datum 
3. ECR, 29 (Drake). 
4. ECR, 30 (Drake). 
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depend more on the associations involved than upon the act• 
ual characters or the mentallltate. This is perhaps sug-
gested by Santayana when be says. "ot course the choice and 
the interest of essences come entirely from the bent or the 
1 "1 animal that elicits the vision of them from his own sou ••• 
Regarding the characteristics or one's own mental 
etates ae known by introspection. it is pointed out that the 
epistemic situation is dualistic. There is no simultaneous 
apprehension of the character-complex "thing" and the oharac• 
ter-oomplex "mental state." 
All cognitive experiences have this tantal-
izing peculiarity. that they are 'knowledge' 
or. not possession of the existent known 
(if it ie an existentS; their validity must be 
tested by o~ber means than the intuition of 
the moment. 
The Critical Realist is thus careful to preserve the 
uniqueness and privacy of individual mental states, and 
carries his epistemic dualism to the mental states of a given 
perceiver. The stress on privacy is one of the character-
istics of the datum self theory.3 The Critical Realist's view 
that data may be identical follows in part from the proposi• 
tion that essences do not have existential status. If they 
had the particularity of existential mental states they 
could not be identical, 
1. San .. tayana 1 SAP. 75. 2. BOR. 32 ~Drake). 
3. See Chapter V1 of this dissertation. 
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3. Variations in tbe Essence View. 
Tbougb there was enougb asreement among tbe collabora~ 
tors of Essays in Critical Real1am, to establish a platform 
for further tbougbt, variations in tbe leading ideas were 
early apparent. Despite Drake's persistent hope and belief 
that the differences among the seven were only misunderstand~ 
ings, 1 differences there were. As Critical Realism became 
more widely known and as its original proponents began to 
think out the implications of their views, the differences 
became sharper and more crystallized. As Harlow, writing 
ten years after the publication of Essays in Critical Real~ 
ism, put ita 
Tbe group bas completely lost solidarity; 
they are divided not only upon the doctrine 
of essences, or the nature of data, but also 
upon the monistic or dualistic nature or 
knowledge. It is probably an accurate state-
ment tbat at present Santayana, Drake, Lovejoy, and 
and Sellars. represent four distinct types of 
theory. And some observers believe that ••• 
the doctrine of essence iJ about to be re~ 
nounoed by its advocates. 
Indeed, this is not the place to consider all the refine~ 
menta and variations in Critical Realism,3 but the varia~ 
tiona concerning the idea or the given will be dealt with. 
Two main types may be noted. Tbe first concerns differing 
1. See tbe introductory material in this chapter. 
2. Harlow, BGSAR, 102. 
3. It should be noted here that the British volume Qritioal 
Realism by George Dawes Hicks represents a view quite in• 
dependent of the American Critical Rea~ism here studied, 
It is surprising that British tbougbt rarely worked over 
the American doctrines of this period. 
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emphaaes on the nature and definition of the datum; the 
second, differing views on the locus of the datum, or ita 
ontological status. 
i. Differing emphaaes on the nature and definition of the 
datum. 
The "maJority view" on the nature of the given has been 
expounded in the initial part of this chapter. At the time 
of the writing ot lasara ip Critical Realism, Drake, Santa-
yana, Strong, and Rogers agreed that the essence doctrine 
was basic and that essences were not parts or characteris• 
tics of mental states. How in the early development of the 
doctrine, there were variations as to the precise nature 
or the given essences. As time went on particular thinkers 
developed their special facet or the definitional problem. 
Among those who held to "the majority view", two emphases 
in defining essences can be noted, the first, that essences 
are "characters", or 11 character-o~mplexes",1 the second that 
essences have logical or aesthetic status only.2 A subor• 
dinate view that essences are to be viewed as "meanings" 3 
will be reviewed in another connection. Joad.wrote an arti-
cla as early as 1922, attempting to show that the views of 
essences as "oharacter-eomplexes" and as "logical entities" 
were incompatible. Be aaid, "t am going to indicate why 
1. ICR, 5, 19, 22, 26, 30 (Drake). 
2. EOR, 168n, 180, 1~2. (Santayana}. Ct. ECR, 223 (Strong). 
3. ECR, 237! (Strong). Ct. ECR, 92 (Pratt), Pratt-was not 
a member of the majority group, however. 
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it' a impossible tor a thinker who agrees w1 th Dl-ake- to sub-
scribe to the doctrine or Santayana and vice versa."1 
a. Essences viewed as character-complexes. 
Tbis definitional emphasis 1n the theory which main• 
tains that essences are given was supported vigorously by 
Drake, (who held, in spite or Joad's cr1t1c1sms, that his 
v1sw ~compatible with Santayana's). It is concerned pri-
marily with the problem or perception and the organic, func-
tional response 1n the knowing process. Essences or •char• 
acter•complexes" are given in a knowing situation as a re• 
sult or the action or an object on mental states. No con• 
cern 1s expressed here tor their eteraality or the infinity 
st tbeir .uabsr. Tbey are the product or tbe response or 
a perceiving organism to its environment. And the response 
is etten automatic. "Tbe process or perception occurs whe• 
ther we wish or no, it our sense organs are acting."2 On 
tbis interpretation, then, data are not 
indisputable elements or existence ••• On the 
contrary, their appearance is the result or 
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a eomplicated organic process, and their vert• 
dic1ty a matter or varying degree. Far the 3 greater nllllber or our data are perceptual data. 
Furthermore, this organic process involves a type or pro• 
jection, but 1t 1s not a mechanical one. Drake notes, "Pro• 
jeot1on is merely the referring ot character-complexes to a 
1. Joad, Art. (1922), 520. 
2. Drake, MPif, 31. 
3. Drake, MFR, 144. 
certain position in space; it is a process ot imputation, 
based upon motor tendencies. "1 This idea that the gi't'en, 
or essences, or character-complexes.are imputations is 
carried further wben Drake adds that data "are Just imputa-
tions. !bey are what the bo~ is taking into account, when 
such and such mental states exist."2 
b. Zssences viewed as logical entities. 
Somewhat at variance with this view which stresses 
the organi.sm' s function 1D knowiJlg and maintains that es-
sences are best understood as character-complexes imputed 
to obJects, is the view supported chiefly by Santayana,3 
that the given essence.s are logical entities. Like the view 
Just stated, it is here held that the logical entities are 
immediately given and serve as the means or vehicles tor ac-
quiring knowledge. 
Like the "character-complex" Tiew, the essences or 
logical entities have no mental or physical existence but 
1. Di=ue, MPi, 142. (or. Chapters XI and XII in MPtN. 
2 • Drake, MPI' , 16lt. 
3. 0~ A. Strong was a Tigorous supporter ot this view in its 
earlier period. His Origin ot Consciousness (1918) was a 
fountain tor Drake and there was the closest harmony of 
ideas in Drake, Strong and Santay~a, at least up until 
1925 and the publication ot Drake s MPH. In 1926, in a 
two-part article in !1R! entitled "!be Oenesis or Sensible 
Appearances", Strong meTed away from the "logical ent1 ty" 
theory and be~ to deTSlop a Tiew that the giTen consists 
ot "phantasms." This was further clarified in his Zssays 
OR the Batural Origin or Mind in 1930.. (This work included 
the two-part essay in I1U cited aboTS). In his A Cr'ed tor 
Sceptics in 1937, Strong definitely rejects Santayan&:a 
view and deTSlopa his theory along panpaychiatic linea. · 
For a tull treatment ot the change in Strong's thought, con• 
sult Charles 'If. Morris' S'l'M, 216n and 217•233. 
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haTe "only logical being~•1 But where the former Tiew is 
concerned primarily with the problem of perceptual knowledse, 
this one regards the term essence as inclusiTe of all kinds 
of knowledge. Tbe essences of the "logical entity" Tiew 
are understood as members of a realm2 and this realm becomes 
then •a name for the inexhaustible fund of possible charac-
ters~•' Again, the rtew's chief proponent says, "To the 
apbere of essence• I tranapose the familiar pictures painted 
by the sense, or by traditional aoience and religion.•4 Fur-
thermore the realm of eaaeaoea is infinite "lying out there 
waiting to become the content of our experience ••• "5 It 
forma an "indelible background to all tranaitory facta.•6 
This may be one reason wb7 Lamprecht says Santayana is not 
an empiricist.7 
Kow these essences are construed as eternal and as uni-
Teraala. Santayana speaks of "the eternal self•identity of 
eTery easence•8 and maintains that each essence is, b7 being 
iclent1cal and ind1Tidual, also uniTersal.9 Tbey may recur 
any number of times •10 But though essences are to be under-
stood as uniTersals, they are not abstractions, for the im-
1. Santarana, RJ:, Tiii. 
2. Tbe title of one of Santarana's books 1s fbe Realm of Be• 
•!!ll•· 3o OOr7, Art. (1940), 101. 
4. Santayana ill Adams and Montague, CAP, II, 254. 
5o Joad, Art. (1922), 527. 
6. Santa7ana, RJ:, 21. 
7. Lamprecht, Art. (1940), 121. 
8. Santarana, Art •. (1940), 525• 
9. Santayana, RJ:, 18. 
ID. Santayana, Art. (1940), 527. 
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1 
material is not abstracted from the material. Essences 
are the direct data, and the only possible da t.a, of sensa-
tion and thought. They can not be abstractions from objects 
for the objects are believed-in objects inferred by animal 
faith from the presence of essences. Santayana adds "the 
ideas (images) that he [Berkeley) recognized, and the notions 
(concepts) that be was obliged to admit, were precisely my 
2 
essences." The "character-complex" view, which Drake sup-
ported is not clearly favorable to this idea of subsisting 
logical universals. For Drake, as will be seen later, es-
sences are universals only in the sense of repeatability. 
It is not difficult to see how this realm of eternal 
logical universals or essences could be linked up with Pla-
tonic thought. Indeed, Russell maintains that Santayana 
"remained a Platonizing Scholastic." 3 Harlow, without much 
justification, quickly compares the views of all the essence 
men to Platonism.4 Montague speaks of "Santayana's extension 
of the meaning of Platonic ideas."5 And indeed Santayana 
himself said, "I might almost say that my theory is a variant 
of 7latonism, designed to render Platonic logic and morals 
6 
consistent with the facts of nature." In another place he 
acknowledges the help of G. E. Moore and Russell who helped 
"to grind fine and filter Platonic Ideas into my realm of 
essence."7 But by no means can the realm of essence, 'of 
5. Montague, Art. (1938), 576. 
6. Santayana, RE, 155. 
7. Santayana, Art. (1940), 587. 
1. Santayana, RE, 32. 
2. Santayana, Art. (1940), 534. 
3. Russell, Art. (1940), 454. 
4. Harlow, BGSAR, 72n. 
logical entities, be thoroughly identified with the Platonic 
doctrine.1 Santayana draws this distinction carefully. Ea-
sences have no ontological status but they do have a logical 
status. In a word, they subsist. 2 On this point, the appar-
ent difference between the view of Drake and Santayana seems 
to be leesened. Drake has written: 
It is important to remember that the realm 
of essences is not quasi-existent. , There is 
no mysterious heaven where Plato's ideas' have 
their abode. These ideas, essences, characters, 
logical entities, are merely possibilities of 
existence, and possibilities of d1scourse ••• 3 
ii. Differing views on the locus of the datum. 
The question as to the status of the datum is of far 
more consequence here than the previous question as to its 
definition. There was disagreement from the very beginning 
on this problem among the Critical Realists, and it is pointed 
out by Drake in two footnotes in the first essay in Essays 
in Critical Realism. The essential difference is found at 
the point of the ontological status of the datum. Is it a 
psychological existent, or is it a subsistent possibility 
with no real existence? The minority group takes the first 
view, the majority, the second. Since the general exposition 
of the essence view dealt with the majority position-that 
of Santayana, Drake and Strong, the minority view will here 
1. Joad has perhaps stressed unduly the Platonic strain.in: 
Santayana, in Art. (1922), 525. Plato's Ideas have norma-
tivestructure. Santalana's do not. · 
2. Cf. Santayana, Art. ll940), 527f. 
3. Drake, MPN, 198. 
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be presented.. 
According to w. T. Btace, wr1t1ng about the problem 
1n a somewhat different connection; 
!be question whether the presentation 1s 
'mental' or 'non~ental' ••• 1s itself mean• 
1ngleas, and. the d1apute wh1ch 1a supposed. 
to center around. 1t 1s a mere quarrel over 
words. 
But the problem cannot be so quickly annulled. It 1s true, 
as Btace later says, that the term mental 1a unclear, but 
examination will reveal that the proponents of the v1ew 
that data are ps7cho~og!cal or mental existents define their 
terms carefully. 
Sellars and LoveJoy are the central defenders of th1s 
minority view resard1ng the essence. Indeed, Sellars be• 
comes so strong 1n b1s cr1t1c1ams of the central v1ew that 
be prefers to &TOld the term essence.2 The basic d1fferenoe 
1s stated 1n one of the footnotes 1n the 1n1t1al essay of 
Sssaxs 1D Qr1t1qal Realism. All of the critical realists 
agree that existence 1s not given, but the minority holds 
that what 1s given 1s tbe character of the mental existent 
of tbe moment.3 !be datum 1s a name for traits that have 
actual, literal, psychological existence. Or as 1s stated 
1n another source, "the actual content of intuited obJects 
turns out to be subJeot1ve."4 
1. Btaoe, TIC£, 74. 
2. At one spot be s~7s "I ~ 1nol1ned to f1gbt sh7 
term essence"--Art. (1922~, 39. 
3. ECR, 2Qn. (:Qrak.•). 4. Sellars, D, 32. 
of the 
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Blansbard sharpens the contrast round in the two facets 
of Critical Realism when he says: 
The theory is this, that what is presented to 
thought is not a timeless and independent uni-
versal, but a transient bit or mental content.l 
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Sellars himself makes the striking statement, "The critical 
realist agrees with the idealist that the content is mental. •• 2 
Later he wrote, "the existential locus of these characters 
and meanings is the psycho-physical orsanism." 3 In one place 
he calls his view apprehensional realism. Non-mental entities 
are literally given in what may be called the field of con-
aciou~ness.4 There are obvious inconsistencies here. 
The argument most often employed by the proponents of 
the view that data are not logical entities but psychological 
existents is the argument from empirical observation. It was 
Sellars's opinion that the doctrine of essence of Santa-
yana and Strong bad "very much complicated the s.i tuation. n5 
Asain, it is 
principle of 
said, "the doctrine seems a sin asainst the 
6 parsimony." The empirical appeal is further 
shown when Sellars elsewhere maintains that the facts of 
science indicate the datum is subjective or bound up with 
the percipient organism. 7 "Both sensation and the total 
process or experiencing which contains it are natural 
1. Blanshard, NT, I, 426. 
2. ECR (Sellars) 212. 
3. Sellars, Art. (1927), 240. 
4.·Sellara, PPP, 150. 
5. Sellars, Art. (1924), 383• 
6. Sellars, Art. (1924) 1 383. 7. Sellars, Art. (1922) , 32. 
isolates within the brain actiT1ty."1 The "projection" 
11eohanism implied by Drake is similarly unempirioal, par• 
ticularly tor the critic who maintained, "I have wanted to 
keep as near to naive realism as the taots would let me."2 
'l'o construe essenoes or data as universals is similarly 
unempirical tor a universal is "a product ot abstraction, 
comparison, and symbolization."' 
That data are seemingly mental and not logical is the 
view supported ably by Lovejoy4 in his brilliant crarus Lec• 
tures. In sense perception 
there are, in short, changes in certain pby .. 
sioal structures which generate existents that 
are not physical in the sense in which those 
structures are; and t.hese noll-physical part1 .. 
culars are indispensable means to any know-
ledge ot pbJsioal realities. Repellent as 
this conception still is to many scientitic men, 
there is no conclusion or empirical science about 5 the physical world ••• whioh is better established ••• 
ot oourse, those who preached the doctrine ot essenoe 
could not accept the minority view here stated. Drake tried 
to show that it would probably be impossible to investigate 
the content ot mental states. tt is doubtful it one can 
"ever introspect his mental states at the moment ot per• 
ceiving outer objects, because the perceptive tunotion and 
introspective tunotion are incompatible, inhibiting each 
63 
1. Sellars, Art. 5 
2. Sellars, Art. 1924 
3. Sellars, Art. (1926 , 258. 
4. For a turtber elaboration or Lovejoy's views and their con-
trast with Sellars~, see Morris S'l'M, 215, 246tt. 
5o Lovejoy, RAD, 319. 0?. Drake MPH, 179ft tor a criticism 
ot this view. 
other.•1 Henderson makes this comment on the minority viewa 
In their effort to reduce the datum to the 
status of merely psychological existence, they 
have really been trying to save only our 
klehp1sse, which Santa;rana' s2d1otum never touched, much less destroyed. 
Other critics have maintained that the minority view, in 
stressing the data aa mental contents ia close to pure 
repreaentationism auch as is found in Reid, Hamilton, or 
Looke.3 Representationism ia the chief tear ot the major• 
it;r group and to be avoided at all costs, but Sellars pre-
fers tbe riak of representationiam to manufactured log1cal 
entities and seeks for a "representationism of the right 
sort.•4 He maintains that 6ritical ~ealism is "essentially 
a reconstruotion of representationism wbioh does justice 
both to the reference and the mechanism of the knowledge 
olaim."5 
It would seem that some form of representationism is in-
deed implied on this minority view of Critical Realists for it 
is a clear epistemic dualism. The chief question for any 
representationism is the test emuloyed in the gaining of veri-
dical knowledge. The knowledge claim refers to something 
other than itself, but the question of how the "other" may 
be verified needs a careful answer. 
1. Drake, MPI, 69. 
2. Henderson, CBBS, 215. 
3. Harlow, BGS.AR, 72n. 
4. Sellars, Art. (1924), 386. 
5. Ibid. 
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4 •. Certain Implications of the Essence Poctrine. 
This section wfll.'d,al with some obvious implications 
of the theory that essences are given, as those implications, 
unuttered or expressed, are found in the writings of the 
proponents of the view. Further implications of the view 
will be discussed in the section on criticism, for many of 
the criticisms attack the less obvious implications and in-
deed go so far as to deny the validity of the theory because 
of its alleged unsound implications. Three areas will be 
dealt with, (1) the theory of knowledge, (1i) ontology, 
(iii) the theory of mind. 
i. Implications for the theory of knowledge. 
The view that the given consists of essences and that 
essences are not existents of course means that existents 
are never given. Knowledge of the external world is medi-
ated not immediate. Essences, ('character-complexes" or 
logical entities) are the vehicles of knowledge, the means 
by which knowledge becomes possible. This 1i clear epistemic 
dualism. As Henderson puts it, after noting that essences 
are not existents; "This being so, the notion of essence be-
comes a strategic conception for dualistic epistemology." 1 
Sellars and Lovejoy were the clearest voices in seeing this 
implication of epistemic dualism, though it is present in 
Santayana, Strong and Drake. Lovejoy's significant book, 
1. Henderson, ORHS, 212. 
65 
fbe Revolt Against Dualism, considers the arguments of epi-
stemic monism, answers them and argues for dualism. 
A dualistic epistemology based on the idea of mediating 
factors in knowledge, accounts for the possibility of per-
ceptual error. Indeed, the essence view was developed to 
solve that very problem which was the weak point of both 
naive realism and neo-realism. "Knowledge is a beholding 
of the what of the nature of objects."1 It never is direct 
and consequently, never certain. The Neo-realistic epistemic 
monism grants certainty but cannot distinguish truth from 
error; the critical realistic epistemic dualism accounts for 
the possibility of error but cannot give·· certainty. And on 
this point Drake makes an interesting confession. 
The idealists have been on the track of a truth 
which most realists fail to grasp, viz., that rea-
lism (in the accepted sense of the term) is a hypo-
thesis, not a certainty, in the sense in which the 
appearance of our data is a certainty, or in which 
logical and mathematical truth is cert~in. Con-
sciousness is a perceptual assumption. 
But if certainty about the objects of knowledge cannot be 
had, bow is veridical knowledge possible? The essence doc-
trine definitely implies this question. And, as will be 
shown later, this is one of the points of attack on the 
whole view. If as Drake says, "there is no way in which 
our own conscious life could get out and include events or 
1. Drake, Art. (1920), 179. 
2. Drake, MPN, 179. An idealist such as Brightman, for ex-
ample, distinguishes between 11 si tuations experienced" and 
"situat!ions believed-in." Sllte Chapter V, Section 2, iv 
of this dissertation. 
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existents outside or us,"1 bow can we know anything? An 
answer is suggested by Santayana in the title or his book, 
Scepticism and !nimal Faith, but more especially in this 
quotation: 
Knowledge accordingly is belie!; belie! in a 
world or events ••• Tbis belie! is native to 
animals and precedes all deliberate use or i~­
tuitiona as signa or descriptions or things. 
Veridical knowledge is a matter or animal raitb, not rational 
inference. There is no causal connection between data and 
obJects believed in. As ~ake says: 
The olass or data or consoiousness is one 
class or essences, the class or existents is 
another. In cases or ve~idical cognition, 
these two classes overlapo-' 
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4 But this overlapping is little more than a chance possibility. 
LoveJoy too, talks or knowing by !aith5 but stresses a spon-
taneous propensity rather than a chance possibility. One or 
the !unctions or an organism is "a propensity or the organ• 
ism to think some or the characters or the immediately given 
as actually or potentially belonging to external situations 
in that- order."6 Sellars gives what might be called a prag-
1. ~ake, ITP, 178. 
2. Santayana, SAP, 179. 
3. ~ake Art. (1925), 323. 
4. Joad in Art. (1922), 526, brings this out. "The datum 
is a mental construction which when we are lucky is identi• 
cal with the characteristics or the so-called obJect." 
5. Lovejoy, RAD, 318. 
6. Lovejoy, RAD, )19. 
matic test f'or veridical knowledge. When one's behavior is 
guided successfUlly by "claimed knowledge through contents ••• 
it is bard to understand why there would be this successfUl 
guidance if the contents did not give knowledge. "1 
ii. Implications for ontology. 
One or the supposed strongest planks in the platform 
or the realists who collaborated in Essays in Critical Real• 
ism was that the view therein presented according to the 
PPef'ace was to have no particular ontological connections. 
This was an ideal which was sacrificed within the first ten 
pages or tbe first essay.2 And as the thought or the ori-
ginal seven developed, the ontological implications were 
clarified though there were striking differences among them 
ranging f'rom Santayana's avowed materialism to Strong's 
panpsychism. All agreed that ontological idealism was not 
an implication or the view and that it could be discounted. 
But Drake went so far as to allow it as a bare possibility 
when be said, "But even 1f' i~alism 1! true, I do not see 
why our doctrine of' essence is invalidated."' And earlier; 
The belief in the identity or datum or con• 
soiousness and independent existent is. for 
all realists, strictly spe-ting, an hypothesis, 
not an unquestionable fact. 
1. S•llars, Art. (1924). 387. 
2. In EOR, 5. Drake speaks or belief 1n the physical world as 
"prae-atically )ustif'iable" and ,n page six says, "Every-
thing is as if realism were true; and the as if' is so 
strong that we may consider our instinctive and actually 
inescapable belief'_~ustif'ied." 
3. Drake, Art. (19281, 59. 4. Drake, Art. (1925), 325. 
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In general, it may be said that the proposed existential 
status of the essences had much to do with ontology. If es-
sences or data were endowed with mental existence, Drake and 
Santayana saw idealism coming in. They agreed that conscious-
ness does not confer existence upon its objects, and that 
the fact of being given to consciousness gives no ontologi-
cal clue. If they were understood as physical existents, 
nee-realistic panobjectivism seemed the logical implication. 
A partial answer to the ontological problem is sugqested by 
Drake who in seeking to define the meaning of existence said: 
My own conclusion is that to exist is to be 
the whole or part of the one universal sub-
stance; this substance may be called "psychic" 
in view of the fact that it is the very sub-
stance of you and me ••• and may be called "phy-
sical" because it is the substance of which phy-
sical bodies are composed •••• It implies realism, 
ontological monism, determinism, and what some 
people call panpsychism, others1rnaterialism, and everybody, perhaps, naturalism. 
This almost seems to be a type of psycho-physical dualism, or 
at least a double-aspect ontology. 2 Lovejoy's view is taken 
' 
as psycho-physical dualism, though there is some doubt about 
the charge. Incidentally, the problem of the relation be-
tween epistemic dualism and such proposed metaphysical dualism 
bas been explored by Sellars with the conclusion that there is 
no logically necessary connection.3 
1. Drake, Art. (1928)I, 62:('. 
2. As set forth in RAD. 
3. See Sellars, "Epistemological Dualism vs. Metaphysical 
Dualism" in PR, 30(1921), 482-493. 
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Santayana defended a materialist ontology on the basis 
ot his epistemic theory but there is some question whether 
his near-Platonism in regard to essences is compatible with 
such an ontology. Strong, who took another turn in ontology--
towards panpsychism,1 suggested resard1ng the implications 
ot Santayana's essences, that: 
the point goes pretty deep; in ita ultimate 
consequences it makes all the difference be-
tween a naturalistic and a (so to apeak) an• 
tbropomorphic outcome; between the view that 
universals are prior to particulars in ~be 
nature of thinga and the contrary view. 
The relation between epistemological theory and metaphysics 
in critical realism has been ably suggested by Sellars. And 
it is his interpretation of the ~pistemic-ontolog1cal pro• 
blem which is most generally accepted by those holding to 
the essence view. 
Knowing is, in short, a specific kind or 
event wbiob can't be reduced to a eompreaence 
of organism and obJect but rests upon abili• 
ties and developed contents. When an obJect 
is cognitionally given, or known, it is not 
existentiallY given, i.e., does not enter con-
sciouaness.Y 
This implies realism of some sort by virtue of its implicit 
1. See his A Cieed tor Sceptics (1937), for this view. Mon• 
tague said, This book will stand as a model for all who 
believe that reality is dust and that that dust is essen• 
tially mental." Art. (1938), 580. For a discussion of 
Strong's view in some detail, see Morris, Six Theories of 
~. (1932), 217•230. 
2. Strong, Art. (1940) 1 447. 3. Sellars, Art. (1926J, 257. 
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denial of idealism. Knowing does not bestow on existence 
any ontological traits. The mediating eseences, those neu-
tral somewhats (for the ~ajority) guarantee that. 
iii. Implications for the theory of 'llind. 
The implications of the essence doctrine for the theory 
of mind is significantly dependent on the meaning and place 
given to essences. The leading and best known proponent of 
essences, Santayana, has written very little specifically on 
the problem of mind, 1 as su.ch, thoue;h there are certain 1m-
plications regarding it throughout his view, Various state-
ments appear from time to time giving his view of 'llind. In 
general, it may be said that the problem is not a basic one 
for Santayana and. indeed, that there is no unique entity 
which can be called mind. If pressed, Santayana would pro-
bably maintain that the term mind is a way of understanding 
a function of matter. Eliseo Vivas identifies his view as 
epiphenomenalism.2 In the Preface to the Realm of Spirit, 
for instance, in which he prefers to use the term "spirit" 
to the term mind because of the confusion attachinf to the 
latter, he says: 
What I call spirit is only that inner light 
of actuality or at tent! on which fl.oods all 
1. Of. Part I of Little Essays. New York: Charles Scribner's 
Sons, 1920. According to the bibliographical index pre-
pared by Shohig Terzian in Schilpp, PGS, 609-678, there 
are no other writings which deal with mind specifically. 
2. See Vivas, Art. (1940), 317. 
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life as men actually live it on earth •••• 
Llving mind ••• ia • moral atreaa of vary• 
ing acope and intenaity, full of will and 
selectiveness, arising in animal bodies, and 
raising their priyate Tioisaitudes into a 
moral experience. 
In his Realm of Matter, Santayana'• materialistic interpre-
tation is evident. 
Mind-stuff is ••• simply an indirect name :tor 
matter given in deference to an idealistic 
biaa surviving the wreck of idealism; and 
nothing but a confusing attachment to a 
paycholog1cal2vocabulary could counsel ita frequent use. 
Elsewhere be has said, "I am constrained to register as a 
brute :tact tbe emergence of consciousness in animal bodies."' 
In dealing with the mind's relation to essences, Santayana 
is :round saying. 
ror a materialist tbe mind will be aim-
ply sensibility in bodies; things that 
ltimulate that sensibility will be the 
inevitable objects of pursuit, attention, 
and passion ••• (he feelings aroused in 
tbe organism] ••• will transcribe only the 
effects o:t thOse things on the organism • 
••• Mind, :tor a materialist, will there-
fore 1eem necessar41y poetical, and data 
:tiot1ona o:t sense. 
The reductionism of Santayana is not adopted by his 
otherwise close :tolloweri'Drake. Rather tban giving an 
epipbenomenallst interpretation o:t mind, be proposes a 
1. In RB, 550. 
2. In RB, ,SO. 
3. Santayana, in, Adami and Montague, OAP,II, 253. 
4. Santayana, Art. (1940), 529. 
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double-aspect theory. The mind is identified with the brain 
on this view and is conceived as basically spatial.1 Yet 
it can be d1stinsuiahed from other parts of the body because 
of its f~ction in perception. He says; 
In using the term 'mind', we are conceiv-
ing ••• cerebral events as they are on the 
inside, so to speak; i.e., we are thinking 
or their substance. When we use the term 
'brain' we are looking at tbem from the 
outside, through our sense-organa, that is, 
we are exteriorizing our own mental states 2 and thinking of the brain in terms of them. 
Some of the further ramifications of this view, together 
with criticisms are brought out by c. W. Morris in his 
able book, Six 'l'heories of Mind. 3 
'l'he view or Strong is quite similar to Drake's, though 
a panpaychistic interpretation is to be found. 4 Sellars, 
who disagrees with Strong, as well as with Drake and San-
tayana on the status of essences, apparently holds a view 
similar to Strong's and Drake's. In an article, "Is Con-
sciousness Ptiysical?", Sellars puts his case thus: 
I bold consciousness to be physical in the 
sense that it is an internal character of 
the functioning brain, though it is not a 
complete physical thing to be known5exter-nally by the sense-data it arouses. 
Yet in a more recent work, he is more aware of the problem 
1. Bee Drake, Art. (~26F, 233r. 
2. Drake, Art. (1926~, 235. 
3. Bee pages 237-246. 
4. For a discussion of thi~ see Morris STM, 217-220. 
5. In Jour• Pbil., 19(1922r. 693. 
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of' the nature of' the given when be brings out that it was a 
rejection of' sense data as particulars "that enabled Strong 
and Drake to defend mind-stuf'f'ism."1 He speaks here of' mind 
or consciousness as "an event and not a thing or stuf'f'; and 
it is an event adjectival to the brain." 2 This view moves 
away f'rom the double-aspect theory and also from Santayana's 
ultimate materialism and suggests that consciousness, 
though not an entity in itself' is an achievement of the pby-
sical system. Consciousness is "not an independent event 
but a feature or a physical event."3 This may perhaps be 
called an emergent theory of' mind.4 
5. Criticisms of' Essences as Giyen. 
The pivotal significance of the essence doctrine as 
presented in Essars in Critical Realism is indicated by 
the numerous criticisms of that doctrine which followed. 
The literature of' criticism and counter-criticism is abun-
dant. The numbered points which follow aim at summing up 
and interpreting most or the criticisms which have appeared 
in print. !bey refer primarily to the eo•called majority 
view among Critical Realists. Various attempts to answer 
these charges have been made and these will be suggested in 
1. Sellars, PPR, 408. 
2. Ibid. 
3. Sellars, PPR, 424. 
4. That this is the case is well brought out by A. W. Munk 
in an unpublished doctoral dissertation, Ror Wood Sell&rt~ 
Criticisms of' Idealism, (Boston University, 1945) Obaptera 
I .and VU. 
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the footnotes. 
i. Alleged historical connections. 
As soon as tbe view that the given could be understood 
as consisting of essences was put into systematic form,· 
it provoked a number of charges wbicb denied any uniqueness 
or originality to tbe view. For several of tbe critics, the 
essence doctrine was essentially a restatement or time worn 
problems, and the implication was that it could hence be 
disposed of since certain of tbe older theories bad long 
since been abandoned after due criticism. This is especially 
the point of view or Harlow, wbo.saya: 
The position as a whole bas gradually been 
recognized as lacking in true originality. 
The essence doctrine ••• is considered a re-
formation of Aristotle's doctrine of essence, 
and tbe whole system bas finally been identi-
fied as a representatlonism which is reminl-
scent of Locke, and eyen approaches the pure 
idealism of Berkeley •. 
But this summary dismissal is not so easily effected. It 
1• possible to note all aorta of historical relations in a 
view, but this does not affect ita validity. At least nine 
~rying historical allegations have been made concerning 
tbe essence doctrine. (1) Cory calls it a "modern refine-
ment of the Platonic doctrine of Ideas."2 (2) Noll re-
lates the essence doctrine "to the solution given by the old 
1. In BGSAR, 101. 
2. Cory, Art. (1940), 101 • 
• 
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acholastics."1 (3) Dorward maintains that it is "nearer 
to the common sense view" than representationism.2 (4) 
Gr•B&rr relates it definitely to Reid's theory.3 (5) Sev• 
eral critics make the charge that it is essentially the re-
presentationism or John Locke.~ (6) English claims that 
Drake's view "is Berkeley."5 Lamprecht too makes.the charge 
of subjectivism.6 (7) Bode suggests that "the data of Cri• 
tical Realism can easily be induced to take the place ac-
corded to objects in pragmatic philosopby."7 (8) Perry ven• 
tures the opinion that "the more careful and vigorous think-
ing out or the doctrines or 'critical' and 'neo'•realism will 
render them indistinguishable."8 (9) Bosanquet in studying 
the Crit1oal Realists' stress on the 'what' in knowledge, 
is "reminded strongly or the familiar absolutist theory or 
the relation between truth and reality." He adds, "It might 
seem as if the two theories differed only in worde." 9 With 
this widely divergent array or possible interpretations,is 
there any wonder that Drake, the consistent defender or es-
eencea, claimed that most or the criticisms were due to 
misapprehension and verbal ditticulty?10 
It is interesting to note here that even the views w&1hh 
1. Boll, Art. (1926), 620. 
2. Dorward, Art. (1921), 340. 
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3. Gregory, Art. (1921), 354. 
4. For example, Boas, Art. (1927) 1 , 490; Henderson, CRHS, 250. 
Joad, Art. (1922), 522; Lamprecht, Art. (1922), 654; TUrner, 
Art. (1922), 404. 
5. Snglish, Art. (1926), 0682. 6. Lamprecht, Art. (1922r, 657. 
7. Bode, Art. (1922) 1 72. 9. Bosanquet, MSCP, 134. 8. Perry, Art. (19201, 408. 10. See Drake, Art. (1927~, 570. 
the Critical Realists are most opposed to are allegedly as-
sociated with them. Such views are subjectivism, naive-
realism (co .. onsense), repreaentationism, and nee-realism. 
Indeed, the essence view touches o!f a whole chaim of reac-
tiona. One reason for this might be the lack or clarity and 
exactness in the definitions of terms. I! essences can be 
oon•traed in so many different ways, one wonders whether 
the term or the position baa ever or anywhere been carefully 
defined. This leads to the next criticism. 
ii. Ambiguity in the term essence. 
There was unclarity from the very first among Ori tical 
Realists on the meaning or essences. As bas been noted, 
there was initial disagreement within the covers or Essays 
in Critical Realism. Later the rift became more evident and 
Sellars writing some ~ears later maintained that he along 
with Rogers, Pratt, and Lovejoy "never stood ror the strict 
1 
essence doctrine.• This was largely due to initial ambi-
guity in the term essence. Even those who held to the strict 
essence doctrine varied somewhat, Strong finally giving up 
the essence doctrine in favor or his view of "phantasms." 
After considerable discussion in the journals, Drake admit-
ted that someone "should invent a less ambiguous term."2 
But wherein is this ailtbigui ty to be round? When it is 
said that essences are given or comprise data !or conscioua-
1. Sellars, Art. (19~), 239. 
2. Drake, Art. (1927~. 577. 
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• ness what is meant? It is anawered that the essence is the 
~of something, •a describable somewb~t", and this seema 
to imply some logical or structural characteristic. Yet 
essences are not always given but comprise a realm of pos-
sible givena. How then would the essence given in any per-
ceptual situation differ from the essence thought of? The 
esaence of a red apple would be the same whether perceived 
or conceived. !o this charge, Drake answered, "What is our 
datum, in conception, may then be only a part, or aspect, 
of the total essence, or a complex or essencea, given in 
perception.•1 Then one may ask with Boas, "But one could 
aot have part or an Aristotelian essence. lfhat would the 
worda mean 'a part of applenesa' ?"2 0. D. Broad points out 
this alllbiBU1-t7 by an illustration of a stick in water. We 
aee a brown, bard object of a certain length appearing bent. 
~ua theae are parts of the total essence which we ascribe 
to the stick when we see it. Are they 'given to us?" 3 The 
· 'bentneas' is not a characterietic of the stick. Is it a 
given essence however? 
Again, it is possible to view essences as qualities of 
an object given··in perception. But these qualities or es• 
sences have no existence. The;r are the "vehicles" fer per-
oeptual knowledge. Though the;r seek to bring the object 
1. Drake, Art. (1927P,. 573. Tbis article also attempts to 
anawer some of tbe2charges made against the view. 2. Boas, Art.2(1927) ,. 659. ror Drake's answer, see Drake, Art. (1928) • 
3. Broad, Art. (1924}, 110. 
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closer to tbe perceiver, tbe7 seem to push it a step back. 
Boas brings out that Strong speaks or an eaeenoe as an ob-
Ject in apace. but 7et tbe dominant view is that tbe7 are 
not in space, indeed, not even in time.1 
Wben it is bald by both Santayana and Drake that as-
sanoea are anything conoeivabla. does that mean that they 
are obJects or the characteristics or an obJect? Aa Sel-
lars says. "It obJect. than a physical thing 1s, by deti-
. 2 
ni tion, an aas'anoe." 
Duoaase shows further ambiguity in the view by noting 
that the term 'datum' "aomattaaa retara to the entity that 
baa a certain status, and sometimes to the status that a 
certain entity bas."' 
Tile difficulty in det1n1t1on and the lack or clarity 
is once more shown when Drake speaks or three types or ••-
aeneas: "tba essence which exists as object to be known, 
the eaaanca which exists as the mental state ot the knower, 
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and the essence which is 'given', wbich is before the mind ••• "4 
Tba problem or knowledge may be solved by the term essence. 
but it tbe term means everything related to the problem ot 
knowledge. as it seems to bare, the p~oblem ia not solved 
but is, in tact restated. 
Soma ot the criticisms which follow will be mora de-
tailed d1souaaiona or the ambiguity in the view. 
l. Boas , Art • ( 1927 )'1, 488. 
2. Sellars, Art. (1929), 453. 
3. Duoaasa, Art. (l9gJ), 365. 
4. Drake, Art. (1927}'!, 575. 
iii. Tbe view that essences are given is unempirical. 
There are two senses in which the essence view may be 
considered unempirical: (1) It may be said that it is not 
baaed on obaerTed facts, (2) It stresses the universal and 
timeless character of essences as over against their parti-
cularity and temporality. 
(1) D. c. Macintosh holds that the essence view is 
merely a verbal solution tor it is based on two fictions, 
rather than empirical facta. He maintains that it is false 
to identify an external datum with something in the head as 
well as with an external physical obJect. Those who bold 
the essence view "leave no place for knowledge in the sense 
of direct or directly verifiable awareness of the indepen-
dently existing physical reality." 1 But this criticism 
presupposes monism and has within it, the Critical Realists 
would say, more unsolved problems than the essence doctrine. 
Tbougb the concept of essence often is difficult to de-
fine and seems a verbal solution, a more serious charge is 
that offered by those who urge that there is no psychological 
support tor such a view. Essences, it may be said, are not 
the immediately given data, but a theory about data which 
presumes to be based on data but isn't. Accordingly, J. B. 
Kent writes, 
Tbe doctrine of essence assigns to the given 
obJect itself the status of an obJective exis-
1. Hacintosbl'l Art. (1927), 131. for an answer, see Drake, 
Art • ( 1928 r, 67ff. 
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tenet poatulattd by thought instead of giv• 
ing it the status of an iamed1attly given 
d&t• wbiib enables thought to make the pos-
tulation. · 
Baaenoea are not pr1aa fat!• facta but conclusions about 
the nature of knewledea in order to account for some of 
ita problema. 
H. B. English nominates naive realism to succeed the 
essence view for it is closer to the facts and does not 
misconceive the psychological situation. Yet there is some 
question as to what the psychological facts are and whether 
they are to be taken as logically prior in an analysis. 
English claims that "what we perceive is always a total 
situation of which we call physical obJects only a part ••• 
There seems some merit in the suggestion of Gestalt psycho-
logists on this."2 Sellars too would emphasize a m•r• 
wholistic account of psychological facts if the nature of 
the datum is to bt understood. He hints that the essence 
view might lead to "logical at011iam" and adds, "The unit 
in jud!!!!!ept is a Gestalt in wbicb we mean and interpret 
oblects."3 But Sellars is neither a monist nor a naive 
realist aa English is. 
J. s. Moore likewise stresses the need for a more 
thorough examination of the empirical situation to clear 
up the problem raised by essencea. "I think a careful 
1. Kent, Art. (1928), 623. 
2. English, Art. (1926), 684. Both Drake and Strong have 
aaticipated this charge in their respective chapters is EOR. 
3. Sellars, Art. (1927), 240. (Italics his). 
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analysis or some concrete experience will show us the way 
out," he says •1 ADd A. 'If. Moore proposes that the essence 
view ia a "confusion or the entities and maehinery or logi-
cal operations with the r .. iliar things or immediate erper-
ience."2 
There is considerable force in these views as well as in 
the opinion of G. D. B1oka, Wbo, though not directly deal• 
1Bg with the essence view opposes any terti \Ill au14 in epi-
stemological theory•3 ~ essence is a third something, 
an add! Uonal probln, perhaps, an UDDecesaary complication 
poatulated to take care or the problem or error in perceptual 
knowle4ge.4 Evea one or the original collaborators in the 
movement saw this and held that the strict essence doctrine 
was "a sin against the principle of parsimony."5 
(2) The other aspect of the arpent against eaeences 
aa unempirical is the charge that the emphasis on viewing 
them as universals ia out of contact witb particular con-
crete experience. Santayana is the stalwart defender or 
their universal status and is echoed from time to time by 
Drake. 
C•lkins abows tbat Santayana is inconsistent in hold-
ing that essences are both universal and individual. Ria 
1. Xoore, Art. (1928), 374. 
2. A. w. Xoore, Art. \1922), 591. 
3. See his Critical Reali!!• Ti. The Critical Realism of 
Hicks is quite .unlike the American view and seems to get 
along blissfully unaware of the American problem. 
4. This criticism is also raised by Blanshard, NT, I, 439t. 
5. Sellars, Art. (1924), 383. 
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eaaencea are "logically outlawa.•1 Boas argues that the 
datum neither looks nor acts like a univeraal.2 And Broad 
maintains that if esaencea are to be understood as particu• 
lara, "bow bave we arrived at tbe notion that there are 
partieulars at all?"3 He adds; 
Ia the notion of a particular a ~ely 
apriori notion which we import (rightly or 
wrongly) into our interpretation of the 
univeraala wbicb alone are given ua?4 
J. a. Moore alao arguea vigoroualy against essences aa 
univeraala and abows how one would bave to believe in all 
aorta and cond1tiona of logical abaurd1ties as subsistent 
esaencea if the view is pushed.5 a •. I. Lewis brings out 
that tbe "tatal error" ot Or1tieal Realism is the "con-
tusion ot the logical universal with given qual1a of sense."6 
Lovejey shows bow there is little warrant for stressing the 
universal oharacter of essencea when be ~ys: 
The obT1oua truth, then, that qualities when 
predicated of two or more things are necessarily 
dissociated in thought from the particularity 
ot each of those things, does not warrant the 
conclusion that as reallr characteiiz1ns each 
tsing, the qualifies do not 1ex1st , or are 
not particulars. 
1. Calkins, Art. (19~6), 704. 
2. Boas, Art. (1927) , 494t. 
3. Broad, Art. (1924), 114. · 
4. Ibid. For an answer to tb1s, see Drake, Art. (1925), 324. 
5. J. a. Moore, Art. (1928), 376 • 
. 6. Lewis, MWO, 60. 
1. Lovejoy, RAD, 112. ar. 113r. 
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Indeed the critics ba~• pounced upon the theory that 
easences are universals and have virtually dena away with it. 
Drake admitted the difticulty--"I wish nona of us bad used 
that unhappy term ••• now we are all tangled up in all sorts 
ot argulllents about what universals can be and can't be."1 
Unfortunately, Santayana never bothered to answer the pene-
trating criticism ot his view on this point. 
iv. How can it be that essences do not exist? 
This question may leg1t1aately be raised ot the be-
liever in essences. It is a cardinal point ot the doctrine 
that the data ot experience do not exist. But it essences 
are data, are given, how can oae talk about something which 
is given,not existing? The view of Santayana, Strong and 
Drake will not grant existence to essences as data tor they 
realize that 1t done, idealiu se8111s to be implied and the 
tact or error cannot ~ understoo4.2 Yet by no means is 
the relation between essence and existence clearly sat forth. 
Drake a&aits that the •relation between the status ot exis• 
tense and the status ot being-aa-essenoe is impossible to 
detine.•3 Also, "I agree that the term existence 1s 1nde• 
finable and can't be defined apriori.•4 
1. Drake, Art. tl928Jl, 66t. (As early as 1921, Dorward indi-
cated the need tor clearing up the relation between univer-
sals and particulars. See Art. ( 1921) , 345. 
2. This point is brought out by Perry, Art. (1920), 400. He 
says that it essence and existence are not kept distinct 
but unite, "then when one is given the other is given too, 
and the virtue ot tritical realism will have been~lost." 
3. Drake, Art • ( 1927 f, 573t. 4. Drake, Art • ( 1928 r, 62. 
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On the other band, mention is made or essences which "at-
tain to ex1atence"1 1D veridical knowledge, but "it is not 
ot the nature ot even such essences to be exiatent in the 
apatio•teaperal existing universe, else the ontological ar• 
suaent would apply to them all."2 One finds on the one 
band an agnoat1ciam regarding the problem and on the other 
an assertion about the existence ot essences which seems 
unwarranted. 
Tbe view that essences do not exist bas serious re,er• 
ousaions according to the various critics. Bode suggests 
that "the doctrine ot essences works havoc because it leaves 
no room tor existence et any kind. •3 And Boas anrs. that 
the concept or existence "must be defined, otherwise the 
whole value or tbe theory depreciates to zero."4 Tbe dis• 
tinction between essence and existence is apparently the 
new idea the Critical Realists are urging, but there is a 
refusal to define existence. However, it must be aaid that 
Drake attempted a definition even though be implies that it 
is "indefinable." 
My own oonolusiop is, that to exist is to be the 
whole or a part or the·one universal substance; 
this substance may be called 'psychic' in view ot 
the tact that it is the very substance or you and 
me ••• andmay be oalle¢ 'physical' because it is the 
substance or which pbysioal bodies are eompoaed.5 
1. Drake, Art. (1927J!, 574. 
2. Ibid., 576. For a critical comment on this, see J. s. 
Moore, Art. (1928), 313-376. 
3· Bode, Art. ( 1922) , 77. Dorward in Art. ( 1921) , 345, makes 
essentially the s~e point. E 
4. Boas, Art. (1927) , 662. 5. Drake, Art. (1928) , 62t. 
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Bsaences then may be said to exist, it is elucidated fur• 
ther "only in so tar as perception is verid1cal."1 To the 
question of what they are when not existent, Drake replies, 
"They are simply non-existent essences falsely supposed to 
exiat."2 
'rb*::issue on tbis question turns then on the definition 
of existence. A great deal of the difficulty in tb~ essence 
doct.ine is to be found at this point. Nothing given exists 
and existence Is never given, thousb some essences may be 
understood as existing when they refer to something wbioh 
actually is. Yet, bow is it known wbat actually exists, 
or when veridical knowledge takes place? The only answer 
offered is Santayana's idea of "animal faith." Drake calls 
it a kind of practical instinct.' Bssences are viewed as 
the means of solving some of tbe basic problems of epistemol• 
og, but when their nature is elC&IIIined, the problema arise 
asain in all of their compleXity. The severe critic might 
go so far as to say that essences are mere bypostatizations. 
'rbey explata everything, yet they themselves are inexplicable, 
particularly their relation to existence. But this criticism 
could be made of any ultimates save possibly persons. 
1. Drake, Art. (1928)2, 189. 
2. Ibid. 
3. On this point, Prall asks this discerning question: "Have 
we thus done away with everything bUt universal essences in 
immediate eXperience merely to reinstate by an act of in-
stinctive faith existent ~ticular thin~ with universal 
qualities and relations?" ·(In Art. (1925), 271). 
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v. Tbe relation or essences to the perceiving mind is un• 
clear and contusing. 
Blanahard points out that tbe chief difficulty with 
tbe essence view is "that tbe relations of these essences 
to the physical thing on tbe one band and the perceiving 
mind on the other are never made clear."1 Each or these 
points will be considered, the latter here, the former 
under the next sub-bead. 
It one exa.ines caretully the individual essays in 
tbe cooperative volume or Critical Realists, he will tind 
that not all or the initial subacri.bers to the essence 
view·are indefinite on this point. Sellars, for instance 
treats the essence as a trusient bit of mental content and 
hence answera the question above raised,2 But this is not 
tbe case with tbe so•called "maJority view" which is the 
main concern here. 
In the literature, one rinds widely variant criticisms 
ot the relation or essences to mental states. This again 
m~y indicate tbe ambiguity in the view. On the one band, we 
find Horris.implying that tbe Critical Realists stress mind 
too much. He aaks, "Does tbe attempt to get 'enough mind' 
to aeet the d1fftoulties or new realism require so mucb mind 
that pay~iam, partial or complete, is dragged back on the 
stage of tbought?"J On tbe other hand, we find Blanshard 
1. Blanshard, NT, I, 143. 
2. For a thorough-going cri t1cism or Sellars's view, see 
Blanshard NT, 1, 426-431. 
3. Morris, S~, 214. 
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stating that "one would wish to canvass more hopeful views 
before signing away so irretrievably the efficac7 of one's 
mind. nl 
'lbougb Santayana, Strong, and Drake speak of the rela-
tion of essences to mental states, mental states as such are 
not viewed as having any meaningful existence. Indeed, the 
expression •mental states" or "consciousness" becomes a 
term~ describe a characteristic of essences. Drake main-
tains that Strong is "the only thinker, so far as I know, 
who bas clearly formulated tbis conception of conscious• 
ness."2 !ben Drake quotes a section from Strong's Origin 
ot Oonaciousness wb1cb bears out the charge made above. 
G1venness originates by states of our sensibi-
lity being used as symbols tor objects. That 
which uses them is tbe orsaai .. , at once psychic 
and extended ••• Givenneas or consciousness is 
thus no added existence, nor is it a psychical " 
fact knowable by introspection; it is simply 
tbe meaning or intent which tbe sensation ac-
quires through becoming in tact the index of 
tbe object ••• Wbat we really mean by 'conscious-
ness 1 is this relation of ,.symbolism as eur-
cised b1 a psychic state.~ 
*ind on this account is a derivative. Essences do not be• 
long to mind or mental states, are not in it, but essences 
are understood as relating to mental states when an organ• 
lam confronts them in knowing. Drake's point ie that we 
are not aware of mental states in perception but of essences. 
1. Blansbard, :If, I, 438 • 
2. Drake, Ml'lt, 174n. 
3. Strong, 00, 122f. 
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"He bolds tbat evidence for tbe existence of mental states 
is on a par witb tbat for tbe existence of physical things." 1 
They are believed to exist only in so far as they explain 
tbe fact of experiencing. As Bode brings out, the facts or 
introspection on this view reveal nothing about mental 
states. Indeed, 
introspection cannot d1solose a 'sensation 
of blue,' but merely 1 blue 1 • That is, in-
trospection comes upon tbe same datum that, 
in the original perceition was assigned to 
tbe physical objects. 
It is bard to feel tbe foroe of the implication of 
Morrie's question quoted above. Not only is there not enougb 
mind on the essence view, but tbere is some question as to 
whether there is any mind at all. Mind is not a basal start• 
ing point bere, but is explained away in terms of what is 
not mind. Blansbard notes that if Critical Realism is cor• 
rect, the thougbt process becomes "a series of snapshots 
of an alien world produced by fortuitOus changes in the 
brain ••• Rationality beco.ea animal luck."' 
It can further be argued against this view that a self 
or mind and ita experienoea "are mt least as immediately ob-
served and as self•evident aa essenoes."4 And though, aa 
Calkins &bows, Santayana pays little attention to this, be 
nevertheless treats the awareness of self as more fundamen-
1. Ducasse, Art. (1927), 367. 4. Calkins, Art. (1926), 705. 
2. Bode, Art. (1922), 75. 
3· Blanahard, NT, I, 4}8. 
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tal than awareness ot outside cbjects.1 He "tacitly admits 
what be formally denies, an attil1at1on between essence and 
mind. "2 
As a compromise between neo•realism and idealism,. the 
view ot Critical Realism as understood through the essence 
doctrine, may be said to c0B1pr011ise the tacts ot mental lite 
to a point ot meaninglesaness. It would seem that one is 
tar more sure ot aelt-awareness and aelt-identity through 
memory than he is ot objects or essences. For it essences 
are external to mind, they are objects tor beliet or in-
terence and not incontrovertible tacts. 
vi. !be relation between essences and physical objects is 
vague and ambiguous. 
For the Gritical Realist, tbe world ot external phy-
sical objects is never given to the perceiver. Only essences 
ot the external objects are given. Essences are meanings 
or character-complexes ot things. It they are "only de-
tached, concrete natures ••• ot those thinga," 3 bow can it 
be that they are also the characters ot the very things 
trom which they are detacbed?4 It essences are vehicles 
or meanings presented by objects, and yet are not ontolo-
gically related to them in any way, bow is it possible to 
gat knowledge ot the objects? As Perry says: 
1. Ibid. fo abowtbia, Calkins quotes Santayana, SAP, 204, 
"A aelt and not a material world is the tirst object to ba 
posited." 
2. Ibid. 706. 
3. ECR, 223 (Strong). 4. or. Calkins, Art. (1926), 704. 
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Let us suppos~howeTer, tbat the existent 
object is not sensibly perceived, but only 
!efDt ••• !be trouble now ia that tbe exter-
nal obJ•tt asaUIIes tbe same status as the 
essence. 
Strong, as Blanabard abowa,2 baa argued convincingly that 
essences are not physical things or to be identified with 
them in any way. Tbe arguments also prove "to precisely 
the same extent, that these data cannot give the cbaracter 
of physical things."' It is i•possible to get clear evi-
dence of an object~'• existenoe in the presence o:t' its es ... 
aenoe. We act on the basis or practical instinct, or 
"aniaal :taitb," as i:t' objects were be:t'ore us. I:t' essences 
vary with the organism which baa them as Strong seems to 
say,4 the gap between essence and object is still wider. 
There is some question as to whether the view is any 
better off than Looke 1 a in enabling us to know external 
objeota.5 Henderson has the nub or the problem in these 
wordu 
But none or the Seven bas succeeded in avoid-
ing Locke's view of the physical thing as an un• 
known somewhat; :tor they all confessed vicar• 
iously tbrouSb Pratt that the intrinsic char-
acter or the thing is UDlmowable, a conclualon 
necessitated by their own view or physiological 
relativity wbiob ••• is a boomerang which strikes 
them down on the very threshold or the objects 
1. Parry, Art. (1920), 402. 
2. Blanshard, NT, I, 421. Cf. ZOR, 226 (Strong). 
3• Blanahard, BT, I, 421. 
4. Compare Drake, MPI', 195. 
5. Tbis question is raised by Lamprecht, Art. (1922), 653. 
DJ'ake bas attempted u uawer to this charge in Art. (1925), 
323. 
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bol:r or bolies.1 
Essences are divorced from physical things and ;ret are our 
only source of knowledge about them. In their attempt to 
avoid neo•realism which says that physical objects them-
selves are given, the Critical Realists have moved so tar 
from the object as to make it an unknowable. And in their 
attempt to avoid idealiSID which says that mental events are 
basic, the Critical Realists have •oved so tar from mind 
as to make it a mere verbali811. 
vii. Veridical knowledge is 11Dpossible on the view that 
essences are given. 
Tbis criticism, or course, grows out or the previous 
point. It essences and ex~atents are forever sundered, bow 
is it possible to get epistemio validity if only essences 
are given? Drake seta up this problem in the early pages 
or Bsf1Ys 1n Critical Realism when be says that cognitive 
• 
experiences are never possessions of the existent lmo~ 
"Tbeir validity must be tested by other means than the in• 
tuitioa of the moment." 2 Bat the question is, what are 
these means? Drake nowhere makes this clear. He and the 
other Critical Realists are carefUl to point out that abso• 
lute certainty cannot be bad 1n knowledge a.sp1te the claims 
of epistemclogic-.1 11onism. Yet what ~ or certainty can 
be bacl? How can one distinguish between true and false 
1. Henclerson 1 CBHS t 256. 2 • :zoR , 32 \ Drake I • 
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perceptions? !be knowing experience is full of essences, 
bUt only when those essences eorreapond with existents do 
we say we have veridical knowledge. 
But whence the correspondence? !be best answer that 
caa be offered is of prasaatic character. 
We may legitimately consider that our sup-
posed knowl'8dge is actual knowledge when it 
works. When we use 1t to guide our action, 
we fin~ourselves dealing successfully with 
thimgs. 
SQtayana~ as ill well-t:a:.D, makes veridical knowledge a mat-
ter or "animal faith." Elsewhere the concept of instinct is 
introduced to account for veridical knowledge. Macintosh, an 
epistemological monist say~ accordingly: 
all tbeir theory allows for is the substitu-
tion of a practical makeshift tor real knowl-
edge; tbey leave no place for knowledge in 
the sense of direct or directly verifiable 
awareness of t~e independently existing pby-
aioal reality. 
But tbere is a real question as to whether real knowledge 
is confined to the directly present. Yet can any validity 
be found on the criterion of pra@Matic justifiability? 
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Boas in an extended criticism maintains that tbe pre-
seace of essences in consciousness and the contemplation of 
them "is not suffieient fo,reveal (their) implications. We 
obviously can't move to the object without making bypotbeaes.•3 
1. Drake, MPN, 49. 3. Boas, Art. (1927)1, 492. 
2. Macintosh, Art-. (1927), 131. 
Knowledge claims can be validated through reason and per-
haps a system of interconnected relations. The essence 
theorist maintains veridical knowledge is apprehended : 
through instinct or as a result of some need.1 Unless rea-
son is used in verification, and this the Critical Realist 
denies, it is bard to see bow relativistic subjectivism 
could be n:oided. Aa Lampreebt puts it, "!ruth being con-
formity of an essence to an object we can by hypothesis 
never reach, knowledge is impossible.•2 
Perhaps the most devastating presentation of the cri-
tioi .. that the essence theory makes veridical knowle4ge 
impossible is to be found in an article by Joad. Joad at-
tacks the Cr1t1oal Realist for the very point they bold 
dearest, namely, the ability of their view to account for 
error. On his interpretation, veridical knowledge is a m•re 
chance occurrence. "In short, for Drake, tbe datum is a 
mental construction which when we are lucky is identical 
with the characteristics of the ao•called object.•3 Again, 
referring to Santayana's view, be states that the occurrence 
of perception can be reduced to a mere accident. It is 
bard to see bow Joad' a cri Ucism can be answere4. Blansbard, 
writing some eighteen years later makes essentially the same 
charges. "Rationality becomes animal luck ••• Reflection is 
1. Bode, Art. (1922), 77, says that Critical Realism "shows 
a striking capacity ror. simple faith." 
2. Lamprecht, Art. (1922~. 655· This writer later implies 
tbe presence or subjectivism in Critical Realism. 
a. Joad, Art. (1922), 526. 
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a aeries or wbimaioal glances cast by an animal at the out-
ward abows or tbinsa.•1 
It must be said in closing tbe discussion or this par-
ticular or1tioi .. tbat Sellars, stalwart representative or 
the minority group, recognized tbe problem implied in the 
majority view. He bad no commerce with Santayana's idea or 
•animal faith." According to his book Bvolutionarr Natur-
alifl• which be mentions in one or his articles, be stresses 
that in perception there is a. "reproduction or the ordtr or 
the external cause in tbe internal medium: In line witb this 
be addBJ 
I developed a theory or the categories as 
controlled developments in the mind ••• the 
very nature or the ideas reflects their 
function in the act or oognition2 In it they are molded and categorized. 
But this is a far cry from the essence view just criticized. 
Sellars' view raises other questions which cannot be dealt 
with here. 
viii. Tbe view is based on veiled assumptions which are 
unwarranted. 
There are at least four assumptions implicit in the 
essence tbeorp or the given which are open to serious quea• 
tion and upon Ybicb the view seems to depend. Tbe first il 
ontological realism. It is assumed from the start that 
1. Blanabard, NT, I, 438. 
2. Sellars, Art. (1929), 450. 
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objects independent of mind are real. Drake, for instance, 
reserves the term existence fer what baa locus in the space-
time continuum,1 so that mind, which is sometimes construed 
as independent of that order is ruled out or must be under-
stood in terms of the brain alone. As&tn, in a later work 
it is stateA "we are all instinctively realists."2 But it 
can be said tbat whether or not cntclog1cal realism is true, 
it must be derived from the nature of the knowing experience 
and not assumed. The majority view does not start with raw 
immecliacy nor with an innocent given, but rather with an 
assumed ontology and then postulates a theory of the given 
in accord with that ontology. 
A second assumption which may be noted is like the 
first. !be datum is defined in terms of "the status or 
a postulated objective spatial existence, instead of giving 
it the quite different status or an immediate experience."' 
!bis same point is stressed by Lamprecht when be makes this 
discerning comment' 
Indeed, what Mr. Drake really ever:rwhere as-
sumes as given, and ever:rwbere works from r 
is not at all the 'data of consciousness, but 
on the c~ntr~ry, tbe lacts or~ysics and phy-
siology. 
Tbe holders of the essence view begin with the fact or 
knowledge of an external world and postulate essences to 
1. Drake, MPI, 180. 4. Ducasae, Art. (1927), 370. 
2. Drake, I~P, 109. 
3. Kent, Art. (1928), 622. 
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account tor this knowledge. '!be question to be answered 
is, however, the nature or the given, the immediate. Rather 
than arriving at how knowledge takes place trom an analysis 
ot the given, knowledge or tbe external world is assumed and 
the essence the•rr is offered as an explanation or that kniwl• 
edge. 
Kent points out that the essence view is contradictory 
because or ita assumption that the datum is an essence. An 
essence is~ postulated objeet which presupposes the reality 
or the datum or given existence as the basis or the postu-
late. nl 
A third assumption implicit in the essence view or the 
given is a physiological psychologr. Perception is viewed 
as pbJSiologio&l reaction in tbe brain and the categories or 
consciousness and brain are seen as one. For example, 
nr&ke speaks or "cerebral events", "psycho-neural processes", 
and "neural currents ••• (wbicb) determine those adjustments 
and reactions in Which introspection oonsiats."2 Santayana 
too interprets all so•called "mental lite" in terms or the 
phJsical. 
It actual feelings or intuitions have any 
ground at all this ground is physical ••• Pby• 
sioal, finally, is tbe sole evidence open to 
any mind or the existence or character or 
minds in otbera ••• Payobology reports ceitain 
complications in the realm or matter ••• 
1. fent, Art. (1928), 623. 
2. nr&ke, MPJI', 203. Ct. Chapter XVI. 
3. Santayana, RCII, in RCB;, 381 •. 
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BUt it cannot be said that awareness contains evidence 
of pbysicality, neural processes or cerebral events. Those 
are proposed explanations of the phenomenon of consciousness 
• 
and are not found in it. They are inferred descriptions at 
best and the bases for such inferences are not apparent. 
No "neural current" or "matter" is given. Indeed, as Du-
casse says in another connection, the Critical Realist 
"states problems in te):'llls of solutions."1 
A fourth assumption for which Critical Realists have 
been criticized is "the bifurcation of nature." It is held 
that the Critical Realists make a false division between 
stimulus and perceived entity, when in reality no such divi-
sion can be found. 2 It is held that the facts of psychology 
will not support such an analysis and bifurcation. About 
Drake's view, in particular, it is said: 
his theory rests on a fundamentally crude 
conception of space-time and that the pro-
blem of getting objects in-here,which are 
out-there is wrongly conceived. 
Lamprecht makes the same observation about the essence view. 
Yet, as must be noted, the very supposition 
of different types of realities apart from 
experience is only a pious hope based on emo-
tional preference; it is at best an 'instinc-
tive and tnescapable belief,' an alogical posi-
1; Ducasse, Art. (1927), 370. 
2. See H. M. Smith, Art. (1929), 100. She describes the view: 
"Stimulation of an end-organ gives rise it was conceived--
to a new element in consciousness, and given a normal condi-
tion of the organism, the relation between the stimulus and 
the psychic entity is constant." 
3. H. M. Smith Art. (1929), 112. For an answer, see Drake, 
Art. (1929), 473-476. 
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tion congenial but unverifiable, and at 
ita worst a kind of soothing mythology.l 
And D. S. Mackay in his article "The Displacement of the 
Senae•Datum" criticizes Love~oy for assumed psycho-physical 
dualism, or bifurcation.2 
In their effort to avoid the problema of naive realism 
and subjectivism, it may be said that the Critical Realists 
perhaps too hastily assume a bifurcation in nature and fail 
to give it support. But there is some question as to wbe• 
tber the epistemic dualism of the Critical Realists, which 
is grounded in their essence theory is a bifurcation of 
nature. As Sellars bas pointed out in an article elsewhere 
referred to,3there is.no necessary connection between 
epistemic dualism and metaphysical dualism. The problem 
is to account for the nature of knowing and some analysis 
into elements is needed if one is to understand the pro• 
blem, let alone solve it. 
1. Lamprecht, Art. (1929), 29. 
2. In Jour. Phil., 29(1932), 253•259. 
3·. His article "Epiatemolosical Dualism and Metaphysical Dual• 
ism," Phil Rev., 30(1921), 482-493. See also his article 
"Concerning 'Transcendence' and 'Bifurcation'" in Mind, · 
31(1922)~ 31•39. 
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1. Introduction. 
CHAPTER III 
SENSE-DATA AS GIVEN 
One of the significant recent movements in epistemic 
theory is the sense-datum theory, or as it is sometimes 
called, the "COllective Delimitation" Theory. Its chief re-
presentative is Henry H. Price, there being so far no group 
1 
of men who advocate the theory. The view bas a definite 
historical rootage, David Hume being the illustrious ances-
tor and G. E. Moore, B. Russell, and c. D. Broad providing 
' the more immediate background. Though the view bas admitted 
and definite relations with these thinkers, it departs from 
them at several basic points one of which is the degree of 
attention accorded to the theory of the given and its rela-
tion to.perceptual knowledge. Indeed, it may be said, the 
sense-data theory of perception is constructed on the basis 
of a careful analysis of the given. The term "the Given" is 
found frequently in Price's book and careful attempts are 
made to define it exactly. 
Price's general view is perhaps closest to Broad's 
sensum theory, but there are some very important differences, 
1. In discussins problems of epistemolo~ in a two-part arti-
cle in Mind, ll949 and 1950), called, Sense-Data and the 
~rcept Theory," Roderick Firth puts Berkeley, Broad, Price, 
and G. E. Moore into the sense-data category. This may be 
an acceptable practical device for overall criticism, but 
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it does not_bring out differences in these thinkers which 
they think are quite important. The only one of these think-
ers primarily concerned with the Given as such, is H. H. 
Price. Barnes, Art. (1945), is critical but recognizes the 
difference between the sensum and the sense-datum theory 
(p. 106). 
which will be noted below. ~oad nowhere develops his po-
sition by using the term given nor does he use the term in 
any other significant connection, as far as the present writ-
er has been able to determine.1 It is Price's contention 
that all theories of perception should start from a clear 
understanding of the given.2 This is essentially what the 
majority group of the Critical Realists maintained, but 
their interpretation is markedly different from the present 
sense-data view. 
The chief sources of the sense-datum theory, of course, 
are in books and articles written by Price, though there 
have been a number of valuable critical articles by others 
which offer some aid in expounding the view. The term 
"sense-datum" was first used by Bertrand Russell in 1912.3 
G •. E. Moore also used the term. The systematic presenta-
tion of the theory is found in Price's Perception, (1932, 
revised 1950) and the theory shines through in Hume's 
Theory of the lxternal World (1940). Two other short books 
are not very significant for the present -purposes. They 
are, Truth and Corrig1bi1ity (1936), and Thinking andRe-
presentation (1946). Price has written a number of arti-
cles on perception and related problems, the first appearing 
in 1924, when be was 25. These will be referred to from time 
1. The basic works presenting Broad's well-known Sensum 
Theory are his Soientifi{ Tboygbt (1923), and hie The Mind 
and its Place in Nature 1925 , In neither do the terms 
"data" or "given" occur in any significant sense. 
2. ~ice, PIR, 19. 
3· Price, Art. (1941), 283. 
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tchUme. 
2. Exposition of the view. 
The pattern of exposition to be employed will be to 
follow the main outline of the argument as it is presented 
in Perception and to fill in some of the gaps from certain 
critical expo-sitions by others. Some of the finer points 
of difference will be brought out in the sections on com-
parisons as well as in certain of the problems raised under 
"criticisms." The several points which follow are pri-
marily based on the first one here discussed, hence consi-
derable space is given to its clarification. 
i. Sense-data are indubitably present and are neutral. 
In analyzing the process of perception with particular 
reference to seeine and touching, Price notices that ini-
tially there is much that can be doubted. In perceiving 
an object such as a tomato, one may doubt the status of the 
tomato. It may be a reflection, a piece of wax, etc, but 
in the act of perception there is one thing that cannot be 
doubted, namely, the red co.lor patch. It is the clear and 
distinct residue after doubting has done its best. The 
length of its existence temporally as well as its possible 
presence in other minds may be doubted, but its presence in 
the immediate perceiving mind is beyond doubt. "But that 
it now exists, and that l am conscious of it--by m~ at 
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least who am conscious of it this cannot possibly be 
doubted."1 Such things as color patches may be understood 
as being directly present to consciousness. This is also 
the case with things touched, tasted, smelled or heard. In 
perception, there is something indubitably present in con-
sciousness. It is that which is indubitably present to 
consciousness that Price calls the given. 
Tbe peculiar and ultimate manner of being 
present to consciousness is called being 
given, and that which is thus present is 
lialled a datum. The corresponding men tal 
attitude is called acquaintance, intuitive 
apprehension, or sometimes having. Data 
of th2s special sort are called sense-
data. 
The datum which Price is concerned with here is not the re-
sult of any inference or intellectual process but is that 
presence in consciousness behind which it is impossible to 
go. 
Now sense-data differ from other data such as the data 
of memory or introspection. Sense-data lead us to believe 
in the existence of certain material things. Other data 
do not. Sense-data are further characterized by an inde-
scribable characteristic, 'sensuousness.' Price does not 
do very much with non-sensuous data though he clearly ad-
mits that there are such data. In an article entitled 
"Touch and Organic Sensation," it is maintained that the 
1. Price, PER, 3. 
2. Price, PER, 3. 
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sense-datum terminology doesn't fit other types of sensa-
tion, especially organic sensation. Though such data are 
sensuous, they are treated as special oases. 
' 
The natural terminology for analyzing or-
ganic sensation is a feeling-and-content 
terminology, rather than an aot-and•datum 
terminology •••• The sense•datum terminology 
fits those sense-experiences in which the 
objective reference is clear and sharp, and 
fails to fit those in which the objective 
reference is dim or confused or absent 
altogether.l 
It would have been instructive if the term "the given" had 
been used in this connection. Price does not admit, that 
there are different sorts of acquaintance, "e.g. sensing, 
self-consciousness, and contemplation of mental irnages." 2 
Certain philosophers doubt the doctrine of sense-data, 
indeed, the very idea of something given. There are two 
forms that the criticisms take. They may be called the 
Apriori Thesis and the Empirical Thesis. The Apriori 
Thesis denies that anything oan be given at aa and that 
the notion of givenness is absurd. The Empirical Thesis 
says that the theory of the aiven is of no importance to the 
philosopher because we cannot find anything which is given. 
The argument of the Apriori Thesis holds that any ap-
prehension involves a thing and its qualities. A fact is 
1. Price, Art. 0944), viii and ix. (This article was the 
presidential ~ess given before the Aristotelian Soci-
ety). 
2. Price, PER, 5. 
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never separated from relations. A color patch is in some 
shape and spatial relations and these are apprehended along 
with the any color. If this be the case then there is no 
passive reception but rather active thinking, hence no given. 
It is answered that though this criticism shows that nothing 
is merely given to the mind but stands in other relations, 
it does not prove that there is no given. "The fact that 
A and B are constantly conjoined, or even necessarily con-
nected, does not have the slightest tendency to prove that 
A does not exist. 111 Furthermore, the criticism is weak 
because it fails to recognize that some subject matter for 
thought is given to the mind and that sensing is a means 
for receiving such subject matter. 
The second criticism, the so-called "Empirical Thesis" 
ma~tains that it is impossible to discover any data? This 
is not so radical a. charge as the first, but is more diffi-
cult to answer. So-called data are not really given but 
are the product of interpretation. Now "interpretation", 
it can be said, may mean (a) association of ideas, (b) des-
cription or analysis, or (c) the attempt to get knowledge 
about the datum. These will be taken up in order and cer-
tain criticisms will be noted. 
(a) If "interpretation" is to mean association of 
ideas, several criticisms may be offered. (1) Association 
1. Price, PER, 7. (A stands for 1 Givenness 1 and B for 
'thought-of-ness.•), 
2. For a recent treatment of this, see Johnstone, Art. (1951). 
105 
means relation and when there is association, as in linking 
the idea of coldness with a distant mountain peak, "what is 
1 
associated must be associated with something." The some-
thing here is that which can be said to be given. (2) There 
is some question as to what characteristics of an object of 
perception are due to association. When it is said that cer-
tain qualities cannot be given to sight, for example, it 
is implied that at least there is a datum of sight. (3) 
When the associationist critic distinguishes kinds of asso-
elations such as tactual and kinaesthetic, the presupposi-
tion is, "that the associated characteristics, though not 
given now, have been given in the past,"2 else how would it 
have been possible to employ the word tactual? (4) By defi-
nition, the Given is that, "which by being itself actual 
and intuitively apprehended, makes it possible for something 
else to seem to exist or to have a certain qual1ty." 3 If 
this be the case, the distinction made by the critic that 
the Given as it really is and what the Given seems to be 
is unimportant and cannot be admitted. Price makes this 
point quite strongly: 
If something is given, it is given, and we 
must just make the best of it. In a matter 
ot this kind we cannot and xill not accept 
the dictation or theorists. 
(b) The term "interpretation" may mean not only 
1. Price, PER, 9. 3. Price, PER1 lO. 
2. Price, PER, 9. 4. Price, PER, 10. 
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association of ideas but also description or analysis. If 
this be the ease, the criticism of the theory of the Given 
under the "Empirical Thesis" takes a somewhat different 
turn. It maintains that if there were a datum, it would be 
impossible to know it for when one attempts to describe it, 
the description alters it. It is claimed that this eriti-
eism, however, rests on the assumption that, "if I kno1~ or 
believe that something has a certain nature, it follows that 
it cannot possibly have the nature that I know or believe it 
to have."1 Though this assumption is patently bard to ac-
cept, the critics have unwittingly adhered to it for three 
chief reasons concerning which attempted refutations may be 
offered. It is said that: (1) Describing is an active pro-
cess and a great deal of related knowledge may be involved 
in it. How is it possible to arrive at any datum? It may be 
answered that though thinking is an activity it does not 
alter the thing thought about. It may indeed lead to prac-
tical activity which does alter the object and there may be 
a measure of practical control exercised in connection with 
some act but the intellectual activity of describing is not 
the same as the practical activity of doing something with 
what is .described. "From the f'aet that A and B are eon-
neeted, however intimately, we cannot infer that A is identi-
cal with B, still less that A does not exist."2 
It is further said, by way of' criticism, that: (2) just 
~: Price, PER, 13. 
Price, PER, 15~ 
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as dissection destroys an organism, intellectual analysis 
destroys the thing which is analyzed. An organtc whole is 
analyzed into parts which are understood by the 11 and 11 re-
lation alone while the meaning of the organic whole is lost. 1 
Thus, the given cannot be known. To which it may be ans-
wered, intellectual analysis is the seeking after of rela-
tions and does not involve doing anything to whatever is 
being analyzed. Relations and qualities are discovered, 
they are not produced by analysis. 
Likewise, the critics maintain {3) that attention 
destroys or transforms the given for when an object is at-
tended to it becomes more and more clear. An image may 
turn out to be a bronze statue, etc. But it may be asked 
whether this is an essential change in the given. And it 
can be answered that the apparent change, 11 is simply in our 
mode of apprehension and not in the thing apprehended. 112 
(c) "Interpretation" may also mean the attempt to 
know the given. It is maintained by some critics that 
givenness is destroyed by the attempt to know about it. 
Although a certain red patch after being 
described is the same entity as it was 
before, yet it is not the same datum--for 
it is no longer a datum at all, but has 
become an 'intellectum' instead.3 
1. It is perhaps possible that one may hold to an idea of 
the Given and interpret it in terms of an organic whole 
and thus preserve both Price's point and the point of his 
cri.tics. This will be discussed in Chapter V. 
2. Price, PER, 16. 
?• Price, PER, 17. 
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That which is called knowledge of the datum, then, is really 
knowledge about former data. This is a question of a change 
in the Given's relation to mind. 
It may be pointed out that when a datum is reflected 
on, 11 it is no longer merely a datum, 111 but that does not 
necessarily imply that it is no datum at all. The fact 
that a datum can be described and recognized for what it is 
does not prove that the perceiver is not acquainted with it. 
Price clinches the point in this way: 
We must conclude then that the given is still 
given, however much we know about it. Know-
ledge-about is the usual, perhaps the inevit-
able, companion of acquaintance, but it is 
not its executioner.2 
All of the preceding discussion has aimed at bringing 
out Price's point that no matter how one looks at the pro-
blem of perception, there is an indubitable Given and this 
Given consists of sense-data. His answers to various pro-
posed criticisms have been presented in order that the 
reasoning substantiating his view might be at hand. 
One further observation must be made in this section 
of the exposition of the sense-datum theory of the given,--
and that is that these sense-data are to be understood as 
neutral as well as indubitable. Accepting the sense-data 
theory, Price suggests, commits one to very little and it 
is in this sense that sense-data may be viewed as a neutral 
1. Price, PER, 17. 2. Price, PER, 18. 
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term. For instance, the sense-data view of the Given does 
not necessarily entail the view that sense-data continue to 
exist in periods when not sensed, Also, it need not be ad-
mitted that several minds can be acquainted with the same 
no 
sense-datum. FurtheJ', no view about the precise status of 
sense-data is implied at this point, i.e., they may be events, 
substances, mental, etc. Finally, no theory about the ori-
gin of sense-data follows from the definition of sense-data 
as indubitable givens. Hence it is said that sense-datum is 
a neutral term. As Price puts it, perhaps somewhat optimis-
tically: 
The term is meant to stand for something 
whose existence is ind~bitable (however 
fleeting), something from which all theories 
of perception ought to itart, however much 
they may diverge later. 
ii. Naive realism rejected. 
The idea of sense-data as indubitable gi vena is sub-
stantiated by Price in a negative way when he shows that 
neither naive realism nor the causal theory of perception 
is tenable. Here naive realism will be considered. 
Naive realism purports to answer so'l!e of the questions 
raised regarding the processes of perception. It first as-
serts that consciousness of an object means knowing that 
the object for which some sense-data may be present, exists. 
The object is known, and not inferred or believed in on 
1. Price, PER, 19. If indubitably given, it is hard to see 
how sense-data rePain their neutrality. 
the basis of sense-data evidence. Again, the naive realist 
would maintain that when one speaks of sense-data belonging 
to an object be really means that the sense-data are, "part 
of the surface of" the object and that the object, conse-
quently, is located in space.1 
Now this nafve realism virtually denies the theory of 
sense-data as given for it merely says that objects are 
given too. If the sense-data theory is to stand, the weak-
nesses of na~ve realism must be made manifest. And this is 
achieved after some lengthy discussion by Price when he brings 
out that the so-called argument from illusion is adequate to 
answer the naive realist. This argument from illusion breaks 
down into two distinct arguments. The first tries to show 
that there are sense-data of sight and touch which cannot 
be idantical with parts of the surfaces of material things. 
The second attempts to prove that sanae-data, "only exist 
while certain processes, other than sensing but contemporary 
with it, are going on in tha nervous system and perhans in 
the mind of the being who senses them. "2 
The existence of sense-data apart from the surfaces 
of or any connection with perceptual objects is denied then, 
on the grounds that there are many illustrations of illu-
sory sense-data, sense-data which we tend to take as "part 
of the surface of a material object, but if we take (them) 
1. See Price, FER, 26. 
2. Price, PIR, 27. 
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so we are wrong."l Illusory sense-data are found in per-
ceptual consciousness for various reasons. They are due 
sometimes to perspective difficulties, sometimes to dis-
tortions by reflection and refraction. And one notes il-
lusory data as due to physiological disorder, after-images, 
and hallucinations as well. One cannot dispose of the 
problem of illusory sense-data by making a distinction be-
tween normal and abnormal sense-data. As Price puts it: 
Indeed the whole trouble about abnormal 
sense-data is precisely tliat they simulate 
normal ones. Otherwise it would not even 
be possible for us to be deceived by them; 
they would b~ strange, but they would not 
be illusory. 
If, now, the arguments against naive realism have any 
cogency, it follows that sense-data cannot be parts of the 
surfaces of material objects. And it also follows that not 
all instances of perceptual consciousness--i.e., when sense-
data are present, are instances of perceptual knowing. It 
may then be said that, "all sense-data are produced by pro-
cesses in the brains of the beings who sense them, 11 3 
But naive realism is not so easily overthrown, Ob-
jections may be raised concerning these conclusions, It 
may be said, for example, that when one discusses illusory 
sense-data, he must have other sense-data which indicate to 
1. Price, PER, 27. Cf. Price 1 s article, "A Realist View of 
Illusion and Error," Monist, 36(1926), 340-354. 
2. Price, PER, 31. 
3. Price, PER, 33. 
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h~ that the first are illusory. These sense-data, then, 
it may be argued, do in fact attach to the material object 
in question. Naive realism would be refuted on the point 
of illusory sense-data but in order to do the refuting, 
naive realism would have to be assumed. 1 
Yet, this counter charge of the naive realist can be 
met once the so-called Phenomenological form of the argu-
ment against naive realism is carefully stated. This is no 
simple task and comprises considerable detailed discussion 
on the part of one defending the sense-datum theory. The 
most difficult problem the sense-datum theorist must face 
is that deVelopment of Naive Realism known as the Selective 
Theory. This states in essence that any material object 
is a group of 11 sensibilia. 112 All sorts and conditions of 
sense-data could then 11 belong to" an object, illusory ones, 
correct ones, etc. Though this newer view is difficult to 
handle, it is suggested that sense-data are rather to be 
understood as somato-centric.3 
There have been attempts to restate and modify the 
argument of the naive realist concerning the nature of per-
caption and sensation and these must be dealt with if the 
1. Price, PER, 33-34. 
2. I.e., potential sense-data. 
3. This is a summary of Price's complex argument. There-
mainder of his book and the remainder of the present ex-
position take up some of the ramifications of this argu-
ment. The term somato-centric when applied to sense-data 
implies that some are related to material bodies and some 
to the surrounding environment. See Price, PER, 38f. 
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sense•data view of the Given is to stand. There have been 
three such attempts, it is noted, (1) the Theory of Multiple 
Location, (2) the Theory of Compound Things, and (3) the The-
ory of Appearing. The proponents of these views offer sharp 
criticisms of the sense-datum view, as will be seen later. 
( 1) The Theory of Multiple Location, nroposed by ·~'illite• 
head, holds that a distinction must be made between the aual1-
ties which characterize an object from a place and those which 
characterize it simoly, i.e., the scientific account. The 
"multiply located" characteristics of an object are as little 
1 dependent on mind as i te "simoly loca.ted" ones. But Price 
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aeke if one and the same entity can £21Q be qualified from a 
place, and be qualified simply or from no place. It seems 
much more reasonable to bold that an object "exists wholly from 
a place and has no qual! ties whatever except multiply located 
ones."
2 llhere is no evidence for any others. (2) The Theory 
of Compound Things holds that illusory sense-data can be ex-
plained as in reality forming parts of the surface of the ob-
ject in question, but the object is a compound object.3 The 
criticism which can be offered is that there is no evidence 
for the existence of such a compound. "It is only a sort of 
towel-horse postulated ad hoc, to hang an inconvenient sense-
datum upon."4 (3) The third attempt to "save" nalve realism 
1. The view is often called Objective Relativism. See A. E. 
Murpht:"s article: "Objective Relativism in Dewey and White-
bead, in Phil. Rev., 36(1927), 121-144. 
2. Price, P.IR, 57. 
3. This is the view of S. Alexander and was invented by him. 
4. Price, PER, 61. 
is the so-called Theory of Appearing.1 This has a common-
sense starting point and holds, "that a visual or tactual 
sense-datum is always a part of an object's surface appear-
ing to some one to have certain characteristics. 112 This 
attempt fails not only because the word "appear• may be 
taken in two senses but also because it would treat pre-
sumed immediate indubitables as subject to question. Though 
a specific datum may have no real connection with an ex-
tarnal object, the datum is nonetheless a fact and cannot 
be explained as an appearance. Indeed, one begins with pre-
sent data and seeks to discover their meaning or referent. 
He does not know immediately if any datum has no referent 
or no meaning in the objective world. 
iii. The causal theory of perception rejected. 
Just as the sense-datum theory of the Given may be de-
fended against naive and ~so-na!ve realism, it may also 
stand up against the so-called causal theory of perception, 
it is said. This causal theory of perception maintains 
that any sense-datum is caused by an external object, and 
consequently, that "perceptual consciousness is fundamen~­
ally an inference from effect to cause."3 This view is si-
milar to Representationism which most of the followers of 
the essence theory are anxious to avoid. But it is closer 
1. This view is ably defended by G. Dawes Hicks in his arti-
cle "Sensible Appearances and Material Things," in Bright-
man (ed.), P6IC, 224-236. According to Murray, Art. (1933), 
Price fails to consider Hicks's view. 
2. Price, PER, 62. 3• Price, PER, 66. 
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to the sense-datum theory than nalve realism for it accepts 
immediate data as a starting point. 
An initial difficulty in the theory, it is pointed out, 
is the process involved in moving from the data to objects. 1 
The process of inference whereby knowledge of objects is 
presumably attained is not a conscious process. It is held 
that though one is not aware of a conscious process of in~ 
ference, it takes place unconsciously and it does so because 
in early childhood, patterns of inferential reasoning from 
data to objects were formed. Yet it may be urged that this 
supposed inferential process is very complicated. "No sim-
ple causal argument, which could be gone through again 
every time without trouble, will take us from a sense-datum 
to a material thing."2 
But how can on delimit the cause of sense-data? One 
could say they were caused by light rays in the retina, or, 
if one were viewing the light from an electric bulb he could 
push the 'cause' back to the dynamo, prehistoric coal forests, 
to whatever preceded them, etc. Though this argument has 
force, the causal theory merits more investigation before it 
is rejected. 
There are several ways of defending the causal theory 
which is so clearly illustrated in Berkeley. Price lists 
five distinct types of defense of the theory that sense-
data are produced by unsensed causes and presents them in 
1. See Price, PER, 67-70. 2. Price, PER, 69. 
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all fairness. 1 
Now the analysis of the causal theory is not especially 
rel'9vant here because the problem of the dissertation is 
not how one moves from sense-data to objects or material 
things, but the nature of immedifi.cy, the starting-point, or 
the given. Followers of the causal theory agree with the 
sense-datum theorists that there is something given but they 
disagree as to how much is given and to how one can "get 
out" of the given. The causal theorist would argue that the 
given would include an inferential process leading to ration-
al belief in a material or objective world. The sense-datum 
theorist would say there is no inferential process within 
perceptual consciousness. And he reaches this conclusion by 
analyzing the possible validity of the various methods of 
the causal theorist. As Price concludes: 
We have a consciousness of the material world, 
but ••• it is not an inferential consciousness--
neither ~ causal inference or any sort of in-
ference. 
In this discussion of the causal theory it may be 
noted that something which was earlier hinted at is now 
further implied, namely that the given is not identifiable 
1. These five types are: The Method of Correspondence, the 
Method of Discounting, the Method of Sources, the Method 
of Indispensables, and the Method of Hypothesis. See 
Price, PER, 74-91. 
2. Price, PER, 95. Price also carries his argument against 
the causal theory to the problem of how~other selves are 
known. See Art. (1932), and Art. (1938r. 
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with consciousness. 1 Sense-data which are given are present 
in consciousness. Also present in consciousness, appar·ently, 
is the material world. Price says: 
The Causal Theory holds that we are not entitled 
to consider that visual and tactual sense-data 
are constituents of the surfaces of material ob-
jects until we have proved that they are. But, 
whether we are ent1 tled to or not, what we actu-
ally do is just the opposite: we consider them to 
be so until it is proved that they are not,2 
The difficulties of the process of inference in the Causal 
Theory are avoided and a form of epistemic monism is ac-
cepted,3 though this is quite subtle. The Causal Theorists 
are, of course, epistemic dualists.4 It is exceedingly 
interesting to note that though Price denies inference in 
perception, he makes room for apriori innate ideas "in 
some good sense."5 He maintains that: 
what is innate and what is apriori must be the 
whole complex notion of material thinghood, in 
which causality is a f~ctor, not just the no-
tion of cause alone ••• 
1, See P~ge 103 of this dissertation. 
2, Price, PER, 100. See also 98-99. 
3. This is also brought out by L. Wood, Art. (1950), 534. 
Wood says that Price's view "veers off in the direction 
of monistic realism." 
4. One who opposes Price's view and holds to an inferential 
element in perception, yet is an epistemic monist, is B. 
Blanshard. See especially, NT, I, Chapter 2, where 
Price's view is discussed. 
5. Price, PER, 101. 1 6. Price, PER, 102. 
iv. The characteristics of the sense-data. 
It has already been suggested that sense-data besides 
being indubitably given are also neutral. It can also be 
said that they are not universals in any sense of the word. 
They are particular existents. But the question of what 
kind of particular existents they are may be asked. 
They are not to be understood as substances for, "they 
are unlike any substances known to us ••• They come into 
being at a stroke, and go out of being at a stroke."1 
Though they have some temporal duration it is a limited 
duration, "so that although the annihilation and re-creation 
of sense-data is not continuous, it certainly does happen 
and is indeed extremely frequent." 2 The appar~nt persis-
tence and numerical identity of sense-data are dependent on 
the originating cerebral conditions alone. They cannot 
change, for by definition they are unchanging. When there 
is an apparent change, there is really a new sense-datum. 
It may then be said that, "sense-data are not substances, 
but events or occurrences.•r3 
Now if sense-data are not substances but events, it 
may then be asked what ~ort of events they are. The three 
possibilities seem to be (1) physl.cal, (2) mental, and (3) 
cerebral. They are not physical for that would be the view 
of naive realism, already dealt with. But whether they are 
1. Price, PER, llJ. 
2. Price, PER, 115. 
3. Price, PER, 116. 
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mental or cerebral is a more involved question. 
There are no apriori objections to the view that sense-
data are psychical,1 but more must then be said of their 
nature. Can sense-data be understood as types of feeling? 
Certain similarities may be noted but, 11 it seems impossible 
to hold that we feeL red or loud or striped as we feel hun-
gry or afraid." 2 Despite the resemblances between sense-
data and emotions, there is not sufficient warrant for re-
garding them as qualities of what can be called 11feeling-
contents.113 Yet whether they are psychical or not in the 
general sense is a matter to be decided. 
As regards the other hypothesis, that sense-data are 
cerebral, there are likewise no simple decisive objections. 
Perhaps data can be viewed as neither physical or mental but 
vital, that is, inherent in one of the body's organs, parti-
cularly, the brain.4 But if they are so viewed, problems 
of the situations of sense-data arise. "If visual and tac-
tual sense-data inhere in the brain, shall we not have to say 
that the brain is in two places at once? 115 Nevertheless, 
one can view the brain according to its "vital aspect," and 
in this sense expanded visual or tactual fields do not af-
fect the status of its existence.6 
Neither the mental nor the cerebral view of sense-data 
1. Price, PER, 120. 
2. Price, PER, 126. (This 1s largely a language problem.) 
~: Price, PER, 12 • Price, PER, 127f. 
6: Price, PER, 128. Price, PER, 131. The point here is difficult to grasp. 
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can be overthrown, nor is either strong enough to carry the 
day. It may then be proposed that sense-data are related 
both to the psychical and the cerebral, for in fact, sense-
data depend upon both the self and the brain, 11 and could not 
occur in the absence of either. 111 The self and the organism 
which anilriates it foi'IIl a "substantial compound ••• and it is 
in this substantial compound ••• that the power of generating 
sense-data really inheres." 2 It can then be said that; 
sense-data are those vital processes in which, 
on the reception of physical stimuli, the ani-
mate organism displays external objects tj 
itself, or makes them manifest to itself. 
The synthesis sounds appealing but it can be criticized 
because the relation of sense-data to events inherent in the 
brain and the self, 11 is not at all the same as the rela-
tion of those events to one another."4 The conclusion which 
follows seems to be that sense-data are not to be related 
to substances at all, even a psycho-cerebral compound. 
There is a clear and close relation between the psycho-
cerebral compound and sense-data, but, 11 it does not happen 
to be the same sort of relation as that whidh subsists be-
tween two phases of one substance."5 The implication here 
is that sense-data are related both to minds and to the ex-
tarnal world and that neither mind nor the external world 
1. Price, 
2. Price, 
;3 •• Price, 4 Price, 
5. Price, 
PER, 
PER, 
PER, 
PER, 
PER, 
133· 
133· 
13;3f. 
134· 
137· 
See ensuing discussion. 
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nor brains can be understood without reference to sense-
data. 
v. Perceptual consciousness. 
Strictly speaking, the concept of a perceptual con-
sciousness which is supported by the sense-datum view here 
being considered, does not bear directly on the problem of 
the dissertation. The nature of the given has already been 
defined on the sense-datum theory. But it is important also 
to see how much is given and how much is not given on the 
sense-datum theory. A brief treatment of Price's view of 
perceptual consciousness will show this. 
Perceptual consciousness is distinguished from the 
Given.~ Indeed, it is that in which sense-data are to be 
found. Perceptual consciousness is more than the Given 
(sense-data) bat includes sense-data. Sense-data are indu-
bitables, but they are indubitables in andfor the percep-
tual consciousness. The indubitable given is an element 
in our total state of mind, but though indubitable, is but 
a part of perceptual consciousness. 
Now perceptual consciousness has two grades, percep-
tual acceptance and perceptual assurance.2 Perceptual ac-
ceptance is the term applied to that grade of consciousness 
wherein perceptual objects are taken for granted or accepted. 
And this being taken for granted is dependent on the sense-
1. A view which virtually identifies the Given with percep-
tual consciousness will be considered later. 
2. See Chapters VI and VII of Price, PER. 
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datum, The nature something 11 is taken to have obviously 
depends partly upon the nature of the present sense-datum."]. 
However, a material thing, "differs radically from any datum 
that we sense. 112 Perceptual acceptahce isn't an activity 
but since it is undoubting and unquestioning, "it resembles 
an act of intuitive consciousness.n3 
The whole of our knowledge of the empirical world, 
Price affirms, is derived from perceptual acceptances, yet 
single perceptual acceptances are inadequate to deal with 
a series of interrelated acts. This leads then to another 
level, or grade of consciousness called "perceptual assur-
ance.114 Perceptual assurance is a state of settled convic-
tion about the existence and character of material thinghood 
and it ~s reached by a process of advancing from an initial 
acceptance by the "Principle of Confirmability 11 5 or rational 
conviction. 
Of course, these are later stages of consciousness 
based originally on the Given, which consists of indubit~ble 
sense-data. It is interesting to note in this connection 
Price's statement: 
We may sum up this part of our discussion 
1. Price, PER, 142. 
2. Price, PER, 1~5. (A sense-datum is transitory, spatially 
incomplete, private, of many kinds, and without causal 
characteristics. A material thing persists, is spatially 
complete, public, an identity, and has causal meaning.) 
3. Price, PER, 153. 
~. Price, PER, 170. 5. See Price, PER, 188ff. 
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by saying that perceptual consciousness is an 
ultimate form of consciousness not reducible to 
any other; and further, it is an autonomous or 
self-correcting form of consciousness.! 
If it is ultimate, it might well be asked why 1t isn't the 
basic starting point or given on this theory. Again, if 
it is the "ultimate form of consciousness," what is the con-
sciousness of which it is a form? No answer to these ques-
tions is forthcoming in the presentation of the view. 
vi. Relations between sense-data--Families of sense-data. 
One further point must be brought out by way of ex-
pounding the theory that sense-data are given. This point 
2 is that sense-data are organized into "families." According 
to Kerby-+1iller, this idea is one of the two "outetanding 
novelties" of the whole theory. 3 But again, as with the case 
of perceptual consciousness, this emphasis sheds no particu-
lar light on the theory of the given. Families of sense-data 
are not given, though particular sense-data are. As Price 
says, "we could never have discovered families of sense-data 
at all except by a •synthetic' process."4 Interestingly 
enough, though this synthetic process ia not an inferential 
process, it is: 
simply the discovery of certain kinds of wholes 
1. Price, PER, 193. 
2. It is instructive to compare Whitehead's more fruitful 
concept of "society" at this point. See his PR, 136-167. 
3. Kerby-+1iller, Art. (1935), 192. For a criticism, see 
page 151 below. 
4. Price, PER, 310. 
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whose diverse parts are successively and 
separately presented, and or certfin kinds 
or relations between such wholes. 
The word "discovery" is used misleadingly in these instances. 
When something is discovered it is round, having been al-
ready there, but yet, ramilies or sense-data are not round, 
or given, they are arrived at by some snythetic process. 
The ramily or sense-data includes sense-data which are ac~­
ual and also others which may be said to be obtainable de-
pending on changes in the observer's point or view. Both 
the actual and the obtainable sense data are related to a 
"single standard solid. 112 When sense-data are seen as mem-
bers or ramilies, one may be assured or the existence or 
material things. 
3. The Relation or the Sense-data Theory to the .Sensum Theory. 
The sense-data theory about the given in perceptual 
knowledge cannot be understood as a unique novelty or in 
isolation rrom other related theories. The chier proponent 
or the view, Price, admits this in the Prerace to his Per-
ception. The sense-data theory is in the great tradition 
or British analytic empiricism. It acquires more meaning 
when it is saen in relation to views similar to it, and, 
indeed, views out or which it grew. 
1. Price, PER, 
2. Price 1 PER, 
see 230-237. 
310. 
267. 
See 
For a discussion or "standard solids" 
also Price, Art. (1927), 117. 
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The view most like the sense-data theory, in general. 
is the "Sensum Theory." In fact it is, for some, apparently 
so similar that the two views are often coupled when criti-
cisms are made. And yet there are marked differences in the 
views, which their apoitles are careful to note. For ex-
ample, Price, the representative of the sense-data view, 
although admitting affinities with Broad who supports the 
sensum theory, nevertheless discredits Broad's terminology 
and takes issue with him on several points, 1 particularly 
on the idea of the Given and its content. Again, there ~re 
meaningful differences among those who are adherents of the 
sensum theory itself. N. K. Smith implies that sensa are 
psychically conditioned, and has a chapter in his best 
known work on epistemology entitled "The Categories. 112 
He is more concerned with the "presentational continuum" 
than is Broad.3 The literature on the sensum theory, its 
background and ramifications is extensive and a thorough 
treatment of it is beyond the scope of this d.issertation. 
Yet several points of similarity and contrast ahould be 
noted between it and the sense-data theory on the specific 
problem of the given. Some of the intricate interrelations 
of various facets of the sensum theory have been worked out 
1. For example, see Price, PER, 19, and 267n. 
2. The title of Smith's book is Prolegomena to an Idealist 
Theory of Knowledge. Chapter VII is the one dealing with 
the categories. Broad does admit the possibility of 
sensa being psychically conditioned. ST, 516. 
3. See Chapter VI. 
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1 in detail in C. w. Morris's Six Theories of Mind, and to 
some extent by John Laird in his Knowledge, Belief, and 
Opinion.2 Certain differences between the sense-data theory 
and the sensum theory have been pointed out by Blanshard. 3 
The following observations may be made on the relation 
of one view to the other: 
(a) Both the sense-data theory and the sensum theory 
are primarily oonoerned with the problem of knowledge as it 
relates to perception and the treatments of eaoh view are 
admittedly limited to perceptual knowledge. In discussing 
the "raw materials" of knowledge, then, only the question of 
sensory knowledge is considered. In a way, both views beg 
the question on the nature of knowledge by limiting the evi-
dence beforehand. Prioe, for ina tanoe, refers to "other 
4 data'' besides sense-data. And Drake in oritioizing Broad's 
sensum theory maintains that his diotrine of essence, "is 
of wider application than Broad's term 'sensum' because ••• 
the problem of consciousness is essentially the same in oases 
of perception, memory, oonoeption, eta. " 5 Neither Broad 
nor Price seem too oonoerned about this. 
(b) The sense-data view as opposed to the sensum theory 
stresses the faots of givenness and makes careful use of the 
terms "given" and "datum." The very term sense-datum, "is 
meant to stand for something whose existence is indubitable. "6 
1. See Chapter IV. 
2. See Chapter XII. 
3. NT, I, 143. 
4. Prioe, PER, 4. 
5. Drake, Art. (1925), 322. 
6. Prioe, PER, 19. 
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This is not the case with the sensum theory. Indeed, there 
are particular existents in a perceptual situation, but they 
are highly individualized and vary with each individual. 
This is clearly brought out in a striking statement by 
Broad: 
At a place, where the physicist would say that 
a single physical process is going on, it is 
possible for all sorts of qualitatively differ-
ent sensa to be sensed by putting in different 
observers or by altering the states of a single 
observer. If physiological processes be purely 
selective, we shall have to postulate as many 
different kinds of sensa-co-existing at a given 
place and time as any observer, however abnor-
mal his bodily condition, can sense if put there at 
that time.l 
This is undoubtedly the sharpest difference between the 
sense-datum view and the sensum theory. What the former 
view would consider an indubitable starting point of per-
ceptual knowledge, the latter would take as a subjective 
variable. No doubt the sense-datum theory with its 
stress on the indubitable givens of consciousness arose as 
a corrective to the problems raised by a view which had 
everything but indubitables. It may be said that the 
sense-datum view is more empirical in that it accounts for 
knowledge on the basis of assumed incontrovertible facts and 
explains error as due to a subjective failur~ to relate the 
facts properly. The sensum theory seems to come at the 
problem backwards. It admits that there is perceptual 
1. Broad, ST, 528. 
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knowledge and then casts about in thought for an exolanation 
of illusion and error, settling on the idea that many, and 
often utterly differing, sensa, may relate to any one per-
ceptual object. Price asks whether this theory does not 
"give us more than the facts warrant." 1 
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It must be noted that another proponent of the sensum 
theory does place some stress on what the sense-datum theorist 
would call the given. N. K. Smith speaks of the "presentation-
al continuum"2 and deals with varying views of its content. 
He does not make 1t an indubitable sta.rt1ng point, but rather 
treats it in a Kantian way, suggesting that it is a source of 
the mind's materials, materials upon which categories will op-
erate,3 Much concern is shown tor the starting point of knowl-
edge, but it is not thoroughgoing, Lovejoy points out that 
Smith gives four distinct answers to the question of the gener-
ation of sensa and that the elements of his book "have no true 
logical affinity tor one another, "4 
(c) Because of its stress on immediacy and the given in 
knowing, the sense-datum view is closer to Phenomenalism than 
the sensum view, The latter, on the other hand is much clos-
er to naYve realism, or a commonsense account of perception. 
It is very interesting to note how Price carefully differ-
entiates his view from Phenomenalism and shows how it 
1, Price, Art. (1926)1, 170, 
2, The term was originally James Ward's, and Smith acknowl-
edges his debt to Ward, though departing from him, 
3, See Chapters VI (especially 12lf) and VII of Smith, PITK. 
4, Lovejoy, Art. (1925}, 193, 
differs from that position. 1 Brett, in reviewing a presen-
tation of the sensum theory says that Broad, "is really con-
cerned to establish a refined form of common sense."2 Price, 
who is a foe of naive realism once said that, "so far as the 
facts go, there is no reason whatever to think that common 
sense is right."3 
(d) The sensum theory seems to introduce something extra 
or a tertium quid into the problem of perception, "particu-
lar existents (sensa) which flourish in the private space of 
mind. 114- In this sense it resembles the essence theory pre-
viously discussed. Sensa become vehicles for perceptual 
knowledge, vehicles which are rather wobbly because one 
doesn't quite know what they are. The sense-datum theory, 
on the other hand avoids any tertium quid, but it does run 
into the dangers of epistemic monism. 
(e) Both sense-data and sensa are neutral. Sensa, 
it is said, "are particular existents of a peculiar kind 
being neither mental nor physical.n5 That sense-data are 
neutral is brought out in an earlier section of this paper, 
(2,i). The most that ~an be said of both sensa and sense-
data is that they are events. But the sensum theory does 
not deal with how these events are related as the sense-
datum theory does, when, for instance, it speaks of "families 
1. See for exam~le, Price, PER, 181, 20S, and 314. 
2. Brett, Art. (1928), 184-. 
; •• Price, Art. (1927), 125. 4 Blanshard, NT, I, i4-3. 5. Broad MPN, 184. 
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of sense-data" and their relation to "Standard Solids." 
(f) The passage from sense-data to the perceived phy-
sical object and the passage from sensa to perceived objects 
are processes of varying complexity. It is easier to follow 
the exposition of Price as to how perceptual knowledge occurs, 
moving from the indubitable sense-data. The sensa theory 
does not so easily explain the process of perceptual knowledge. 
Indeed as Blanshard says: 
It is not easy to make out how, if we are really 
confined to sensa, we also manage to go beyond 
them and gain real knowledge of physical things.1 
Instead of attributing differences in appearances, and the 
facts of illusion and error to the perceiving subject and 
his troubles, Broad posits a whole new world of particular 
existent sensa. He avoids Berkeley, but other problems 
crowd in on him. 2 
Other points might well be raised by way of comparison 
and contrast on these two theories, but any thorough detailed 
comparison would take a volume the size of Scientific Thought 
at least. Several important critics of the sensum theory, 
as such, must be noted in concluding this section on compari-
son. Some of the criticisms made against the sensum theory 
apply in part to the sense-datum theory in so far, for example, 
as both views may be called ~tomistic. G. Dawes Hicks is a 
1. Blanshard, NT, I, 143. 
2. For example, the problem of the nature of the mental life 
which Drake points out in Art. (1926)1. 234. 
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thoroughgoing critic of the sensum theory contending that 
"there are no such things as sensations. 111 Durant Drake 
was consistently critica.l of the sensum theory, at one point 
calling it "na"!ve. 112 H. C. Brown makes some very discern-
ing observations against the psychological approach of the 
sensum theory.3 Helen Smith avers that Broad in his sen-
sum theory takes as an underlying assumption the bifurca-
tion of nature.4 Other criticisms may be found in l!lmost any 
recent book dealing with the problem of knowledge.5 
4• Implications of the Sense~datum Theory. 
The implications of the sense-datum theory of the given 
are somewhat more subtle than those of the essence doctrine, 
for the latter is a broader, more inclusive point of view. 
On the sense-datum view, not many clear-cut implications may 
1. Hicks, TRE, 17. See also the chapter on "The Sensum Theory" 
in his CR, 48-67, in which Broad's view is analyzed very 
carefully. Notable also are his published contributions to 
the Aristotelian Society, such as his section in the sym-
posium on "The Nature of Sensible Appearances," Art. (1926). 
An article of similar import, "Sensible Appearances and 
Material Things" is found in Brightman (ed.), P6IC, 224-
236. 1 
2. Drake, MPN, 14?.2 See also Art. (1925)j 322; Art. (1926) , 2.33f; Art. ( 1926) , 581; and Art. ( 1928 1, 67. 
3. Brown's article is entitled "Scientific Thought and Real-
ity", Jour. Phil., 21(1924), 393-410. Cf. his article 
"Why the Sensa?" in Brightman (ed.), P6IC, 245-250. 
4. Smith, Art. (1929), 99-120. The title is: "sensible Ap-
pearances, Sense-Data, and Sensations." 
5. A few may be noted here: Lewis, MWO, 3lf; Lovejoy, RAD, 
116-117; Morris, STM, 159-161; N. K. Smith, PITK, 79f; 
Wood AK, 33. 
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be noted. The fact that Price's view is called phenomenalis-
tic by some and realistic by others indicates the -possibili-
ties of interpretation. 
i. Impl1ca tiona for the theory of knowledge. 
It is the obvious desire of the sense-datum epistemolo-
gists to find the clue to a geueral theory of knowledge in 
their views on perception, though they are secondarily inter-
ested in metaphysics also. Clearly, there are imnlications 
for epistemology on the view that the Given consists of sense-
data. One possible implication is Phenomena.l1sm, a mild form 
of scepticism regarding one's knowledge of external objects. 
It seems that everywhere, the possibility of Phenomenalism is 
recognized by Price, but he avoids it like the plague. As 
Hahn, in perhaps the most detailed and exhaustive critique of 
Price's sense-datum view, puts it: 
A large part of his entire theory depends upon 
what might be called phenomenalistic grounds. 
His reluctance to give·,,up phenomenalism, coupled 
with his feeling that 'a prudent philosopher will 
keep as close to it as he possibly can,' is the key 
to the very great im£ortance he attaches to combina-
tions of sense-data. 
The view is close to Phenomenalism for it seeks to derive 
knowledge of an objective world by forming combinations of 
immediate elements. It is similarly close to idealism. The 
question might well be raised whether it is possible to do this 
and still avoid subjectivism of some sort. Price thinks he 
1. Hahn, CTP, 163. Susan Stebbing Says: "It1wouldn
1 t be incon-
sistent with Phenomenalism ••• ," Art. (1933) , 352. '~ood says 
the view "is phenomenalistic up to a point." Art. ( 1950), 
534. 
has avoided this implication and indeed he has, according to 
1 his explanation of the idea of the family of sense-data. 
this will be considered below when various criticisms are 
examined. 
If Phenomenalism as a general epistemic theory is not 
clearly implied, it is possible to maintain that an episte-
mic monism is implied on this sense-datum theory of the 
given. As has been shown, the view would not support or al-
low any element of inference in knowing and holds also that 
knowing is not referential. Evidence of physical objects is 
directly present to the mind, and physical objects are di-
rectly apprehended in the sub-inferential synthesizing of 
the evidence. Sense-data are not mind dependent but objects 
are sense-data dependent. Though the problem of how the 
existence of other minds is possible is not taken up in the 
examination of perception, 1t is interesting to note that 
epistemic monism is also implied on this matter. Price 
favors not the Analogical theory concerning other minds, 
but rather the Intuitional theory.2 
Another implication for the theory of knowledge is that 
absolute or certain knowled~e is impossible and that probabi-
lity is the key. 3 The idea of perceptual assurance is clear-
ly related at this point. Price says that though 
1. Of. Price, PER, 314f. 
2. Cf. two articles by Price. 1. "Our Knowledge of Other 
Minds" in P.A.S •• 33(1931-32), 53-78. 2. "Our Evidence for 
the Existence of Other Minds," in Philosophy, 13( 1938) , 
425-456. 
3. Price, Art. (1927), 125. 
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perceptual assurance, "cannot strictly be called lmowledge 
of the material world, (it) is quite sufficient for all the 
purposes of Science and of daily life. 111 
ii. Implications for the theory of mind. 
The sense-data view of the given, here considered, does 
not deal specifically with the problem of the nature of mind. 
Bertrand Russell who is sometimes classed as a sense-datum 
epistemologist has something of a theory of mind, but his 
view is not being considered here because he has no single, 
crystallized view and he does not deal with the problem of 
the Given especially. In a very recent lecture, he denied 
that there was any such entity as mind and defended this view 
on the grounds of a nee-realistic ontology, 2 not on epistem-
ological grounds. The sensum theorist has a view of mind, 
but that theory is not the chief concern here.3 
Both H. D. Oakeley4 and D. J. B. Hawkins5 point out that 
there is no clear doctrine of the self on Price's sense-data 
view and suggest that this is one of its weaknesses. But 
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though there is no clear doctrine set forth,certairi implications 
1. Price, PER, 203. 
2. This was expressed in the Matchette Lecture delivered by 
Lord Russell at Purdue University, November 1, 1951. This 
has not yet appeared in print. Title: 11 The Physical Condi-
tions of Thinking." 
3. This is to be found in Broad's The Mind and its Place in 
Nature, especially, 556-666. For a critical discussion see 
Morris, STM, 147 and 159-161. Also, Drake's 11What Is a 
,Mind?", Art, (1926)1 0 4· In an Art. (1938), 4-0f. 5. In his book COE, 36. 
are to be found regarding the mind nevertheless. 
The mind or consciousness is not identified with the 
given on Price's view, but rather, the given is one element 
in consciousness,1 But what is consciousness apart from 
the given? Sometimes Price's view seems to identify the 
mind with the brain, particularly when he speaks of the 
Emergent Theory and "soma to-centric data." He suggests: 
Or one might use the language of the Emergent 
Theory, and hold that sensuous qualities like 
red and loud emergently qualify certain physico-
chemical processes in the brain when these reach · 
a certe.in degree of complex! ty ••• ,Sense-data may 
very well inhere in the brain because it is a liv-
ing organ, and ••• they are vital processes.2 
It is hard to see how the brain itself could ever be given. 
Perhaps the view is closer to a double-aspect theory or even 
dualism. 
In any case the self and the brain, or rather 
the self and the entire organism which it ani-
mates, together form a substantial compound, 
having certain characteristics ••• which neither 
of them would possess if it existed alone •••• 
And is in this substantial compound, not in the 
two parts of it, that the ~ower of generating 
sense-data really inheres.' 
tn a later piece of writing it is said that it is debatable 
"whether there could be a mind without the sense of 
1. Cf. PER, 311, where a distinction is made between sense-
data and "my consciousness of matter." 
2, PER, 128. 
3. Price, PER, 133, In a note here, it is sugge•ted that 
there &ould be purely mental or purely cerebral events, 
Compare, however, Art. {1944), where the view of an em-
bodied mind or 'llinded body "seems ••• erroneous." {xiv). 
embodiment, 111 But it is also claimed that "there could per-
fectly well be a mind which in fact possessed no body at all" 
and this "would be quite entitled to be called a 'self 1 , 112 
Thus the problem is not easily solved. 
One thing is evident at least, on the sense-data view 
as here set forth, that Hume 1 s view of the mind is not ac-
cepted. This is implied in the proposed belief in innate 
ideas and is made explicit when the critic's "pulverized 
conception of the self113 is challenged, The appeal is to 
experience and it is urged that new insight about the self 
is available ."when we reflect.,. upon the 'totalistic 1 char-
acter of the voluminous life-feeling and upon its connection 
with self-consciousness,.,n4 Again: "The Regularity Thee-
rist is so intent upon the acquisition of knowledge that he 
has forgotten what it feels like to be alive."5 
The expression "voluminous life-feeling" has affinities 
with Bergson's la duree reelle. It is this voluminous life-
feeling "which we all carry about with us wherever we go."6 
A few words on memory and self-recognition would have been 
invaluable here, but they are not to be found. The view 
of mind which is implied is confusing. It is difficult to 
see how one can have an acceptable theory of knowledge if 
t!1ere is no clear view of mind to go along with it. 
1. Price, Art, ( 1944), xiv. 
2. Price, Art. ( 1944), xiv. 
f~ Price, Art. ( 1944), xxiv, Price, Art, ( 1944), xxv. Price, Art. ( 19lliP, xxv. Price, Art, ( 19 ) , xi, 
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iii. Implications ror ontology. 
In his initial discussion or the given in perceptual 
knowledge, Price states clearly that his view or the given 
as consisting of sense-data has no ontological implications. 
He says that the term sense-datum "is meant to be a neutral 
term. 111 And it presumably does not imply that sense-data 
are physical as does the expression "sensible species." 
Nor does it allegedly imply an idealistic ontology as do such 
terms as "idea," "impression," or "sensation." 
However, the claimed neutrality concerning the given 
'has been questioned, notably, by Winston Barnes in an arti-
cle, "The Myth or Sense Data." It is Barnestl contention 
that the very use or the term is, 
an attempt both to stop the rot of Cartesian 
doubt and to meet the idealist contention 
that all perception involves inrerence, with 
its corollary that ir we seek a datum in 
sub-perceptual sensation, we rind a state 
where the distinction between the ego and its 
object vanishes.2 
Barnes further suggests that if the datum means that in 
sense experience a perceiver is immediately informed or the 
existence of certain things and of their attributes, without 
the chance or error, the idealistic view is answered. or 
course, the term then is not ontologically neutral. This 
does seem to be the case on Price's view. 
The dominant ontological implication is that idealism 
1. Price, PER, 19. 2. Barnes, Art. (1945), 109. 
is unacceptable and that a form of realism, somewhat diluted, 
is tenable. This is particularly evident in that chapter in 
Perception entitled, "The Relation of Sense-data to Matter." 
Here it is brought out that sense-data are causally dependent 
on states and changes in physical occupants, and physical oc-
cupants are external to mind. Sense-data then, are not 
mind dependent for "if there were no physical occupants there 
would be no sense-data. The sensuous part of Total Nat.ure 
does depend upon the physical part."1 The given, (i.e. sense-
data), does not imply mind dependence, but extra-mental ob-
jects.2 This implication is not an evident one in epistemic 
analysis, but can be shown, as Price claims to have done 
when the perceptual act is thoroughly understood. 
Besides realism, which seems to be the most obvious on-
tological implication here, it may be urged that this view 
of the given implies phenomenalism. That there are strong 
tendencies toward phenomenalism throughout the view, is not 
denied, and certain agreements with Phenomenalism are noted. 
Kerby-Miller speaks of Price's "failure to find evidence for 
realism on the basis of a phenomenological analysis of ex-
perience.n3 But this possible interpretation has been anti-
cipated by Price in his claim that sense-data are causally 
dependent on material things.4 
1. Price, PER, 320. 
2. See Oakeley, Art. (1938), 38. "The notion that the his-
toric data are like all other data which occur, mind-inde-
pendent, and in themselves possible members of families of 
sense-data, forces us into a dubious metaphysic." 
3. Kerby-Miller, Art. (1935), 192. 4. See PER, 314• 
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5. Criticisms of the given as consisting of sense-data. 
The criticisms which follow are for the most part, derived 
from books and articles which discuss the particular sense-
datum view here under discussion. However, certain general 
criticisms are cited even though they do not refer to Price's 
thought particularly. Where criticisms have been answered, 
appropriate footnote references will be given. 
i. The view is unempirical. 
It may be said that the sense-data theory of the given 
is unempirical for several reasons. One is brought out by 
Ledger Wood in his Analysis of Knowledge. Wood claims that 
the view is psychologically false. 
The sense-data conceived as pure, homogeneous 
and changeless qualities have no psychological 
existence--they are 1n fact mere abstractions 
from and ideilizations of qualitatively complex 
experiences. 
Such 11psychological.atomism1 11 it is further said, has been 
vigorously attacked by almost every contemporary school of 
psychology including Gestaltists, psycho-analysts and be-
haviorists. The answer which the sense-datum theorists give, 
namely, that a logical analysis is prior to a psychological 
one, is also criticized by Wood. He maintains that logic 
and psychology cannot be so sharply sundered, and that "the 
attempted divorce ••• has had disastrous consequences, 
1. Wood, AK, 34-. This does not deny .that sense-data are ever 
given but that they are the only given. 
1 particularly for epistemology." Suggesting that the psy-
chology of perception provides "the only possible point of 
departure for an epistemology of perception," be adds: "The 
sense-datum theory if judged psychologtcally f~a.lsa ciannot 
2 
claim to be logically or epistemologically true." 
• 
This psycbolo~cal criticism is also made by Mursell 
who says that no free simple sensations can be found in an 
introspective analysis. He adds this further support: 
All structuralistic attempts to show how men-
tal functions can be analyz~d down into a series 
and constructs of simple sensations are bound 
to fail simply because the underlying organic 
conditions of mental life are such that mental 
functions, to exist and occur at all, must in-
volve more than receptor responses.3 
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A somewhat different slant on this charge that the sense-
data view is unempir1cal is found in a more recent article 
by Isabel Stearns •. She maintains that: 
nowhere does a sensuous element appear apart 
from some, however inchoate, form; always it 
is ordered and oriented with reference to a 
total mixture; and sensuous feeling as a 
whole
4
travels through and through this mix-
ture. 
In other words, there are no sense-data according to the mean• 
ing of the term as investigated hera. 
1. Wood, AX, 35. 
2. Wood, AX, 35. But see Price PER, 17ln. 1 3. Mursell, Art. ( 1922) , 687. See also Lamprecht's Art. ( 1922) , 
174,, where it is held that sensations are qualities which ap-
pear only in connection with a certain process. 
4. Stearns, Art. (1942), 362. 
Pragmatic epistemologists also charge the view with 
being unempirical and suggest that sense-data are products 
of analysis not basic characteristics of the Given. n,ey 
maintain that knowledge really begins with perceptually ac-
cepted objects ~d that the analysis of Price is based on 
such received objects. 11 The indubitable sense-datum is an 
eventual product arrived at only by analyzing a preanalytical 
1 perceptually acc~pted object." It is further saia that, 
"sense-data are not the starting point for our inquiry, but 
rather aspects of a dynamic whole analyzed out for some 
specific purpose. 112 But one wonders whether the counter-as-
sertion of the pragmatist has any more of an empirical basis 
than the sense-data view. Indeed it seems to beg the ques-
tion. 
It may further be said that the sense-data theory of the 
given is unempirical for it is atomistic. Just how far may 
the given be analyzed into sense-data? How does one know he 
has reached a point in his an~lysis which is no longer sub-
ject to analysis? In criticizing the causal theory of per-
caption, Price points out that one could never really know 
what caused perception because the view leads to an infinite 
regress.3 It seems also that one could never know what a 
1. Hahn, CTP, 127. See Dewey EN, 144 where the same point 
is made. (This reference was suggested by Hahn~) Compare 
.also, Loewenberg's article: "Pre-Analytical and Post-
Analytical Data," in Jour. Phil., 24(1927), 5-14. See 
Price PER, 17 for an answer to this charge. 
2. Hahn, CTP, 127. (Essentially an Hegelian criticism.) 
3. See Price, PER, 69. 
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sense-datum was for the same reason. A discussion of the 
logical difficulties of such an atomistic view may be found 
in Bowers~ Atomism, Empiricism and Scepticism where it is 
maintained: 
It is by no means clear that atomism is con-
sistent with any principle of induction what-
soever let alone with one that is also self-
evident ••• The essence of atomism ••• is to deny 
that the occurrence of any event can determine 
or influence the occurrence of any other event, 
while it would certainly seem to be just thi! 
that any principle of induction must assert. 
The criticism that the sense-data theory is unempirical 
bacause it is not inclusive enough in its interpretation of 
the .given will be treated below. (viii), 
ii, Sense-data are not indubitable, it is said, 
One of the cardinal points in the exposition of the 
sense-data view is that sense-data are indubitable. They 
comprise the necessary starting point for knowledge and can-
not be questioned. It is interesting to note that where 
sense-data are indubitable for Price, essences are indubi-
table for Santayana.2 This leads to the obvious observation 
that sense-data have been doubted, not only by Santayana, but 
by other epistemologists as well. Hicks, for example, main-
tains that sense-data "never are, as such, 'given. 111 3 As 
Hahn puts it: "Whether or not Professor Dawes Hicks is right, 
1. Bowers, AES, 41. 
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2, Santayana, SAF, ~5. 
3. Hicks, Art. (192fi'), 225. (Hahn points this out in CTP, 13~). 
it is hard to imagine a greater strain upon the indubita-
1 bility of the sense-datum." Though sense-data are pre-
sumably indubitable,· Price himself notes that "many philoso-
phers do profess to doubt this and even deny it. 112 The word 
11 indubitable 11 is unfortunate for it claims a great deal and 
indeed, is a veiled quest for certainty. Whether a certain 
starting point for knowledge can be found or even defined 
is open to question.3 The critic of indubitability is simi-
larly not certain of his starting point. The fact that there 
is disagreement about what is certain or indubitable does 
not mean there is nothing indubitable, but it does indicate 
the profound difficulties which arise whenever such a claim 
is made, Each one of the four theories being considered in 
this dissertation holds that its particular view of the 
given is as certain, or indubitable as it is possible to be. 
Perhaps the solution can be found by inquiring after that 
theory of the given which is most probable, not that which 
is most certain. And yet, probability is presumably based 
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on factual evidence, As Lewis has said: "Probability itself 
must rest upon some antecedent certainty."~ Can one speak of 
1. Hahn, CTP, 134. (This work incorporates an article by Hahn 
entitled "Neutral and Indubitable Sense Data as a Starting 
Point for Theories of Perception. 11 -in Jour. Phil., 36(1939), 
589-6oo;) Indubitability is also challenged by Cousin in 
an article in the Proc. Aris, Soc, for 1935-36, entitled: 
"Some Doubts About Knowledge." See 259-264. 
2. Price, PER, 5. 
3. See Cousin,.Art. (1936), 26~. "I conclude, then, that 
intuitive certainty of synthetic propositions does not 
exist. There is certainty but it is confined within the 
limits of tautology," 4. Lewis, ~MO, 309. 
probable factual evidence ? The words become meaningless 
and indeed the very idea of 1fact 1 is open to question. 
This has led some thinkers to Phenomenological inquiry, and 
not a little justification can be seen for this approach, 
though it is somewhat beyond the scope of the present dis-
sertation. 
iii. Data are not neutral or unchanging. 
A somewhat similar criticism of the sense-data theory 
of the given is that sense-data are not neutral and un-
changing, as it is claimed. Part of the uniqueness of the 
sense-data theory is its claim that there are no ontological 
implications in the concept of sense-data. As has been sug-
gested earlier, this claim can be challenged. It can be said 
that the attempt to atart with neutral data "is to start with 
the traditional mechanist's inner world of mind ••• and make the 
old attempt to show how we can have any knowledge of theeK-
ternal world."1 Can one begin with Cartesian doubt in order 
to gain knowledge? If one does, it is possible that there 
is no way out. As Hahn says: "If one starts from a truly 
neutral starting place, I fail to see how anyone could be-
come involved in the problem of a material world at large."2 
Price might well reply, however, that it is difficult and th~ 
our knowledge is only probable.3 
1. H.aEil, CTP, 132. See Barnes, Art. (1945l, who says the term 
sense-datum is not neutral "but marked with the saars.of 
combat." (1Q9). See also Prichard, KAP, 213. 
2. Hahn, CTP, 133. 
3. See Price, PER, 203. The "way out" is via perceptual as-
surance, Price would say. "This perceptual assurance ••• is 
quite sufficient for all the purposes of Science and of 
daily life. 11 
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It is said that the view that sense-data are unchang-
I ing is an incorrect report of the facts. Blyth maintains 
that it seems quite certain that there is at least change in 
the brilliance of sense-data, and, be adds: 
It seems possible that there is also a change 
in size and shape of the sense-datum, or sense-
data, specifying a side of the match box as it 
is turned. 
Oakeley, too, is dubious of the claim that sense-data are 
unchanging. She suggests that it might be permissible to 
say they are unchanging for practical purposes but such an 
interpretation "provides a basis only for a 11mi ted account 
of perception. For a more complete account, we have to sur-
vey the continual transformations of perceived collections 
of sense-data in our continuously changing experience. "2 
Habno in his extended criticism of the sense-data theory 
urges that the concept of unchanging sense-data is contra-
dictory. It is so, because a view of somatic data is held 
and these data are made up of many parts which differ from 
time to time. An example would be a pa1n.3 
iv. Alleged linguistic character of the view. 
A cri t1cism which seems to deny the whole point of the 
sense-data theory of the given is the charge that the whole 
problem is merely one of terminology. Ayer,,for example, 
1. Blyth, Art. (1935), 61. But see Price, PER, 115f. Changes 
in brilliance etc., would be new sense-data. 
2. Oakeley, Art. (1938), 37. 
3. Hahn, 017, 161. 
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maintains that the theory of sense-data is not a theory at 
all, but simply an alternative language for speaking about 
perceptual situations, a language invented by philosophers for 
1 the purpose of epistemological discussion. Like other posi-
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tivist criticisms, this one has the merit of being rather 
sweeping and the defect of being rather shallow. In commenting 
on A;,er' s or! ticisms, Barnes says that they "need not detain 
us long" but he adds that the language of the sense-data the-
2 
cry "seems to be decidedly inferior to ordinary language." 
However, as O'Connor has said, "Philosophy tries to do a job 
for which ordinary language was never intended. " 3 < 
A somewhat milder form of the linguistic criticism is 
offered against the sense-data theory by Prichard. He sug-
gests that there is a language difficulty in the sense-
datum theory because perceiving and knowing are confused and, 
indeed, identified.. When such thinkers as Russell and Price 
talk of sense-data, Prichard says, they are at the sa~e time 
introducing a certain theory, mamely, "the theory that per-
ce1v1ng is a kind of knowing, a theory apart from which the 
use of the term is illegitimate. "4 When one goes behind 
such a statement as: The color I see is a sense-datum, he 
l, Ayer 1 FEKl especially Chapter II. Price answers this in Art. \l941J, and says: "It is· very desirable that be 
should explain sometime the precise sense in which the 
choice of one sort of linguistic rules rather than another 
is optional or conventional" (292). 
2. Barnes, Art. (1945), 110, 
3. O'Connor, Art. (1951) 1 808. The whole article is valuable. 4. Prichard, KAPI 210. \Included in the chapter "The Sense-
Datum Fallacy" which is a reprint of a 1938 article.) 
finds that this "is only a misleading way of saying: 'My 
seeing the colour which I am seeing is a special kind of way 
of knowing it.' 111 This is the reason, Prichard implies, why 
the sense-datum theorists fail to see that "Berkeley was 
right about secondary qualities being dependent on the ob-
server.112 
Price admits the logic of the charge but counters 
Prichard's criticism inquiring whether the falsity of the 
sense-datum view can be shown by a self-evident fact. He 
asks: "Is it self-evident that some sound which we hear is 
dependent on our hearing of it? For my part, I cannot see 
that it is."3 However, a sound which we hear is heard. 
v. Veridical knowledge reputedly impossible. 
Probably the most serious charge against the sense-
data view of the given is that it does not allow for the 
possibility of veridical knowledge. As Blyth puts it, the 
•theory permits us no valid assurance of the existence of 
any material thing."4 This is primarily because it is not 
shown how certain sense-data fit together and are continuous 
so that a single solid might be formed. Going into this 
further, it may be noted that the real problem is the question 
of escaping from immediacy". Price gives a clear account of 
what is immediate, but then suggests that it is possible to 
1. Prichard,.KAP, 211, Cf. Mursell, Art. (1922), 688. 
2. Prichard, KAP, 207. 
3. Price, Art. (1951), 114. 
Prichard's criticisms. 
4. Blyth, Art. (1935), 6o. 
See also 113 for an analysis of 
Cf. Price, PER, 203. 
148 
know objects by forming combinations of the immediately given1 
The immediate is transcended by rearrangements of immediate 
data. As Hahn says: 
It seems very curious to argue that one es-
capes from an inner realm of sense-data by 
forming various combinations of these sense-
data, however marvelous or a priori these 
compounds may be.l 
It would seem that the view of immediate, indubitable sense-
data is similar to the view of Kant's products of the sensi-
bility. In both instances, the analysis is so thorough-
going, that special machinery must be set up to make know-
ledge possible. Kant introduces the schematization of the 
categories. Price makes knowledge possible by offering 
innate apriori ideas. Minds can make the passage from sense-
data to things by their innate power.2 Hahn asks: "But is 
this not a rather heavy price to pay for our indubitable 
data?"3 Nothing is found in immediacy whereby knowledge can 
be attained so something which is found nowhere, but must be, 
is introduced and it makes knowledge possible. It is not 
hard to see why some critics have called the view phenomen-
al1stic.4-
But a more thorough examination is needed here. What, 
specifically, besides the emphasis on immediacy, leads to 
1. Hahn, CTP, 163. 
2. Cf. Price, PER, 306. " ••• The notion of material thinghood 
.is an apriori notion." See also 168r. 
;3. Hahn, CTP, i4-1~ 
~.For example, Blyth, Art. (1935), 65; Kerby-Mi~ler, Art • 
.. (1935), 192. 
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the criticism that veridical knowledge is, if not impossible, 
difficult? Two points will be brought out: (1) The diffi-
culty in the concept of Physical Occupant and (2) the pro-
blems in the idea of families of sense-data. 
(1) It is by means of the concept of 'physical occupant• 
that Price's view can be distinguished from Phenomenalism, 
it can be said. Yet he is not clear as to what a physical 
occupant is.l It is related to the notion of causal mani-
festation. And, as Miss Stabbing says, the "main defect ••• 
is his failure adequately to consider the nature of causal 
relation."2 Price holds that; 
sense-data cohere together in families, and 
families are coincident with physical occu-
pants: indeed a physical occupant ••• is de-
fined as a causally characterized entity with 
which a family of sense data is coincident. 
It is simply not the case that the sense-data 
and the physical occupants are related only 
in a causal way, though doubtless they are 
in fact causally related; and it simply is 
the case that thanks to this coincidence they 
form a complex of quite another sort.3 
It is this complex which means material thing or piece of 
matter. But what is the causal relation? It cannot be too 
great, or the causal theory of perception is re-introduced, 
and this is untenable on Price's view. Murray claims that 
Price is virtually accepts the first principle of the cau-
p.l theory.4-
1. Cf. Blanshard, NT, I~ 143. 4. Murray, Art. (1933), $20. 
2. Stabbing, Art. (1933~. 353. 
3. Price, PER, 302. 
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Baylis brings out that Price needs the theory of the 
physical occupants in order to deal with the problems raised 
by his rejection of unsensed sense-data. Sense-data, says 
Price, can only exist when they ~re being sensed and hence 
can have no causal properties. But it may be said that; 
this whole conception of a mysterious physical 
occupant becomes unnecessary once it is realized 
that sensa may, and nucl!ar sensa often do, con-
tihue to exist unsensed. 
If this is the case, the whole theory of Price begins to 
totter. There are no indubitable unsensed sense-data on his 
view. A revised theory of the Given would be needed. A 
further charge against the view quoted above is made by 
Tyrrell in the form of a question:: 
How can a group of sense-data situated in 
physical space, coincide with a physical oc-
cupant which has no place at all in physical 
space, but is me2ely a constituent of some-
thing which has? 
It is hard to see how this could be answered. Perhaps 
Phenomenalism~ the result of this view despite Price's 
valiant efforts to avoid it. 
(2) The problem regarding families of sense-data also 
leads to confusion about knowledge. Price maintains that 
"we could never have discovered families of sense-data at 
l. Baylis, Art. (1950), 457. See also Murray, Art. (1933), 
· 520. "The difficulties would not arise if Price regarded 
obtainable sense-data as sensibilia ••• " 
2. Tyrrell, Art. (1934), 484. 
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all except by a 'synthetic' process." But what is this 
synthetic process? And what are families of sense-data? 
Blanshard says: 
The notion of -a family becomes paradoxical, how-
ever: when one learns that most of its members 
are facts' or truths of the form 'if any obser-
ver were at such and such a point of view, such 
and such a sense•datum would exist.'2 
Cory suggests that there is something one-sided, unyielding 
and intransitive in a theory of knowledge which claims that 
all we can know are sense-data and that physical objects can 
be resolved into families of sense-data.3 Yet he doesn't 
quite show wby the view is one•sided, except to hint that the 
overempha.'sis is on immediacy. He does add that the view 
that the mind has the "power of literally leaping out across 
physical space and revealing surface qualities of things ••• 
is preposterous."4 This seems to be characteristic of the 
sense-data theory. But it must be observed that Price does 
not say that all we can know are sense-data. Rather, he says 
that all that is given are sense-data. 
Price has not explained how or why sense-data associated 
in families, whether they are grasped as such, what the un~ 
que element in the perceiver is which enables him to see 
sense•data in the relatimn or families. Perhaps the solution 
can be found in the fact of memory. If it were said that 
families of sense-data were given, quite a different direction 
would be taken, but this is not the case. 
1. Price, PER, 310. 
2. Blanshard, NT, I, 143. 
3. Cory, A.rt. 
4. Cory, Art. 
• 422. 
• 426. 
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vi. Supposed assumptions. 
Though it is the aim of the sense-datum epistemologis-t 
to begin with an indubitable, factual starting point, and 
avoid references to metaphysics or logic and even implica-
tions to them, certain critics have pointed out that there are 
nevertheless, veiled assumptions in the theory. One of these 
has already been suggested above, namely, that sensing is a 
form of knowing. 1 In perhaps the most detailed criticism yet 
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made of the theory Hahn reveals other assumptions. He notes 
that the term sense-data itself, "sugo:ests that what is recog-
nized through the senses is different in kind from objects pre-
sented by means of other organic structures."2 He also sug-
gests that the "insistence upon these postanalytical data as 
fundamental seems to carry with it the notion that if you want 
what is basically real you should go back to the elements."3 
Both idealism and pragmatism would object to these views. So 
the very idea of indubitable and neutral data entails a meta-
physical assumption. But Hahn's observations do not refute 
the theory. 
One other assumption which seems basic to the view, and 
yet is not brought to the fore, is a view of mind which almost 
compartmentalizes it. The Humian assooiationistio view is de-
nied, but what remains? The Given is divorced from conscious-
ness bu~ how could that be? Hawkins's point seems to hold here: 
1. See page 148 of this dissertation. 
2. Hahn, CTP, l29f. Price would ask what organic structures 
there were. 
3. Hahn, CTP, 130. 
For some the self becomes a kind of disem-
bodied awareness, having sense-data as its 
objects, but in no way essentially connected 
with them, so that sense-data tend to take 
the place of the material world.l 
vii. The distinction between the Given and consciousness is 
unsound. 
This criticism has been suggested in (i) above. The 
sense-data theory purports to be empirical but is so only to 
a degree. It investigates the given and limits the investi-
gation to sense-data alone. Yet it admits that there are 
other data, for example, of memory and introspection.2 
Hardly a further word about these other data is mentioned, 
though it would seem that both types would have a role to 
play in perceptual knowledge. The problem would not be so 
significant if the discussion were limited solely to sense-
data, but the word consciousness is used in several places, 
and in one instance, Price speaks of "my consciousness of 
matter. 11 3 It is implied that sense-data are owned by per-
ceiving selves, but yet this distinction is made between 
the sense-data as given and one's consciousness of matter. 
Is the proper inference to be that we are not conscious of 
sense-data, or that the Given· is not characterized by con-
sciousness? It would seem so. But if this is the case, 
just what is the Given, and what 1! consciousness? Price 
~ffers a partial answer in his idea of a voluminous life-
1. Hawkins, COE, 36. 
2. Price, PER, 4· 
3. Price, PER, 311. 
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feeling, elsewhere referred to, but this volumlnous life-
feeling does not include sense-data. It includes oreanio 
sensations. 1 
The Given is far more complex than the sense-datum 
epistemologists would lead one to believe. Blanshard 
points out how the sensuously given is suffused with thought 
and judgment, 2 Stace, whose view wil.l be taken up presently, 
suggests that the Given is quite complex and even includes 
conoepts.3 And Laird maintains that the Given should include 
memory data and that the contrast between thought and the 
Given is unwarranted. Rather than taking any data as indu-
bitable, he recollll11ends a provisional view of data.4 In any 
event, it would seem that any theory of the Given must ex-
plain the relation of the Given to consciousness and to the 
self-if it is to stand. It cannot be said that the sense-
data theory does this. As Oakeley says: 
I venture to think that Price's system cannot 
be made fully intelligible on its own l-ines, 
without conceding a more important part to the 
subject than the bringing into existence of 
sense·d~ta and collections or wholes of sense-
data ••• 
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Such arguments do not re~te the sense-data theory but eug-
gest that 1t 1s 1mcomplete. More 1s given than sense-data. 
1. See Price, Art. (1944), xi. (The title of the article is: 
"Touch and Organic Sensation."). 
2. Blanshard, NT, I. Chapter I. 
)• Stace, TKE 0 See Chapters III and IV. 4-• Laird, Art. (1934), 310-313. 5. Oakeley, Art. (1938), 44• 
CHAPTER 'N 
PHENOMENA AS GIVEN 
1. Introductory Observations 
Unlike the two previous views, the theory that pheno-
mena are given is less concerned with external knowledge 
than with a thorough understanding of the given itself. The 
phenomenalist rejects the essence theory as unemp1rical, and 
the sense-datum theory as too narrow. He makes no commitments 
on metaphysics, though he makes ontological idealism a possi-
bility. The sense-datum and essence theories p;i ve little in-
sight into the nature of the self while the phenomenalat is 
more favorable to an analysis of the self, though he avoids 
commitments on 1t also. On phenomenalists in general, 1'1ood 
has said.: "They agree in restricting knowledge to the pheno-
menal order of sense-data. They reject the realistic hypo-
thesis of a trans-phenomenal object of knowledge." 1 
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The phenomenalism here to be dealt with must be differ-
entiated from Kant's theory, for Kant did not hold that phe-
nomena were given. For him, their presence in cognition was 
dependent upon the forms of the sensibility and the categories 
of the understanding. Modern phenomenalists would agree with 
Kant's scepticism about the metaphysical basis of phenomena, 
but are more thorough in their analysis of the totality of act-
ual and possible objects of perception and of introspection. 
Modern phenomenalism may be defined as that view which trans• 
lates all propositions concerning the existence, persistence, 
1. Wood. Art. (1950), 531. 
qualities, and behavior of material objects "into equivalent 
propositions about sensations actual and possible in their re-
1 lation to each other." The phenomenalist, says Stout, 
"starts from the assumption which be seems to regard as evi-
dent apriori that originally the percipient is cognisant only 
of his own sensations as they actuallv occur. "2 According to 
Ayer, it is the theory "that physical objects are logical con-
structions out of sense-data."3 
But if these defini tiona are accented> phenomenalism 
seems virtually identifiable with positivism, for positivism 
also limits knowledge to the description of sensory phenomen~ 
However, in the present discussion, the two may not be identi-
fied for two reasons: (1) The positivist is more concerned 
with mathematical relations among sense-elate. than wi.th psycho-
logical introspection which chal!acterizes the views here sur-
veyed. (2) The phenomenalists investigated here do not limit 
their analysis of the given to sense-data alone, but are more 
inclusive than the positivists. 
The view that phenomena are given must also be distin-
guished from phenomenology. In general, both phenomenalism 
and phenomenology seek the ultimate starting point for know-
ing, but they go at 1t differently. Husserl's earlier phe-
nomenology which stressed the descriptive analysis of sub-
jective processes is closer to the phenomenalism hsre con-
sidered than recent phenomenology. 
But, unlike phenomenalism, recent phenomenology stres-
ses that only essences or es2ential structures rather than 
particular facts are to be studied and that the technique 
1. Stout, Art. (19391, 6. 
2. Stout, Art. (1939), 13. 
3. Ayer, Art. (1947), 163. 
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of "elimination" or "bracketing" must be employed to lead 
one "back to the 'pure' consciousness of an individual 
1 knower as the starting-point flr philosophy," The pheno-
menologist is not concerned with the basis of experience but 
with transcendental consciousness, As Farber notes: "The 
suspension of all positings of transcendent existence results 
in the determination of a realm of pure or 'transcendental' 
subject! vi ty, "2 Also, phenomenal! s ts are far more in teres ted 
in the implications of their view of the starting point in 
knowledge than are phenomenologists. 
It bas been said that contemporary phenomenalism c'ln be 
traced to Hume, Leibniz, Kant, and Hegel, particularly, his 
Phenomenology of Mind. Other influences would be the thought 
of J. S. Mill, Brentano's Psvchologie vom emniri~en Stand-
punkt and the phenomenology of Husserl. i3 Much of 1 t came 
about as a reaction to British New Realism, Stace claims a 
kinship with Poincare and Vaihinger.4 
The chief sources for the presentation here are to be 
found in the writings of C. I. Lewis, W. T. Stace and 
Ledger Wood. All of these men deal specifically with the 
problem of the given as such, Stace and Lewis being the 
most vigorous, A. J, Ayer deals with the question and may 
also be classed as a phenomenalist, but he makes the prob-
lem primarily a linguistic one, C. I. Lewis has some 
1~ Farber, Art. (1947), 353. 
2, Farber, Art. (1941), 433· 
3. See Wood, Art. (1950}, 531, 
4. Stace TKE, vi. 
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characteristics of pragmatism in his view, but it may be 
said that his dominant position is phenomenalistic. 
Tbougb Wood does not use the term "Given" in as obvious a 
sense as Stace and Lewis, he nevertheless has much to say 
about the knowledge•situation and "sensory knowledge." 1 
Beck bas noted the distinction between phenomenology and 
phenomenalism in Wood. 
Like the phenomenologist, be studies the 
'origin' and 'structure' of types of inten-
tional 'acts,' and from them be derives the 
characters of their 'cognitive objects.' With 
this similarity, however, his relation to 
phenomenology ends, since bis analysis is 
carried out at an existential level and2from a pragmatic or positivistic standpoint. 
None of these men have written many articles present-
ing their views and there are very few series of give-and-
take criticisms contained in the philosophical journals. 
Tbe periodical literature on the phenomenalist view is only 
about one third the amount of that on the essence theory. 
Tbe view is of somewhat more recent development and yet, 
Lewis's theory first appeared in 1926 in Volume Six of the 
University of California Publications in Philosophy. Tbe 
title of this was: Tbe Praematic Element ip xnowledge. 
It was revised somewhat and included in his later work, 
Mind and the World Ord,tr, ( 1929) • Stace' s volume, The 
Tbeory of Kgowledge and Existence, was published in 1932. 
1. Hie phenomenalistic tendencies (1941), 386. 
2. Beck, Art. (1942), 415. 
are noted by Nagel, Art. 
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Specific chapters on the Given appear in these last two 
works. Another source ia Wood's jpalrsis of KnOWledge, 
( 1940). In 1945, Lewis del1•ered the Paul Carus Lectures 
and these appeared in print in 1946, in the volume entitled, 
An jpaliSis of Knowledge and Valuatbm. .In many ways the 
theory of the given presented therein rese~bles that of 
his earlier Mind and the World Order. Differences will 
be noted later. 
2. li:asent.ial Characteristics or the View that Pbenomena 
are t»yg. 
~o simple pattern of exposition may be employed for 
the view that phenomena are given, for there is no one who 
may be called the master or.leader of this contemporary 
viewpoint. No single line or argument may be followed 
which presents the phenomenalist view. However, it is 
possible to note several essential characteristics of the 
view and how they are arrived at. Certain other but less 
general attributes of the view will be brought out in the 
next section. 
i. Other theories of the given are specifically rejected. 
In his initial treatment of the given, Lewis briefly 
surveys certain important epistemological theories. He 
maintains that most ~f not all theories imply a distinction 
between that which is immediately presented to the mind, 
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and that which the mind itself contributes through construc-
tion or interpretation. Recognition of this distinction, 
be says, "is one or the oldest and most universal of' 
philosophic ina1ghts." 1 Yet, it may be added, epistemolo-
gical theories differ widely not only on the relation be-
tween that which is immediate in knowledge and that which 
comes through interpretation, but also on the significance 
or the immediate and that of' the interpretative. Though 
there are different theories about these two characteristics 
or knowledge, to suppress the distinction itself, Lewis 
adds "would be to betray obvious and fundamental charac-
teristics of' experienoe."2 
Tbere are theories which stress one aspect or the 
knowledge situation to the neglect of the other. Some 
emphasize the activity or the mind in knowing. Others 
emphasize that which is given, or the immediate, and seem 
to exclude the possibility or the role of' mind in knowledge 
altogether. It is Lewis~ contention, of course, that both 
•lements are of almost equal importance in knowing. 
He is critical of' those who stress sheer immediacy as 
the only significant epistemic factor and cites as examples 
the view or Bergson and that of the Amerioal Neo-Realists.3 
Bergson and the Neo-aealists may well give striking analyses 
of immediacy or the given, and indeed, interpret knowledge 
1. Lewis, MWO, 38. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 38. 
3. Lewis, MWO, 39ft. 
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as possible omly because it is immediate, but certain 
questions may be asked concerning the adequacy of their 
respective accounts of the given. 
Bergson's view, that knowledge can be identified with 
intuition or immediacy, Lewis points out, is grounded in 
a metaphysical theol'y. Life or intuitively grasped "real 
duration" is ultimately real fOl' Bergson. Real duration 
would be something immediate which each mind must grasp 
fOl' itself. The outside wol'ld, Ol' the world or science 
cannot be so grasped but is a construction. But the out-
side or spatial wol'ld is not basically l'eal. Consequently, 
app&l'ent knowledge or this wol'ld is not adequate knowledge. 
As Lewis says: 
In shol't, with Bel'gson as with the mystics, 
identification of knowledge with intuitive ap-
pl'ehension of the immediate reflects no basic 
diftel'ence in the analysis ot ordinal'y expel'ience 
but l'athel' a denotation given to the phrase 'true 
knowledge'because or a metaphysical theory which 
denies ultimate l'eality ti what 1s cognized by 
science and common sense. 
The Neo-Realist emphasis on immadiacy or the given as 
pl'oviding knowledge cannot be criticized in the same way 
as Bergson's view. The Neo~ealist seeks to analyze ex-
perience as tar as possible and works with no appal'ent 
metaphysical assumptions. However, b1s emphasis that 
knowledge is pure l'eceptivity leads him into insoluble 
l.Lewis, MWO, 4lt. 
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problems. Notable among these is the problem of error. 
How could mistakes be possible if all knowledge were 
equally_"received" or given? Again, no distinction would 
be possible between veridical or illusory knowledge. 1 
Furthermore, the Neo-aealist account of the starting 
point in knowledge, may be challenged on the ground that 
"it is impossible to escape the fact that knowledge has ••• 
the significance of pred1ction."2 One idea may be a sign 
for another. Lewis suggests: 
So far as this is true, the cognitive sig-
rtificance may attaca to the data of sense 
but cannot Simply coincide With SUCh g1 ven 
data.3 
The Neo- Realist view does not account for this possibi-
lity. 
Tbougb the other two thinkers who, along with Lewis, 
are taken here as representatives of phenomenalism, do not 
explicitly refer to or refute the views of Bergson and the 
Neo-aealists, they are in harmony with Lewis~ emphasis on 
the two elements in knowledge and their near equal signi-
ficance. Stace spe•ks of the Given and also of "mental 
construction."4 Wood refers to "sensory knowledge" and 
1. These points are suggested by Lewis, MWO, 42, but are 
essentially the same arguments the Critical Realists 
employ against Neo-Realism. For an elaboration of 
these criticisms, see Chapter II, Section 2, ii of this 
dissertation. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 44. 
3· Lewis, HW'O, 44. 
4. In TIE, Chapter III and Chapter VI. 
"intent."1 
Besides the theories or Bergson and the Nee-Realist 
who identify knowledge with the given, there are other 
theories or the given which are closer to the phenomenalist 
view, but which, nevertheless, the phenomenalist criti-
cizes. They admit the complexity or the knowing situation 
and Join in with the phenomenalist in opposing "immed1a-
tism." Tbe phenomenalist's point is that these other 
theories though recognizing the given and something more 
in knowledge, give inadequate accounts or the nature or 
the given. By aame, these theories are the "essence" 
theory or Critical Realism and the "sensum" or "sense-
datum" theory or contemporary British realism. 
Tbe theory that essences are given is summarily cri• 
ticized by Lewis on the grounds that it marks a contusion 
of specific qualia with universal concepts. He maintains: 
It is at once the plausibility and the fatal 
error of 'critical realism' that it commits this 
contusion of the logical universal with given 
aualia or s•nse by denominating both or these 
essences.":Z 
Stace and Wood 4o not refer to the essence theory expli• 
c1tly but they would, in their careful stress on analysis, 
concur with Lewis~ basic charge that the essence doctrine 
1. In AK, Chapter I. "'Intent' may very properly desig-
nate that self-transcendence of the immediately given 
involved in every desire& wish, purpose, or act of in-
tellectual apprehension, (13). 
2. Lewis, MWO, 60. 
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is unempirical.1 
The sense-datum or sensum theory of the given is 
likewise opened to criticism by the phenomenalists in 
their attempt to clear the ground for a more adequate 
view. Wood's criticisms are the most searching and ap-
peal to a psychological account of the facts. He makes 
two important observations: (1) Sense-data have no 
psychological existence but "are the ~ products of 
refined and subtle psychological analysis and philosophical 
abstractions."2 The view goes against the abundant evi-
dence from psychology which supports "a structural and 
organic view of perception."3 (2) Sense-data cannot be 
allowed as a valid interpretation of the given merely 
because they are supposedly the products of logical instead 
of psychological analysis. Logic and psychology cannot 
be so readily divorced. 
Especially is it true that the psychology 
of perception provides the only possible point 
of departure for an epistemology of perception. 
The sense datum theory if judged psychologically 
false cannot cla4m to be logically or epistem-
ologically true. 
Lewis~ criticisms of the sensum theory are of a 
somewhat different calibre, and though he charges the view 
1. See Chapter II, Pages 80-84 of this dissertation for a 
more complete treatment of thls point. Wood's psycholo-
gical approach would yield no essences. 
2. Wood, AK, 34. 
3. Wood, AK, 34. 
4. Wood, AK, 35. 
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with being unemp1rical, he does not base his criticism on 
a psychological approach. He notes that "the sensu.111 theory 
fails to go deep enough and to distinguish what is really 
given from what is imported by interpretation. "1 On 
Broad's sensum theory, it is possible to make mistakes in 
seeing, for example, colors. One may note at first that 
a sensum is red, and later that it is purple. Lewis 
doubts whether such an instance of change of report could 
possibly be conceived as given. When one sees a difference 
in color, for example, that difference is better explained 
as an interpretation put upon the succession of sense 
experience tha~ as a report on given content. He adds 
that the sensum theory "imports a distinction between the 
subjective and the objective which is irrelevant to siven .. 
M!,!! as such. "2 
The sensum theory of the given is then rejected be-
cause it gets away from a strict analysis of experience 
and seemingly involves a metaphysics. The immediate is 
explained by something which cannot be verified. 
A sensum which is not sensed, or a sense-datum 
which continues unaltered while consciousness of 
it changes, is merely a new kind of ding an sich 
which is none the better for being inappropriately 
named 10 as to suggest its phenomenological char-
acter.-' 
1. Lewis, MWO, 62. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 63. 
3. Lewis, MWO, 64. 
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Staoe's orit1oism of the sensum theory is not quite eo 
direot as those just noted. He oritioizee it on the ground 
that it entails a "primitive belief" theory about the ex-
ternal world.l Broad's assertion that belief arises in 
the peroeiver with the arising of the sensa must mean, 
Stace oontinuee, "that the independence of the object is 
given, that it is directly peroeived by the eenses."2 It 
is the phenomenalist's task to show that this is not the 
ease. 
Phenomenalists explicitly rejeot Bergson's view, Nee-
Realism, the essence theory and the sensum theory. Can 
the phenomenalist theory of the given suooeed where these 
fail? An examination of further characteristics of the 
theory is in order. 
ii. The given is an undeniable starting point in knowledge. 
Phenomenalist acoounts of the given conour in the view 
that the given is an undeniable starting point in knowledge. 
When one recalls the essence or the sense-datum theory, it 
seems apparent that this is no unique or espeoially signi-
ficant oharaoteristio of the view. Those who hold to the 
essenoe theory, bold that essences are undeniably given 
1. See Stace, TKE~ 84-87. The quotation whioh prompts this 
oritioism is: The belief that our sensa are app•aranoes 
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of something more permanent and complex than themselves 
seems to be primitive, and to arise inevitably in us with 
the arising of the sensa. It is not reached by inferenoe, 
and could not logically be justified by inferenoe," (Broad, 
ST, 268). 
2. Staoe, TKE, 87. 
and those who hold to sense•data maintain with equal force 
their indubitability. It is far more significant (and 
more controversial) to say !hi!• precisely, is undeniably 
given, as the essence and sen~e-datum theories do, then 
to assert that there is a given. Nevertheless, when the 
phenomenalists speak of an undeniable given they mean that 
in the knowledge situation there is something which is 
immediate and something which is not. It is not necessary 
to say there is an undeniable given, if there is no dis-
tinction between the immediate and that which is not 1m• 
mediate. 
Wood does not employ the adjective "undeniable" in 
his initial consideration of the given but rather assumes 
that one must begin with psychological facts. And there 
is no denying the presence of psychological facts, though 
it is true that there might be some debate over the ac• 
curacy of the report on the facts. Wood's analysis, con-
sequently, "consists in the focusing of attention succes-
sively on the ingredients of a conscious process." 1 He 
makes no conn:Utments here as to what the ingredients are. 
Nor do Stace and Lewis debate over the nature of the 
ingredients at first. They do say that there are ingre-
dients, however, Lewis says concerning the given: "In-
deed, an unqualified denial of this element in ordinary 
1. food, AK, 36. 
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cognition is sufficient to put any theory beyond the pale 
of plausibil1ty."1 Later, be indirectly refers to the given 
as "the immediate and indubitable." 2 He also suggests 
that this undeniable given "is not the subject of any 
possible error because it is purely subjective."3 Errors, 
of couree, occur in the possible treatment or interpre-
tation of the given. A further observation concerning 
undeniability is brought out in Lewis' later work. Here 
be maintains that there could be "no per~eptual knowledge, 
nor any empirical knowledge at all,"4 without such sense 
certainties wbiob characterize the given. "If there were 
no such hard kernel in experience ••• then the word 'ex• 
perience' would have nothing to refer to."5 
Stace builds his whole epistemic theory on the grounds 
of an undeniable given. He says: 
It is clear that what the mind is immediately 
aware of is the presentations or sensa, and 
nothing else. It cannot perceive the supposed 
permanent 1real' objects which these are be-
lieved to represent. Nor can it perc•ive pre-
sentations existing unperceived. This is the 
absolute foundation of our position.5 
l.Lewis, HWO, 48. The contradictory of this is held by 
Wild, Art. (1940), 70. He says Lewisl:!view "would 1f 
rigidly adhered to, put an end to all worthwhile inves-
tigation of the nature of knowledge ••• ~" See section 5 
of this chapter for more on Wild's criticism. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 65. 
3. Lewis, MWO, 121. 
4. Lewis, A!V, 188. 
5. Lewis, AKV, 183. 
6. Stace, TKZ, 88. 
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Earlier, in commenting on the distinction between the 
metaphysical given and the logical given, he says, in 
support of the logical given, that it means 
anything that is necessarily taken as given 
or granted, as logically ultimate and indis-
putable, in an argument; that which we cannot 
doubt because we cannot go behind it; that 
which possesses primitive and absolute cer-
tainty, and which is therefore1the necessary logical beginning of argument. 
This differs from the phenomenological approach of Wood, 
but it is still an example of the undeniability of the 
given. What the given includes for phenomenalists will be 
investigated shortly. 
iii. The given is an admitted abstraction. 
Though the phenomenalists maintain t.hat the given is 
an undeniable starting point for knowledge, they are care-
ful to point out that it is also an abstnaction. They 
mean that it is an abstraction for the purpose of epistemic 
theory. Knowledge is based on an undeniable given, but 
this given is never found psychologically. rt·is a help-
ful abstraction in the understanding of how knowledge 
takes place. There are no raw or pure given elements. 
Whatever is given is a part of the stream of experience or 
life. It 1s a part of experience and not identified with 
experience. Lewis sqys that "the given is .!n, not before, 
1. Stace, TKE, 33· 
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experience."1 Further, it is said: "The given is admit-
tedly an excised element or abstraction ••• an identifiable 
2 
constituent in experience." It never exists in isolation 
in any experience or state of consciousness.3 
Stace too maintains that the given is an abstraction, 
"an end-result of thought which cannot, therefore, be a 
beg1nning."4 Wbat he means here is, that the idea of the 
given in general is never found, and that in a logical 
analysis one must begin with hi's own given. Later in 
commenting on the given in a more seneral sense, he says: 
It is not intended, ~f course, that pure 
awareness of the given, without any thought 
el~ent whatever, is ever an actual psycho-
logical state of either man or animal. Such 
pure awareness is an abstraction.5 
fbe given is an apparently irreducible part of actual 
psychological states then and never can exist apart from 
psychological states, except for the purpose of analysis. 
This is not unlike the basic idea of the given on Price's 
view. Price makes the given ~ of experience, though 
he defines its nature in terms of sense-data only. This 
no phenomenalist is willing to do. 
In commenting on his approach to epistemic problems, 
Wood similarly notes that the given ingredients of conscious 
1. Lewis, MWO, 55. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 66. 
3. Lewis, MWO, 54. 
4. Stace, TO:, 30. 
5. Stace, TKE, 45f'. 
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life are abstractions. "The ingredients may be imagin-
1 
atively isolated but they are not actually separated." 
Analysis consists in careful and selective attention to 
certain aspects of conscious experience, but those aspects 
are not actually found in experience. 
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If the given is but part of experience, indeed, an ab-
straction, it is legitimate to ask what other parts of exper-
ience, why are they not viewed li.S p:iven also? Can anything 
be found in experience which is not p:i ven to it? If these 
other "parts" are not given, how are they to be understood? 
As innate or apriori? If so, they would be all the more 
given. Sometimes Lewis, implies this •2 Again, if it is said 
that all experience is given or that the given is the same as 
experience, has anything other than a tautologous statement 
been verbalized? The phenomenalist seeks to avoid that. 
iv. The given is unalterable. 
Phenomenalists also concur in the view that the ~iven 
is unalterable. This point is perhaps best brought out by 
Lewis in his criticism of Broad's sensum theory. \fhatever 
can be called given must be unaltera.ble, for if alterable, 
interpretation on the part of the perceiver is sugvested. 
Lewis notes concerning Broad: 
He seems to mean that with the same sensum 
1. Wood, AK, ;6. 2. See Lewis, MWO, Chapter III • 
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before me I may at one T!lo'llent see it red and 
at a later moment somewhat mottled or more 1 deeply shaded at the center, and so forth. 
But it is not given 1 f it may be seen in different ways. 
What is given is the fact of some color, in this instance. 
If another color is noted, it too is given. It can be 
said that "in a sense the given is ineffable, always. It 
is that which remains untouched and unaltered, however it 
is construed by thought ."2 It will be remembered that one 
of the points in the treatment of Price's view had to do 
with the unchangeable nature of the given sense-data. And 
it will be recalled, that this was an important difference 
between the sense-datum theory and Broad's sensum view. 3 
The similarity in the view of Lewis and Price • however, 
is not carried beyond this point of unalterability. Other 
qualities besides sense-data may be given on Lewis's view--
"the pleasantness or fearfulness of a thing may be as un-
get-overable as its brightness or loudness ."4 He adds: 
"It is the brute-fact element in perception, illusion and 
dream (without antecedent distinction) which is intended. n5 
This "brute-fact 11 character of the given is also 
1. Lewis, MWO, 63. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 53. Also, mental activity cannot alter it. 
(I1!'!{0. 4 7) • 
3. See Chapter III of this dissertation. 
4. Lewis, M'IIO, 57. It must be noted that Price incidentally 
admits "other sorts of data" but he nowhere discusses them 
and they are not part of his theory, as is the case with 
the phenomenalists. (See Price, PER, 4.) 
5. Lewis, M'IIO, 57. 
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stressed by Stace. The given is not dependent on will and 
not subject to change. "The given bas the hardness and 
unyielding character wbicb is attributed to ~· Pure 
given and pure fact are identical."1 The foundation of 
the given cannot be altered by the mind. 
It may be said that tbe very idea of "given", for the 
phenomenalist, entails the concept "unalterability" by an 
analytic apriori judgment. A. C. Benjamin has suggested 
that a boat of philosophical problems would be solved if 
epistemologists held to the concept of a "variable given." 
He maintains that this idea of a variable given. 
includes anything which anybody ever supposed 
to be given in any sense, ••• even what is ordin-
arily characterized as not-given ••• Tbis given 
will vary along a dimension whose matrix is 
indicated by the clarity with which the given 
is given.2 
With this possible view, the phenomenalist would have no 
patience not only because the concept "variable given" 
is self contradictory but also because the proffered solu-
tion is no more than verbal. It denies, in words, pre-
cisely tbe empirical distinction which the phenomenalist 
makes. If something is variable it cannot be given, though 
there may be a variety of interpretations as to what is 
given at any one time. 
1. Stace, TKE, 46. See also page 37, where he notes that 
apparent changes in color, etc., are not given but ex-
planations. Compare Wood, AK, 44-51. "Unalterability" 
seems implied bare. 
2. Benjamin, Art. (1936), 226. 
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It may be added under this head, that Lewis in de-
fining the g1 ven, links the criterion or "sensuous or 
feeling-character" to his idea of unalterability, but 
it is the criterion of unalterability which is "defini-
tive."1 
v. The given is not knowledge, but the source and ground 
of knowledge. 
The phenomenalist account of the given is in many 
ways more holistic than either the essence theory or the 
sense-datum theory. The three theories are alike in 
maintaining that knowledge must begin with the given. But 
the essence theory and the sense-datum theory stress what 
precisely the given consists or while the phenomenalist 
view deals with the character of the given as a whole in 
the knowing situation. Whatever the given includes, the 
phenomenalist would say, is not knowledge, but a source 
of knowledge. Indeed, it is the only source of knowledge. 
Tbe writers under consideration here agree that the 
given is the source of knowledge and that that which is 
given should not be called knowledge. Wood, unfortunately 
gets into a terminological problem with his designation 
"inspective knowledge." "Inspective knowledge consists 
or all judgments which can be made concerning the qual1 ty, 
intensity, extent, and duration of sense qualia on the basis 
1. Lewis, MWO, 66. 
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of simple inspection alone. "1 Tbis is practically the 
same as the given. And it is confusing to apply the term 
knowledge, to that upon which knowledge is based. It is 
especially confusing when in the same chapter Wood calls 
the awareness of qualities, etc., "a pre-cognitive level 
of experience. "2 If "pre-cogni t1 ve, 11 why apply the term 
knowledge to it? 
Lewis carefully guards against a broad and hazy use 
of the term knowledge, suggesting: 
We shall not, however, extend the term 
'knowledge' to cover awareness of the 
sensuously given, or any statement of the 
content of direct experience merely as 
such.-' 
On this reading, the term "knowledge" has a richer meaning, 
though, of course, Wood's description is not intrinsically 
wrong. It is reserved for that concerning which there 
could be error. Tbe given is essential to empirical 
knowledge "but it is not itself knowledge in the sense 
that there could be mistake about it."4 Because the given 
is subjective, and directly experienced, it "is not the 
subject of any possible error."5 
1. Wood, AK, 44. 
2. Wood, All:, 29. In a later article, Wood uses the term 
"given" for "whatever is immediately present to the mind 
before it has been elaborated by inference, interpreta-
tion or construction." See Wood, Art. (1942), 117. 
3. Lewis, AKV, 30. 
4. Lewis, AKV, 30. 
5. Lewis, MWO, 121. 
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Error in knowing, then, arises from one's interpre-
tation of the given, but is not found in the given itself. 
Tbe difference between veridical uerceution 
on the one hand, and illusion and error-on the 
other, is not in the nature of what is given 
except so far as this leads to the lik!lihood 
of an interpretation which is invalid. 
There can be no dispute or mistake concerning the given 
or starting point for knowledge, though interpret.:ations 
and explanations, "because they go beyond the given, may 
all be erroneous." 2 Tbe mind, it can be said, starts with 
the given and moves to knowledge. Tbere can be no errors 
at the source. 
Both Stace and Lewis agree in using the term "construc-
tion" in connection with the mind's dealing with the given. 
In the knowledge situation, Stace says: 
the mind starts from certain fundamental data, 
which we call the given, and ••• it builds the 
whole fabric of knowledge by means of constructions 
and inferences between construction.3 
And Lewis maintains that the external world "is constructed 
by thought from the data of sense."4 Wood does not use 
the term construction significantly but maintains that the 
external world is known because of the presence of a 
1. Lewis, MWO, 158. 
2. Stace, TKE, 34. 
3. Stace, TKE, 351 Mind Construct?' 
4. Lewis, MWO, 29. 
Compare A. D. 
in Proc. Aria. 
See also 44. 
Lindsay, "Wtia t Does the 
Soc., 25(1925), 1-19. 
177 
transcendent reference within the given. 1 This immediately 
given fact may also be called "intent."2 It may be noted 
that the role of the mind in attaining knowledge is far 
more complex on the view of Stace and Lewis, while knowl-
edge for Wood is implied by an aspect of the given and is 
not the result of any particular constructive activity on 
the part of the mind. 
It is here that the phenomenalistic character of the 
views being discussed may be confirmed. The object con-
structed or intended has phenomenal status. As Wood brings 
out:: 
The only objectivity which Lewis~ theory 
unequivocally assigns to the perceived thing 
is the phenomenal objectivity expressible-
by a set of predictive hypothetical statements.3 
Stace more clearly expresses phenomenalism when he says: 
"The essential character of mental constructions is that 
they are pure creations of the mind to which no facts 
correspond. 114 And Wood concerning the fact of "intent" 
in knowing says of his own theory: "The 'phenomenal' 
object is not an existent ent1 ty but an 'object' thought 
about or entertained by the knowing mind." 5 Elsewhere he 
says: "Perception may be defined as the apprehension of a 
1. Wood, AK, 10. He does speak of "constructions which are 
involved in every act of perception," (AK,68f). See AK, 44.. 
2. Wood, AK, 13. · · 
3. Wood, Art. (1950), 533. 
4. Stace, TirE, 168. (This reference was suggested by Wood, 
Art. ( 1950). 533.) 
5. Wood, Art. (19501, 534. 
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phenomenal oblect on the occasion of sensory stimulation."1 
vi. The content of the given considered. 
Phenomenalists agree that the given is more inclusive 
than the sense-data or essence theories. They differ in the 
degree of their analysis of its content. Lewis, for ex-
ample, in his more recent work in epistemology notes that 
there is seldom any need to indicate what is indubitably 
and immediately present. Not only is it difficult to for• 
mulate the content of the given, 
but this difficulty of formulating pre-
cisely and only a given content of exper-
ience, is a relatively inessential consi-
deration for the analysis of·knowledge.2 
Whether or not it can be described accurately, it plays 
the same part in the knowing situation. In his earlier 
Mind and the World Order, however, Lewis gives some sug-
gestions as to the given's content. Even there, however, 
be says that, "in a sense the given is ineffable, always."3 
It does include sensory qualities but also other qualities 
such as pleasantness, and fearfulness, in short, the brute-
fact elements.4 These are called qual1a by Lewis. 5 
Wood, who stresses a psychogenetic approach to the 
epistemological problem, analyzes the given in a more 
1. Wood, AK, 30. (Italics added.) 
2. Lewis , AKV, 182 •. 
3. Lewis, MWO, 53· 
4. Lewis, MWO, 57. 
5. Lewis, MWO, passim • Note Chapter V especially. 
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thoroughgoing way than Lewis. There are four "dimensions" 
characteristic of sensory experience: quality, intensity, 
extent or extensity, and duration or protensity. 1 (1) Qua-
• 
lity manifests itself through various sen~. the visual, 
auditory, gustatory, olfactory and organic. Examples, 
respectively, would be, color, pitch, taste, smell, and 
pressure. (2) Intensity, which is a concomitant or quality, 
as are the other aspects of the given, can be illustrated 
by brightness, or loudness, i.e., the amount or any given 
quality. Qualities, of course, cannot exist apart from 
intensity. (3) Extensity "refers only to the primitive 
spatiality of our sensations and not to the spatial pro-
perties and relations of perceptual objects. "2 It, too, 
is a sub-category of quality. There can be no extent in 
abstraction from quality. (4) Pr~tensity, or duration, 
bas to do with the endurance factor of sensation and it is 
closely related to extensity. As Wood says: "The essen-
tial feature of both duration and extent is the felt con-
tinuity within a qual! ta t1 vely differentiated experience." 3 
But duration is more pervasive. "Time permeates the whole 
or consciousness, but space is tied closely to the indivi-
dual senses."4 
It may be inferred from Wood's view that there are 
certain interpretative factors in the given, but he does 
1. Wood, AK, 38-44. 
2. Wood, AK, 41. 
3. Wood, AK, 43. 
4. Wood, AK, 44. 
not clearly indicate that they are given. He notes their 
importance in perception, but they seem to have a somewhat 
differing character. He notes that "tbere is a duality 
within the percept between the sensory ingredients ••• and 
1 the interpretational factors." This duality may be the 
same as the distinction between the active and passive 
given of Stace which will be noted below, but it is not 
clearly indicated. The interpretational factors which seem 
to have "given" status are these: qualitative discrimina-
tion, sensory correlation, the synthesis of thingbood, and 
external project1on.2 or these, the idea of "synthesis or 
thingbood" seems most foreign to the nature of the given 
as previously defined. Under "qualitative discrimination," 
it is maintained that "sensory blocks" are carved out of 
experience, for no isolated sensations can be found em-
pirically. "A sensory 'block' may be defined as the 
maximum qualitative expanse which is throughout its extent 
approximately homogeneous." 3 This idea of "sensory blocks," 
it may be noted, is in harmony with "the modern organic 
4 
and functional view of mind." 
The proposed factor of "sensory correlation" in Wood's 
list of interpretative characteristics involved in percep-
tion raises the question about the relation of one sensory 
1. Wood, AK, 53. 
2. Cf, Wood, AK, 55-68, 
3. Wood, AK, 55. 
4. Wood, AK, 56. 
lAl 
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pattern to another. Is the object I touch the same as the 
object I see? Sensory correlation is presumably facilitated 
by an "obvious fact of' sensory experience." 1 That fact is 
that the organa of' one sense are in the field 
of' other senses and can be apprehended at the 
very time when they are performing their sen-
sory function.2 
The ground for sensory correlation is conjunction.3 
Perhaps the most significant interpretative factor is 
4 
what Wood Salls "external projection." A collection of' 
sense qualities could not be an object of perceptual 
knowledge if there were no way of' externalizing them. Wood 
says: "The explanation of' the externality of' our percep-
tion is to be found in the intent1onali ty which charac-
terizes all our data."5 Every given involves the fact of' 
reference beyond itself', or intent. Perceptual objects, 
then, are clearly not given but must be believed in. In-
tent or external projection is the one given element which 
leads one out of the given. 
Now this psychological analysis of' Wood, just sum-
marized, has some marked affinities with Stace's view. 
These will presently be noted. In his analysis of the con-
tent of the given, Stace fundamentally agrees with both 
1. Wood, AK, 6o. Is this then a given fact? Wood is not 
clear on this. 
2. Wood, AK, 60. 
3~ Wood, AK, 62. 
4. Compare the essence theory here. "Projection is merely 
the ;:eferring of' character-complexes to a certain posi t1on 
in space." Drake, MPN, 142. 
5. Wood, AK, 66. 
Wood and Lewis that the given involves more than sense 
qualities. There are two parts to the given, he main-
tains, the activities of consciousness and what happens to 
consciousness. 1 Included in the second part are: 
all sense presentations, colours, sounds, 
odours, tastes, smells, muscular sensations, 
etc. (also) all images of hallucination, 
dream, illusion, or memory, which have the 
same immediate2or given character as sense presentations. 
Considering in detail what is given through the sense 
of sight, it is said that the visual given is flat and 
without dept'(J,3 that it includes extension•spread and 
duration-spread, though not space and time, and that spa-
tial shape 1s given.4 The concepts of extension-spread 
and duration-spread are paralleled in Wood's idea of ex-
tensity and protensity. Lewis denies, interestingly enough, 
that the qualia have "temporal spread."5 But Stace argues 
that one of the chief evidences of duration-spread is the 
fact of change. Change itself is not given but "movements 
and changes of color make it clear that the given has 
duration-spread and that the relation of before and after 
is given."6 Extension-spread and duration-spread give rise 
1. Stace, TKE, 43. This sounds like Wood's idea of duality 
cited above. cr. Wood, AK, 53. 
2. Stace, fKE, 34. 
3. Compare Price, PER, 32. He too talks about "flat" givens. 
For a careful criticism see Aldrich, "Are there Vague 
Sense Datal", IU.n,g, 43(1934) • 477-482. 
4. Stace, TKE, 36. 
5. Lewis, MWO, 61. 
6. Stace, TKE, 38. 
to other relations, such as between, to the left of, etc. 
These also are given. 
Regarding the first part of the given, namely, the 
activities of consciousness, Stace proposes that the inter-
nal world of the self is given. This would include "all 
the acts of what has been called the empirical mind." 1 
It does not include the ego, viewed as a transcendental 
unity. Here Stace claims to follow HUIIIe, who denied that 
the self was given. The acts of mind which ~ given 
include attention, conception, willing, etc., and these 
are "ultimate facts of consciousness."2 Furthermore, the 
very distinction between activity and passivity in the 
given, is given. 3 Stace's point on the activity of con-
sciousness as given, would square with Wood's point re-
garding intent or "external projection" as given.4 
vii. Its ontological status not discernible. 
The views of the given thus tar considered, the es-
sence and the sense-datum theories, as well as the view 
to be considered in the next chapter, are alike in that 
they define the given exactly and leave few doubts as to 
its implications for ontology. This is not the case with 
the phenomenalist view. Of all the theories this one is 
the most uncommitted ontologically. · Incte6d, one of its 
claimed features is that it is a view not tainted by 
1. Stace, TKE, 41. 3. Stace, TIE, 44. 
2. Stace, TKE, 43. 4. See Wood, AK, 66. 
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metaphysical considerations. 
Staae suggests: "The given for us does not imply any 
metaphysical theory as to its own status. We are to con-
sider, not the metaphysical given of Kant, but the logiaal 
given." 1 This is speaifiaally supported later in Staae's 
development when he says: 
To the question whether the presentation is 
'mental' or 'non-mental• we shall reply that 
this question is itself meaningless, and that 
the dispute whiah is supposed to aentre round 
it is a mere quarrel over worda.2 
The difficulty about the term 'mental' areeps in, be says, 
when persons interpret the experience of dreams as mental 
and apply the same abaraateriatia to peraeption.3 Dreams 
may be understood as private, and not necessarily 'mental.' 
But the word 'mental' "gets attaabed to any presentation 
whiab is private, and therefore to the pure presentation 
as suab. 114 Presentations are passive and belong to what 
Staae aalls the not-I. When it is understood, 
that the difference between dreams ana 'real' 
presentations is extrinsic, consisting in their 
relations with their contexts, and not intrinsic, 
then it must also be seen that the whole dis-
cussion is meaningless.~ 
Lewis does not view the ontological status of the 
l. Staae, TKE, 33· 
2 .• Staas, T:KE, 74. 
3. Staae, TKE, 89f. 
4. Staae, TKE, 90f. 
5. Staae, TKE, 92. 
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given as a meaningless question but as a "later question." 
If metaphysical questions arise, they ~ay be answered as one 
develops his theory of knowledge but all that can be said 
about the given is "that it should be given." He adds, 
"We need not say that what is given is a 'mental state' 
or even 'in the mind' 
itself implied in such 
in any more explicit sense than is 
1 givenness." Wood, too, brings out 
that the ascription of mentality to the given, which was 
1136 
· characteristic of certain historical forms of representation• 
ism, is not essential to his- theory, "for the immediate 
data of cognition need not partake of the mental nature of 
2 the subject to which they are presented." He later comes 
close to Btace's observation when he suggests that "the 
problem as to what is the stuff or substance of the sensa 
is meaningless or, if it has a meaning is trivial."3 Again, 
he says: "Tbe question of the mental or physical status of 
the sense qualia is completely irrelevant at the level of 
inspection."4 He does admit the importance of determining tbe 
relation of the given to the mind and to objects of knowl-
edge but the metaphysical nature of the given cannot be 
dealt witb. Wood says: "I know of no si&nificant criteria 
whereby the mentality, the physicality, or neutrality of 
the sensa can be determined."5 It might be interesting to 
inquire whether there are any criteria whatsoever, 
1. Lewis, MWO, 65. 
2~ Wood, AK, 17. 
3. Wood, AK, 33· 
4. Wood, AK, 45. 
5. Wood, AK, 33. 
significant or insignificant, which might serve as deter-
minants. Furthermore, it would seam quite impossible to 
know the relation of the given to the mind, if the nature 
of the given itself could not be known. 
Again, the agnosticism of the phenomenalist, as dis-
tinguished from the other views, may be observed here. 
Metaphysical questions are seemingly left open. Idealism 
as well as realism become possibilities, but neither can 
be established on the basis of the given. 
3. Variations in fbenomenalist Accounts. 
Some of the differences among the phenomenalist views 
here being studied have been noticed in the preceding sec-
tion. Other variations as regards emphasis and method 
may here be noted. 
i. Variations in the type of analysis. 
It can be pointed out that there is a difference in 
the type of analysis employed by the phenomenalists under 
consideration. This is substantiated when one observes 
Stace's emphasis on logic, and Wood's on psychology. The 
given for Stace is a logical given not a psychological one. 
He is concerned with the ultimate facts of experience 
"which we cannot get behind and which stand logically at 
the beginning of all inquiry as premisses. "1 Furthermore, 
1. Stace, TKE, 39. 
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Stace maintains: 
It is not intended ••• that pure awareness 
of the given, without any thought element 
whatever, is ever an actual psychological 
state of either man or animal• Such pure 
awareness is an abstraction. 
The appeal is to that which is logically first in the 
knowing situation. For a logical analysis, Stace seems to 
come quite close to the psychological approach in his des-
cription of the elements present in visual experience. 
Nevertheless, he admits his logical emphasis and has been 
thoroughly criticized for it by G. Dawes Hicks. 2 Hicks's 
charges that Stace is lacking in psychological insight 
will be discussed below. 
Now while Stace seeks to describe the given "as logi-
cally ultimate and indisputable, in an argument; that which 
we cannot doubt because we cannot go behind it,"3 Wood 
disavows the logical approach and strongly urges the psy-
chogenetic4 or psychological approach to epistemic pro-
blems. He does not say that the logical analysis of the 
given is worthless, but that it must be supplemented by 
the psychological. Indeed, the psychological analysis has 
priority over the logical. He notes: "Epistemology has 
tended to ally itself with logic with the consequent 
1. Stace, TKE, 45f. 
2. In Hicks, OR. See Chapter X-"'l'he Refutation of Sub-jectivism." 
3. Stace, TK:B:, 33· 
4. Wood, AK, 54. 
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neglect and disparagement of relevant psychological consi-
derations. "1 A theory "if judged psychologically false 
cannot claim to be logically or epistemologically true." 2 
Wood proceeds to relate his analysis to the findings of 
psychology. This is not a concern for Stace. It is inter-
esting to note that .the results of the analysis of the 
given, in each case, are remarkably similar, as noted 
above. 
Lewis 1s not so Jtigorous in his idea of analysis, but 
he seems closer to the logical approach of Stace when he 
says: "The particular purposes which the psychologist has 
in mind in making his analysis of mental states may be out 
of place in epistemology. "3 This is essentially the ap-
proach of the sense-data theory of Price4and is not far 
removed from the essence theory where logic, too, is given 
priority.5 On the other hand, the view to be considered 
in the next chapter, that the datum self comprises the 
given, is much closer to the psychological approach of 
Wood. It cannot be denied that the psychogenetic method 
yields far more details about the content of the given, than 
the Cartesian-like method of Stace. And sometimes, even 
Stace relies heavily on the psychological, as in the case of 
concepts as "given facts." 6 
1. Wood, AK, 35. 
2. Wood, AK, 35. 
3. Lewis, MWO, 57. 
4. cr. Price, PER, 17ln, 190. 
5. Cf. Santayana, SAF, 45 and Drake, ECR, 19f. Data have no 
psychological existence. 
6. Stace, TKE, 49. 
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ii. Variations in the thoroughness of analysis. 
This observation can be substantiated by noting the 
discussion of the content of tbe given above. There is a 
wide difference between the analysis of Lewis as to content 
and the analysis of Wood. A reason for this difference is 
obviously the choice of type of analysis. It may also be 
said that thoroughness in analysis of tbe given or the 
lack of it is due to a different emphasis as to the impor-
tance of the problem. Lewis is interested in the role of 
the given in knowledge. Wood is interested in the given 
for its own sake as well as its function in knowing. 
Stace would be closer to LewisBview here, but he does 
give·~a more thorough analysis than Lewis, as has been sug-
gested above. 
It bas been pointed out by reviewers, and it is evi-
dent in comparing the material, that Lewis stressed the 
analytic method more in his later volume, An Analvsis of 
Knowledge and Valuation. This has been brought out ably by 
Hinshaw,~ and affirmed by Henle~2 
iii •. Tbe subjectivistic tendency. 
While Lewis constantly is on guard against subjecti-
vism in his analysis of the given, Stace and Wood approach 
it in their methods. Stace maintains that the true starting 
polnt of knowledge is "not ~ given, but g given."3 
1~ See Hinshaw, Art. (1949), 1~3. 
2. See Henle, Art. (1948), 528. 
3· Stace, TKE, 31. 
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This leads him later to affirm a methodological solip-
sism, which he discusses in detail in his chapter, "The 
World of the Solitary Mind." Logically, Stace asserts, 
one must begin with his own experience and move from it 
to other selves, thence to the world of physical things. 
But there is no eacaping the initial state of solipsism, 
1 
or my given. 
Wood, too, evidences a subjectivistic tendency in his 
analysis. This is not found in Lewis.2 Indeed, Wood ad-
mits a methodological subjectivism, holding that it "does 
not commit us to solipsism and to the egocentric predica-
ment, nor does it otherwise prejudice in advance other 
epistemological issues."3 Wood is more careful to "bracket" 
the data than Stace, who allows, it seems, an empirical 
self.4 Wt\orl claims to adopt "merely a phenomenological 
analysis of the percept as a preliminary to the description 
of the total perceptual situat1on."5 
4. Ctrtain Implications of Phenomenalism. 
The implications of the phenomenalist account of the 
given are less than might be expected. Each one of the 
thinkers under consideration develops a theory of knowledge, 
1. This bas been ably criticized by Hicks, CR, 262-267. 
2. Note his comment in AKV, 200-202. 
3. Wood, AK, 32. 
4. Stace, TKE, 41. 
5. Wood, AK, 32. It is unusual that Wood makes no reference 
to Stace 1 s view in his AK. Yet Stace and Wood were col-
leagues at Princeton. 
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but those theories are not uniquely dependent on the given, 
with the possible exception of Stace's view. Phenomenalists 
limit themselves to phenomena.. Implications are incidental. 
Were the phenomenalist as thorough-going in his limitation 
on his subject matter as the phenomenologist, it could be 
said that ~ implicatimns would follow. As Farber bas said: 
No metaphysical capital is to be made out of 
an attempt that aims at an understanding of 
knowledge and experience ij their essential 
forms and accomplishments. 
Nevertheless, certain implications seem to relate to the 
view that phenomena are given. 
i. Implications for the theory of knowledge. 
It might seem obvious that the phenomenal account of 
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the given leads to seepticism regarding knowledge in general. 
Some might say this on the grounds that the phenomenalist 
does not allow any escape from the given to the external 
world.2 But this is a misreading of a fundamental aspect 
of the phenomenalist view. Besides the sensuous and rela-
tional factors present in the given, phenomenalists include 
"intent" or that characteristic of the given which enables 
it to "construct" an outside world. The idea of "intent" 
is Wood's; that of construction, Stace's. They have been 
noted previously. The given contains within itself evidence 
1. Farber, Art. (1941), 441. 
2. Of. Wild, Art. (1940), 70. 
of the non-given as well as the activity necessary to refer 
to the non-given. 
Rather than scepticism, then, the view that pheno-
mena are given implies a clear epistemic dualism. The given 
is the starting point and contains within itself factors 
which refer to or "intend" the non-given, or external world. 
There is no fusing of the two. As Wood notes: "The explan-
ation of the esternality of our perceptions is to be found 
1 in the intentionality which characterizes all our data." 
Lewis suggests that action present in the given is the clue 
to the outside world. At the foundation of the external 
world is the sense of action 
at the root, the objectively actual is the 
verifiable; and the verifiable is that the 
predictable experience of which can be realized 
!f the appropriate routine of verifying acti-
vity be adopted. Without this sense of action, 
no sense of ~ world of things beyond experience 
could arise. . 
Stace brings out that the independent world is not an 
inference from the given nor due to any primitive or in-
stinctive belief. He says that for belief in the external 
world, "it would seem to follow that only one other explana-
tion is possible, namely that the belief is a mental con-
struction."3 
Furthermore, it may be said, the phenomenalist ac~ount 
1. Wood, AK, 66. 
2. Lewis, AKV, 21. 
3, Stace, TKE, 94. 
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of the given implies not only epistemic dualism, but also 
that knowledge is probable, not certain or final. This 
might follow from any epistemic dualism. It is implied 
when Lewis comments that knowledge 
means that we are able to interpret validly 
certain given items of experience as signs 
of Other possible experience, the total con-
tent of such further possible experience ••• 
being attributed to the object, as consti-
tuting what we know of it and1what we mean by attributing reality to it. 
We believe in the external world, we do not grasp it with 
intuitive certainty. And that belief is baaed on probabi-
lity. 
ii. Implications for the theory of mind. 
Because of the nature of the phenomenalist analysis, 
mind or consciousness is given more consideration than on 
either the essence or sense-data theory. Stace, particu-
larly, stresses "~ given" as the starting point for 
knowledge, claims to be a "methodological solipsist" and 
speaks of "The World of the Solitary Mind."2 Hbwever, Stace 
does not openly commit himself to any theory of mind any 
more than Lewis or Wood do. He says, for example; 
It must be made clear at the outset that the 
ego, conceived as some kind of transcendental 
unity, is not given •• 3The internal ••• ~ea not include any pure ego. 
1. Lewis, MWO, 192. 
2. See Chapter V in Stace's TKE. 
3. Stace, T!E, 41. 
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No transcendental or substantial self is given. Yet, Stace 
also says, admitting that there is no pure ego in the given, 
that "it includes all the acts of what bas been called the 
empirical mind." 1 He opposes any apriori self or non-evi-
dent substance, but be grants the possibility of an em-
pirical self. Indeed, knowledge of one's self is basal 
to knowledge of the external world. Self-knowledge mani• 
fests itself in the distinction between activity and 
passivity immediately present. He avers: "Knowledge of 
the world as independent and external depends immediately 
on our knowledge of other selves, and therefore ultimat.ay 
on our knowledge of our own selves. "2 Though this is the 
case, Stace does not allow for any ontological conelusions 
from this fact. The mind is active and "immediately aware 
of its own activities-atboughts, feelings, volitions--A! 
act1v1ties."3 But yet, the given exists prior to and inde-
pendently of any activity of the mind.4 Mind gives meaning 
to the passive given and is presupposed by it, but mind and 
its nature cannot be defined. 
Stace's rejection of any transcendental ego or sub-
stantial self as given is also echoed in Wood's treatment. 
Though be too professes not to develop a theory of mind, 
one can see his position without searching very far. Divi-
sion of subject and content is an unempirical procedure in 
1. Stace, TKE, 41, 
2. Stace, TKE, 42. 
3. Stace, TIE, 44. 
4. Stace, TKE, 46. 
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the knowing situation and the fault "of the metaohysical 
soul-substance dogma." 1 Consciousness never occurs without 
content. To say that 1t does is an abstraction. Wood 
says: 
There are neither psychological or epistem-
ological grounds for splitting consciousness into 
halves--act and content. Consciousness is a 
process in which the existence of content is 
ipso facto the awareness of it. There is, 
strictl7 speaking, no consciousness of content, 
but mere2y the conscious presence of conscious 
content. 
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This is very close tp,11' not identical with the view of' self• 
psychology. It seems almost precisely that when the f'ollow-
ing is noted: 
Consciousness as an attentive and selective 
activity performs the !'unction as knowing 
subject and the same conscious content by 
virtue of' its ref'erential capacity ef'fects 
the cognitive transcendence of the immediately3 given requisite to knowledge in all its f'orms. 
This is virtually a summary of' the view which will be pre-
sented in the next chapter of' this dissertation. But on 
that view, ontological implioat1ons play a more si~ificant 
role. 
With the unusual stress on consciousness found here, 
it is diff'icult to see how the "referential realism" which 
Wood holds to could be established.4 
1. Wood, AK, 19. 
2. Wood, AK, 20. 
3o Wood, AK, 21. 
4. Cf. Wood, Art. (1950), 534. Here Wood calls his view 
"ref'erential realism, rather than phenomenalism." 
In an especially fruitful appendix in his Mind and the 
1 
World 0r4er, Lewis takes up the question of the relation 
of the mind to the given. Like Stace and Wood, he denies the 
presence of any transcendental ego as given. 
The transcendentalists' elaborate story of 
the categorizing of experience by the mind 
is inconsistent with itself, since if this 
account of knowledge sho~ld be true it could 
not be known to be true. 
Yet he admits that "the mind and its activity transcend ••• 
what is revealed in any particular case," 3 and adds: "The 
mind.which is known transcends the momentary knowing just 
as the external object known transcends its instantaneous 
phenomenal appearance. "4 But this type of transcendence 
does not involve Lewis in a transcendentalist view, for the 
type of transcendence he means here is a consciously ex-
perienced one, not an aprioristic and necessary one. He 
does not hold that the mind is given for he says that, 
"although the activity of mind is a datum of experience, 
it is not the kind of datum to which the word 1 g1 ven 1 has 
been applied in the preceding."5 This seems largely a 
language problem. It seems strange to differentiate "datum" 
and "given," when "datum" is the Latin word for given. 
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Later he clarifies somewhat by saying that though the activity 
1. Appendix D, 412=427. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 425. See 418 also. 
3· Lewis, MWO, 422. 
4. Lewis, MWO, 424. 
5. Lewis, MWO, 422. Nor are passive elements part of the mind 
for Lewis, for thou&>:ht "can neither ere ate nor alter" them 
(M~O, 47). . 
of mind is not given it is "known through certain data or 
experience r 
Lewis recognizes the metaphysical character of the 
problem of mind and professes not to give a metaphysical 
view. He says: 
What I mean by the mind is partially re-
vealed in just such feelings of purpose, desire, 
interest, and the like, and these other al-
terations in the process2or experience which are attendant upon them. 
After stating this, he then professes scepticism as to 
whether this mind is an immaterial agent or a Democritean 
smooth atom. Apparently, his thought is that a strictly 
empirical account is inadequate regarding the self and that 
some further metaphysical light is needed. The quotation 
above, that mind is "partially revealed," bears this out. 
Wood would disagree on this point, affirming that the em-
pirical evidence is virtually sufficient in understanding 
the nature of m1nd.3 
iii. Implications for ontology. 
The 1lllplicat1ons of the phenomenalist view of the 
given for on'tology are less clear than those for the theory 
of mind or the theory of knowledge. Three possibilities 
may be noted: positivism, realism, and idealism. For each 
ontological possibility, there is some support. 
1. Lewis, MWO, 423. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 421. 
3. Of. Wood, AK, 21, (quoted above). 
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Stace may quickly be excused from the positivist indict-
ment for he explicitly criticises the positivist view of 
meaning in his article "Metaphysics and Meaning. "1 And 
there is not much in his view to suggest positivism for he 
defends the view that mind can go beyond sensations by 
2 
"construction." This is not the case with Wood who gives 
a great deal of his time over to an analysis of phenomena. 
Indeed, Ewing characterizes him as a "positivist."3 Allers 
too, bas noted that there are elements of "contemporary 
logical positivismu in Wood,4 but later says that the last 
chapter of Tbe Analysis of xnowledge, distinguishes Wood's 
view from positivism,5 Wood's stress on the fact of intent 
and knowing as referential would keep his view from posi-
tivism, 
In commenting on LewisJa,.view, Blanshard at one point 
says: "I think that Prof. Lewis, however, is too generous to 
the positivists."6 And quite opposite this is Werkmeister's 
equally lucid statement: "A reaction to positivistic ideas 
is also apparent in such books as c. I. Lewis~lnalysis of 
Knowledge and Valuation."7 Though Lewis deals with the 
sensuously given, he does not confine his theorizing to 
those phenomena, but allows verifiable knowledge of the 
1. In Mind, 44(1935), 417ff. 
2. For example, note Chapter VI of TKE. 
3. Ewing, Art. (1941) 312. 
4. Allers, Art. (l942i, 84. 
5. Allers, Art. (1942), 85. 
6, Blanshard, NT, II, 419n. For Lewis~ comment on this see 
his Art. (1934), 125-146. 
7. Werkmeister, HPIA, 574n. 
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external world as well as of values. 
Realism is a more likely ontological implication of 
phenomenalist accounts of the given, especially on Wood's 
view. After noting that the externality or perception is 
to be found in intentionality which is characteristic of 
all data, Wood says: 
What is more natural then than to suppose 
that the felt hardness and smoothness are 
.!n. the table outside my body and that they 
continue to reside there even when my hind 
is no longer in contact with the table? 
This is more than a reaction to Berkeley's "~is percipi," 
and it is more than epistemic realism. Elsewhere, it will 
be recalled, Wood has denominated h!s own view "referential 
2 
realism." Yet, on the basis of the glven alone, it is hard 
to see bow ontological realism would follow, for all evidence 
is conscious evidence. 
According to H. H. Price, there is some question as to 
just what the implications of Stace's view are. He notes 
that Stace's phrase "unsensed existence of sensa" may be 
interpreted in two ways .... tbe phenomenalistic and the real-
istic.3 In his chapter on "The World of the Solitary Mind," 
Stace speaks of realists in a critical war saying: 
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For they have to admit that the existence of an 
independent external world cannot be proved, i.e., 
that it is not a valid inference from our presentations.4 
1. Wood, AK, 66r. 
2. Wood, Art. (1950) 1 534. 3. Price, Art. ( 19331 ,. 288f. 
4. Stace, T!E, 85. 
Though Lewis does not establish realism be maintains 
• 
that it is a distinct possibility over idealism in so far 
1 
as the given is concerned. If his account is correct, not 
only idealism but also phenomenalism are untenable, be 
claims. 
If this position can be successfully maintained, 
then the fundamental premises of phenomenalism 
and idealism fall to the ground ••• and the general 
attitude of common-sense realism can be reinstated 
without attempting to do the2impossible and avoid the relativity of knowledge. 
The possible idealistic implication in phenomenalism 
is brought out by Wood in a recent statement: "The pheno-
menalistic epistemologies of Lewis, Price, and Stace 
marked further inroads of the idealistic analysis of knowl-
edge."3More stress has been placed on the epistemic subject. 
Wood does not include his own view with that of Stace 
or Lewis. Any stress on the knowing mind and its function--
as a starting point in knowledge--might well open the doors 
to idealism. Wood disavows it, and Lewis opposes it. Yet 
on occasion, Lewis approaches an idealistic view. As Hin-
shaw bas noted: 
Lewis is aware that the spectre of idealism 
haunts the thoughts of him who cannot clearly 
distinguish, in the analysis of knowledge, 
between the given and the inter~retation which 
the mind places upon the given. 
1. See Lewis, MWO, Chapter VI. "The Relativity of Knowledge 
and the Independence of the Real." 
2. Lewis, MWO, 155. 
3. Wood, Art. (1950), 535. 4. Hinshaw, Art. (1949), 183. 
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Stace is quite close to an idealistic ontology because 
of his stress that all knowledge commences with the self. 
And Miss Stabbing once said, commenting on Staas's view: 
"I think, however, that some form of Idealism would be the 
inevitable outcome of this theory of knowledge. "1 This is 
especially the case in the fifth chapter of The Theory of 
Knowledge and Existence. 
In passing, it can be said that there are elements 
ot agnosticism, but this bas been dealt with in connection 
with the treatment of the content of the given for the 
phenomenalist.2 
5. Criticisms of the View that lbenomena are Given. 
The criticisms which have been and may be made of the 
phenomenalist account of the given cannot be isolated with 
the same facility as those of the essence or sense-datum 
theories. Those criticisms which have appeared have been 
directed against particular theories of particular men, for 
the most part. There have been few criticisms which 
directly apply to the three views here studied in relation 
to one another. Nevertheless, it is possible to note several 
general criticisms which are applicable in varying degrees 
to the positions of Stace, Lewis and Wood. 
1. Stabbing, Art. (1933~. 355. 
2. Cf. Stace, TEE, 74, and Wood, AK, 33· 
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i. Alleged weakness in the total phenomenalist conception, 
There have been several critical statements about phe-
nomenalism in general which have denied the validity of the 
whole movement 1vi thout going into detailed cri t1cisms of 
any one thinker. 
Most outspoken of such critics is D. J, B. Hawkins who 
maintains that if the general view of Aristotle were ade-
quately appreciated, the peril of a false start in the cri-
ticism of experience which leads to phenomenalism, would be 
avoided.1 He traces the rise of phenomenalism back to Des-
cartes who gave a new direction to philosophical inquiry by 
stressing questions about the nature of experience. 
Phenomenalism, or idealism in the epistemologi-
cal sense, appears in a comparatively simple form 
with Descartes and Locke and in a much more com-
plex form with Kant. Like all mistakes which 
have had a profound influence on the history of 
thought, it can be presented with a certain plau-
sib1lity,2 
No detailed criticism of phenomenalism is brought out, 
but it is said that the primary activity of thought is not 
the construction of an object but "an awareness of the real 
in its real1ty." 3 The contents of sensation "are not merely 
appearances, they are real, and we can ask where their real-
ity resides."4 Even those philosophers who stress that 
sense-data are real per se, are criticised by Hawkins. 5 
1, Hawkins, COE, 12f, 
2, Hawkins, COE, 13. 
3. Hawkins, COE, 20. 
4. Hawkins, COE, 26. 
5. Ha.wkins, COE, 37ff. 
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The answer to the problem of knowledge is to be found in 
Aristotle, Aquinas and the Tbomists. Hawkins suggests 
throughout his work. 
But this is no refutation of the phenomenalist view. 
The phenomenalist seeks to begin where he finds himself, 
with the basic facts of awareness. Hawkins~assertions do 
not undercut tha phenomenalist view, they merely deny the 
existence of the problem and suggest, virtually, that every-
thing is given. The phenomenalist analysis is not willing 
to dodge the serious questions raised as quickly as Hawkins 
does. 
Yet, the phenomenalist emphasis on analysis, admitting 
the problem of the given, has been criticized in a general 
way also. In a discussion of the criticisms of Critical 
Realism, Sellars says: 
Phenomenalism seems to me to rest upon an 
artificial analysis of experience which does 
not do justice to the distinctions and move-
ments which characterize it and lose1,itself 
in a logical analysis of sense-data. 
Two years later, Sellars reiterated this general charge 
against phenomenalism. 
Phenomenalism is attractive to thinkers because 
it invites a logical analysis of the data and 
conclusions of science and contains no apneal to 
anything more substantial than the elements given.2 
1. Sellars, Art. (1924), 390. 
2. Sellars, PPP, 146. 
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It is important to note that these charges of Sellars were 
written before the theories of Lewis, Stace or:Wood were 
formulated. Though they still have some force, they are no 
longer fundamentally true, if they ever were. 1 
Another implied general cri t1cism of the standpoint 
of the phenomenalist view is that found among certain meta-
physical naturalists, typified by Krikorian. In discussing 
the Naturalistic view of mind, Krikorian virtually denies 
the source and ground of the phenomenalist analysis, indeed 
or any introspective inquiry regarding the given. He sug-
gests that mind, in order to be viewed experimentally--which 
is presumably, the only way to view mind-"must be analyzed 
as behavior, since behavior is the only aspect of mind which 
is open to experimental examination. "2 This view, which 
amounts to a total denial of the experience of inwardness 
and privacy has little to commend it when contrasted with 
the careful analysis of the phenomenalists. Indeed, it begs 
the whole question of the given, by saying that behaviorial 
responses are the only observable data. 
Price, who in certain respects is phenomenalistic in 
his analysis of the given, offers the criticism that the 
phenomenalist view can offer no answers whatsoever regard-
ing the ontological character of the external world. Things 
1. For example, Wood in AK seeks to give a psychological ac-
ctunt of the given, not a logical analysis of sense-data, 
and is concerned with the question of how the ~>:i ven ele-
ments can be transcended in his concept of "intention." 
See Section Two of the present chapter in this dissertation. 
2. Krikorian, Art. (1944), 252. 
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are seemingly identical with data. 
A Phenomenalist must hold that sense-data 
are not caused at all, and that they are 
not even events in the ordinary sense of the 
word. According to him, we must silply take 
the sense-given as a going concern. 
Tbe best that the phenomenalist can do is offer what can 
be called a postulational ontology. There are indications 
of an external world and such a world may be postulated, 
but this world can never be known with even a high degree 
of p~obability. Commitments about the external world are 
not possible on the basis of the given. Nor would commit• --
mente on value problems be possible.2 
In general, it would seem that phenomenalists are 
undecided on questions which demand a decision. Perhaps 
the answer is to be found in modi'Ying their accepted truth 
criterion which is apparently correspondence, though in 
Lewis there is a pragmatic strain.3 
ii. Charges that phenomenalism is unempirical. 
Tbe criticism that the theory of phenomena as given 
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is an unempirical view cannot be made with equal force against 
all of the phenomenalists here studied. Wood's avowed 
1. Price, PER, 317. 
2. See Wood, AK, Chapter 10, especially, 224-234. Cf. Lewis, 
AKV, Chapter 17. 
3. For further general criticisms of Phenomenalism, seeR. I. 
Aaron's article, "How May Phenomenalism be Refuted?", Proc. 
Aris. Soc., 39(1939), 167-184; F. R. Hardie's article 11 The 
Paradox of Phenomenalism" in Proe. Aris. Soc., 46(1946), 
127-154, and G. F. Stout's article "Phenomenalism" in the 
same journal, 39(1939), lff. 
psychogenetic approach is a~ empirical as any approach can 
be on this problem, and Lewish view is similarly compatible 
with a thoroughgoing empiricism. Wood discusses in detail 
the nature of the elements given; Lewis argues for the in-
clusive character of the g1ven.1 The charge that phenome-
nalism is unempirical, then, is chiefly a criticism levied 
against Stace's view in particular. 
G. Dawes Hicks in his Critical Realism devotes a whole 
chapter to Stace's view and entitles it, "The Refutation 
2 
of Subjectivism." Included in it are criticisms of other 
aspects of Stace's view as well as his theory of the given. 
Hicks's initial charge is that Stace's view of what the 
mind has to start with in knowing is open to serious ques-
tion. He says: 
I would urge that to suppose presentations, 
as thus di:stinguished from "things" or "objects," 
are directly apprehended entities is absolutely 
contrary to what can be gathered from evAn a 
cursory inspection of actual experience.~ 
He goes on to add that we are not immediately aware of pre-
sentations in Stace's sense but of "single unified objects 
possessing a variety of characteristics ••• which are never 
presented in isolation."4 Only by careful and sustained 
effort and with the aid of certain devices is 1t possible, 
Hicks claims, to talk about color-patches and such. They 
1. See Section Two of this chapter 1n this dissertation. 
2. It is Chapter X. 
3. Hicks, OR, 258. 
4. Hicks, OR, 258. 
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are not psychologically immediate. In fact 1t is said: 
If there b.- any truth which genetic psychology 
can be said to have established, it is that ex-
perience does not advance by a gradual building 
up of concrete objects from 1originally isolated and detached presentations. 
The conclusion Hicks draws is that the given or the ap-
pearances are "dependent upon the actually real objects, 
and not the objects upon the appearances."2 Stace's view 
is allegedly unempirical for it does not build on the 
psychological facts. 
It may be noted here that Stace himself admits that 
his view of the given is "an abstraction," 3 and that his 
analysis is not a psychological but a logical one. "We 
are to consider ••• the logical given ••• that which possesses 
primitive and absolute certainty, and which is therefore 
the necessary logical beginning of argument. "4 It would 
seem that Hicks's charges had been answered before they 
were made.5 
Price raises a minor point on the empirical character 
of Stace's view when he criticizes him for holding that the 
third dimension of visual space is not given but constructed. 
1. Hicks, OR, 259. 
2. Hicks, CR, 259. 
3. Stace, TKE, 31. 
4. Stace, TKE, 33. 
5. For a criticism resembling HickeL, though not specifically 
directed against phenomenalism or Stace, see Loewenberg's 
article, "Pre-Analytical and Post-Analytical Data" in Jour. 
Phil., 24(1927), lff. 
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The visual field is not flat, Price maintains. "It seems 
to me perfectly obvious," Price says, "that in my own visual 
experience tri-dimensionality is as much given as colour 
or outline."1 Though Price would add that this visual ex-
perience differs from physical distance. This is a die-
tinction which Stace bas not made. 
iii. The phenomenalist account of' the given is presumably 
fruitless and ill-founded. 
F. c. s. Schiller in a review of' Lewieh first work 
2 in epistemology, The Pragmatic Element in Knowledge, sug-
gests that Lewis~ notion of' a given does not get us very 
f'ar in the problem of' knowledge. It is a concept, Schiller 
says, which is "largely fictitious, not merely because we 
never get to a pure datum, but because our 'data' are always 
highly selected objects of' interest and attention extracted 
f'rom the flow of bappenings."3 What we call, data, be con• 
tinues, could better be called aumpta or the "taken" be-
cause so-called "data" really rest on our choice.4 Knowing 
is experimental and tentative. 
Writing a few years later about Stace's view, Schiller 
makes essentially the same criticism, noting that Stace's 
attempt to build on the concept of' the given is questionable 
1. Price, Art. (1933), 279. 
2. Published in 1926. His later work, MWO, incorporates 
the substance of this lecture. 
3. Schiller, Art. (1927), 379. 
4. Schiller, Art. (1927), 379. 
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because "the given of an individual is always given in the 
light of his whole biological past and social environment ." 1 
He then argues: 
Now this means that actually our knowing 
sta.rtiFfrom the common-sense analysis of the 
given and with the 1 categories 1 embodied in 
language, and that the philosophic analyses 
which seek to recover and reconstruct the 
original data are all ex post facto infer-
ences which may misrepresent the actual 
psych~c development and are in da~ger of de-
generating into logical fictions. 
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There is a significa~t aspect in Schiller's two criticisms, 
namely, the tendency to build on a logically indubitable 
rather than psychological fact. But Lewis does not do this, 
nor does Wood, and Stace is conscious of his logical approach, 
as bas been noted under the preceding subhead. What 
Scb!ller's criticism really amounts to is that the given is 
not isolable, and, consequently everything can be given. 
Elsewhere in his attack on Stace he says: "Stace's asser-
tion that 1 the given is independent of will' seems too 
strong."3 It is indeed "strong" for Schiller's instrumental-
ism. But if everything is potentially given and any parti-
cular given is merely a matter of selection on the basis of 
interest or attention, (dependent on will), the whole 
theory of the given as understood in this dissertation is 
denied. .An analysis of the knowing si tuat1on yields dif-
ferences 1n viewpoint, but 1t yields something. Schiller 
1. Schiller, Art. (1933P, 97. 
2. Schiller, Art. (1933~, 97. (Italics his.) 
3. Schiller, Art. (1933~. 98. 
is maintaining that analysis, especially when it leads one to 
the given, is fruitless, and basically unsound. 1 
A similar charge against theories of the given is made 
by G. P. Adams though he carries it somewhat farther. He 
urges that there can be no given free from meaning. 
To suppose that any content can be immediately 
given without any trace of some such meaning is 
to commit what I should call the fal2acy of de-
tached and self-contained immediacy. 
But if this is the case, again 1t may be said that the 
concept of the given is fruitless for it means nothing. It 
means nothing because it means everything and bas no defini-
lli• 3 There is no theory of the given as an aspect of the 
knowledge situation if knowledge (meaning) is itself g1ven.4 
The phenomenalists are not prepared to admit that their pro-
blem is not a real one. 
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Another example of this type of criticism of the.pbenome-
nalist theory of the given can be found in an article by 
c. A. Baylis entitled "The Given and Perceptual Knowledge." 5 
Baylis challenges Lewis's criteria of givenness suggesting 
• that "the criteria of givenness which he specifies are 
1. For Stace 1 s brief answer to Schiller, see Stace "Letter," 
in Mind, 42(1933), 268-269. 
2. Adams, Art. (1928), 120. 
3. For an interesting comment on Adamsh observation, see Mor-
ris, STM, 301n, where Adams and Dewey are compared as to how 
much meaning is given. 
4. For a point of view similar to Adams~ see M. T. McClure's 
. articlet "Data and Meaning in Cognition," in Jour. Phil., 
22(1925}, 337-346. 
5. In Farber, PTFUS, 443-461. 
neither necessary or sufficient."1 He adds that we should 
"leave open the question of whether this content is alter-
able by our mental attitudes."2 The reason offered in de-
fense of this criticism which suggests that the defining 
characteristics of the given be kept at a minimum, is to 
be found earlier in Baylis 'a article. He there suggests 
that it is difficult to transcend the given and thereby 
attain knowledge "because the given bas often been defined 
in such a way that it cannot have the characters it would 
need to have if it were to provide literal knowledge of an 
object. "3 The verbal character of Baylis's cri t1cism of 
Lewis is at once patent. The epistemologist cannot play 
fast and loose with the meanings of fundamental terms and 
expect to give any light on the problem of knowledge. It 
is undoubtedly to the credit of the phenomenalists herein 
considered that they are exceedingly careful in their term~-
no logy. 
Two other criticisms need only passing reference here. 
They echo, in effect, the charges thus far noted that the 
phenomenalist concept of the given is fruitless and baseless. 
In a discussion of Stace'a view, Murphy warns the episte-
molo~st to "beware of indubitables," such as Stace's "given," 
which Whitehead, Perry, Hocking and G. E. Moore would all 
1. Baylis, Art. (1950), 449. Lew1s 1scr1teria of the given, 
it will be recalled, are "sensuous or feeling character" 
and unalterability by thought. See MWO, 66. 
2. Baylis , Art. (1950) , 449. 
3. Baylis, Art. (1950), 447. 
212 
deny.1 Commenting on Lewish view, Hugh Miller claims that 
Lewis "defines too narrowly the material which epistemology 
must organize," for experience is far more complex than he 
2 
allows. 
iv. The view makes veridical knowledge impossible, 
A. J. Ayer has defined phenomenalism as the theory 
which holds that external objects are logical constructions 
out or sense-data. And he adds: 
To say that physical objects are logical 
constructions out of sense-data ••• does not 
mean that physical objects are literally 
composed of sensewdata ••• It means simply that 
statements about p~ysioal obJects are some- 3 how reducible to statements about sense-data. 
If this is the case about all phenomenalist views, it is 
not difficult to see why the charge is made that the 
phenomenalist account or the given makes veridical knowledge 
impossible. Of course, a great deal hinges on what is taken 
to be veridical knowledge, And that in turn hinges on one's 
criterion of truth, and further, on one's concept of logic. 
That there are positivistic implications in the 
phenomenalist view of the given has already been pointed 
4 
out. But there are other aspects of the view which lay 
it open to the charge that veridical knowledge seems im-
possible. Ayer's statement above is not wholly applicable 
1, Murphy, AE., Art. (1934), 29Bf. 
2. Miller, H., Art. (1931), 575. 
3. Ayer, Art.·(l947), 169 •. Of. Marhenke, Art. (1950), 299ft, 
for an elaboration of this. 
4. See Section Four, subhead three of this chapter in this 
dissertation. 
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here, but it does have some bearing. 
In an important article about the theory of the given 
in general, Wild has criticized Lewislt view of the given 
on the grounds tbat it is an abstraction which is distin-
guished from other aspects of the "original given." The 
result is "a world divided into two portions, one of which 
is infallibly present, but ineffable and thus of no strictly 
cognitive value, while the other, though knowable is be-
yond our ken." 1 By the "original given," Wild means "what-
soever is capable of being given to the human knowing facul-
ties, either to sense or to reason."2 His implication is 
that Lewis bas created for himself an artificial problem 
which, in fact, on his own grounds, precludes veridical 
knowledge. 
But it oan be asked whether this is the case. Wild 
develops his critic ism of Lewis Ia view by referring to the 
thought of Berkeley, Berkeley and his followers, which 
would include phenomenalists, take the given in a limited 
sense, says Wild. 
That which is given not direetly and in~allibly, 
but mediately and at first fallibly, £I such data, 
is held by them not to be given at all, and 
hence not accessible to any sort of observational 
or desortpt1ve tgchnique, but only to postulation 
and speculation.) 
The theory then leads to a dilemma. In one oase, knowledge 
1. Wild, Art. (1940), 71. 
2. Wild, Art. (1940), 70. 3. Wild, Art. (1940), 74. 
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1s unverifiable; 1n another subjective. The theory must 
either 
try through speculation and aprior1 methods 
of postulation and deduction, to gain knowl-
edge of what 1s non-relative, or 1t must try, 
through inductive observation or immediately 
given data, to ga1~ knowledge of what is ul-
timately relative. 
Now 1t does not seem that the phenomenalist would admit 
this dilemma. He admits that his starting place is sub-
ject1ve,2 but he does not maintain that knowledge 1s there-
fore unverifiable. The verifiability or knowledge is de-
pendent on the criterion of truth adopted. However, Wild 
woul-d otter the counter-or! t1c1sm: "What no Berkele1an has 
ever successfully shown, are convincing phenomenological 
reasons for getting locked up 1n the first place." 3 It 
could be said, that the "reasons," are essentially nothing 
more than a description of psychological facts. But Wild 
has recognized this too when he says that the issue 11 1s 
not between two rival interpretations of obvious facts--but 
is the nature of facts themselves."4 The "facts" are 
found, according to Stace, by a logical analysis. For Wood 
the "facts" are found by a psychogenetic approach. It 
almost seems that Wild 1n his baste to overthrow the theory 
of the given, applies the term given to all the facts and 
1. Wild, Art. (1940), 74. 
2. For example, note Wood's "methodol.ogical subjectivism," 
AI!:, 32. 
3. Wild, Art. (1940), 78. 
4. Wild, Art. (1940), 77. 
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consequently misses the problem phenomenalists are trying 
to solve. 1 If everything is given, knowledge is immediate 
and falsehood is immediate. Wlld is left with the problem 
of accounting for bow the two can be distinguished. The 
phenomenalist can account for errors in knowing, but has 
some d1ff1cul ty in moving from the gi van to the known. 
How the phenomenalist tackles this problem has been noted 
2 
earlier in this chapter. 
Others have made the charge that veridical knowledge 
is impossible on the phenomenalist view of the given. 
Baylis suggests that Lewis \a view is especially weall: "for 
it seems to exclude the possibility of certain knowledge, 
and if eo of all knowledge, for, as he tells us, probable 
knowledge must be based on some antecedent certainty."3 
or course, it may be said that Lewis!! antecedent certainty 
is not the same as knowledge. It comprises the source for 
knowledge which is derived through probable inference. 
KerbyMMiller, recognizing that Stace claims to escape 
the given by mental construction which would be veridical 
if consistent and needed for the purposes of knowledge, 
nevertheless makes the following charge, which he does not 
develop: 
1. He says, 11 In reality, everything whatsoever is gi:ren, 
including illusions, contradictions, and nonsense. · Art. 
( 1940), 82. 
2. See Section 2, v and vi. Note Lewis, MWO, 155, regarding 
the obJect's knowability. · 
3. Baylis, Art. (1930), 326. 
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The account he gives of bow the mind made 
the inference from mere 'groups of presen-
tations' to the existence of otbir minds 
meets with obvious difficulties. 
The difficulties are less obvious than on a monistic view. 
Stabbing expresses doubt as to what Stace means by his 
methodological solipsism and does not see~ much hope for 
veridical knowledge. ''It would seem to follow that we can 
never be certain that there is a public e:X:ternal world. "2 
But the phenomenalist might well reply that it is quite 
impossible to be certain of anything and that adequate 
knowledge is all that may be sought legitimately. Thls 
reply could also be made to Hicks" charge that the belief 
in an independent world appears "more like a fairy tale 
than a veritable piece of philosophical analys1s." 3 How-
ever, Hicks's criticism of the involved mental machinery 1m-
plied in Stace's theory is of considerable value, though 
4 
somewhat beyond the scope of the present study. Price's 
detailed examination of Stace's theory of mental construction 
is similarly worthy but somewhat irrelevant here. 5 
v. Instances of internal inconsistency. 
Several instances of inconsistency may be noted in 
the phenomenalist accounts of the given, but these are 
terminological. Wood, for instance holds that "the awareness 
1. Kerby~1ller, Art. (1934), 317. 
2. Stabbing, Art. (1933)2, 356. 
3. Hicks, OR, ~61. 
4. cr. Hicks, OR, 26lff. 
5. PriceA Art. (1933). For Stace's reply see Stace, Art. 
(1933)~. 
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of simple isolated sense qualities ••• belongs to a pre-
cognitive level of experience."1 Yet, his discussion of 
these qualities along with other aspects of the given is 
included in his chapter entitled "Sensory lhowledge." He 
is not as clear in his use of the term knowledp:e as Lewis 
is. Lewis limits the term knowledge to the non-given.2 
Wood uses it for both the given and the perceived. 
Stace, too, is inconsistent in his usage of the term 
given. He notes that it falls into two parts, the active 
and the passive. The active aspect of the given "consists 
of our own mental activities, such as knowing, thinking, 
willing, feeling, attending."3 And yet, on the next page, 
he maintains that "the given is independent of the will."~ 
He ought to have said, the passiye given is independent of 
the will. 
A more serious inconsistency is one which is more 
implied than explicitly stated. Both Wood and Stace define 
the given in terms which indicate that it is non-mental.5 
Later both maintain that one can't know whether data are 
mental or non-mental. Stace says: "To the question whether 
the presentation is 'mental' of 'non-mental', we shall 
reply that this question is itself meaningless, and that 
the dispute which is supposed to center round it is a mere 
1. Wood, AK, 29. 
2. Cf. Lewis, AKV, 30. 
3. Stace, TKE, 45. 
4. Stace, TKE, 46. 
5. Cr. Wood, AK, 17 and Stace TIS, 32. 
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quarrel over words." 1 And Wood says that he knows of no 
"significant criteria whereby the mentality, the physicality, 
or neutrality of the sensa can be determined."2 It is dif-
ficult to see bow data can be anything but mental by virtue 
of the fact of being data and being present in conscious 
experience. 
This leads to the next and last criticism which can 
be offered against the phenomenalist view. 
vi. The distinction between the given and consciousness is 
unwarranted. 
Some of the implications of the phenomenalist theory 
of the given for the theory of mind may be noted above. 3 
It may be added here that one of the weaknesses in the 
phenomenalist view is the distinction between the given and 
consciousness. In several instances, for example, Lewis 
makes a sharp distinction. One of his chapters dealing with 
the problem is itself entitled, "'l'be Given Element in Ex-
perience."4 He speaks of the given as an element ",!n, not 
before experience."5 The implication is that experience 
is a more inclusive category than the p:iven. If the given is 
found in experience, in consciousness, what is consciousness? 
Is not consciousness itself a basal, given fact? Not so, 
Lewis would answer: 
1. Stace TKE, 74. cr. 86ff. 
2. Wood, AK, 33. 
3. See Section Four, subhead two of this chapter in this dis-
sertation. 
4. Chapter II of MWO. 
5. Lewis, MWO, 55. Of. also MWO, 48, 50, 54, and 66. 
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We need not say that what is given is a 
'mental state' or even 'in the mind' in any 
more explicit sense than is itself implied 
in such givenness. Nor should it be presumed 
that what is thus in mind is exclusively men-
tal.l 
Later, in an appendix Lewis implicitly recognizes the dif• 
ficulty of the mind-given relationship and says: 
Although the activity of mind is a datum of 
experience, it is not the kind of datum to 
which the word2
1 given 1 bas been applied in 
the preceding. 
But this seems to add to the confusion for mind, experience, 
datum, and given are all referred to as distinctive factors. 
The words "given" and "datum" presumably mean different 
things, but what precisely the difference is, is not made 
clear. In an early cbapter,3 Lewis uses "datum" and "given" 
interchangeably. It would seem that Lewis means by the 
given, the sensuous given, though be here implies that 
mental activity, too could be given, yet it is another kind 
of givenness. Perhaps Lewis is having language difficulty 
about Stace's point on the active and passive given.4 But 
granting this possible reinterpretation, why must it be said 
that the given is given to something, namely, experience? 
Is experience the receptor of both the sensuous given and 
1. Lewis, MWO, 65. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 422. For a comment on this see McCreary, Art. 
( 1948)' 710. 
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3. See Chapter II in MWO. 
4. Cf. Stace, TKE, 43. "The primitive world of the given di-
vides itself into two halves, (1) what I do, the activities 
of my consciousness, and (2) wbat ••• bappens in my conscious-
ness independently of me." 
mental activity? If it is the receptor, why not call it 
the given, and include sensation and activity as elements 
within it? Wood, incidentally, seems to do this in h!s 
inclusive account of the given. 1 For him there is no ex-
perience of the given but the ~iven is identified with ex-
perience. "There is, strictly speaking, no consciousness 
~ content, but merely the conscious presence of conscious 
content ."2 
But Wood, like Lewis, is not prepared to identify 
the given with consciousness or the self. Everything seems 
to point in such a direction, but the phenomenalist is wary 
of metaphysical implications. To define the self is to 
enter the area of metaphysics, but we have no right to enter 
that area, therefore, the phenomenalists seem to reason, we 
must leav« the self undefined. Wood and Lewis as well as 
Stace definitely reject any transcendental ego or soul sub-
stance.3 They do not seem willing to admit that an empirical 
definition of the self can also be a metaphysical one. It 
is possible to interpret the self or mind in an empirical 
and not transcendental W'fi.Y•· It need not become "the ultimate 
4 
and hopelessly esoteric mystery" Lewis says it is. The 
difficulty can be resolved by clearing up the distinction 
1. See Wood, AK, Chapter II and III. 
2. Wood, AK, 20. 
3 •. See Wood, AK, 21; Lewis, MWO, 425; Stace TKE, 41. 
4. Lewis, MWO, 425. 
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between consciousness and the ~iven. The nhenomenglists, 
1 
with the exception of Wood, do not do this adequately. 
1, Some of the difficulties in this nroblem especially as 
they relate to nhenomenolo~ ~ay be noted in Gurwitsch's 
article, "A Non-Egolog1cal Conception of Consciousne"'s," 
in Phil. Phen. Res,, 1(1940), 325-"""38, See also, ',o{in-
fhrop1 s article, "Phenomenological Method from the Stand-
point of the Empiricistic Bias," in Jour. Phil., 46(1949), 
57-74. 
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CHAPTER V 
THE DATUM SELF AS GIVEN 
1. Introductory Observations. 
Tbe view that the datum self is given is in some ways 
similar to the view just discussed, namely, that phenomena 
are given. But there are also some significant differences. 
Tbe datum self theory is in basic accord with the phenome-
nalist rejection of both the essence and sense-data theories 
and it concurs in the holistic stress of the phenomenalist 
account. BOth theories oppOse the oversimplification of the 
given which views its content as a collection of irreducible 
somewhats. Yet the datum self theory differs from the phe-
nomenalist view in its concern for the epistemological and 
metaphysical implications which follow from an acceptance 
of the theory. The phenomenalist, for the most part, is 
content to describe the phenomena given. The datum self 
theory>" is interested in the given phenomena, but also in 
what those phenomena mean epistemically and metaphysically. 
Accordingly, the datum self theory, as will be seen, holds 
that the given can be best understood as a self. And this 
self is, veritably, a metaphysical entity, the starting 
point for all knowledge of this world and worlds to come. 
An obvious question may well aris' regarding the ter-
minology of this' view. Why, it may be asked, should one 
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say that the "datum self" is given, when the term "datum" 
already means "given?" It may be answered that the ex-
pression "datum self" bas a special meaning in recent expo-
sitions and appears in the literature in a technical sense, 
though it admHtedly seems tautologous at first sight. The 
significance of the technical term "datum self" and its 
synonyms will be presented below. 
The theory that the given consists of a datum self is 
implicit in much of modern ideal1sm, 1 though it is not 
wholly confined to idealism. ~. S. Brightman bas pointed 
out the use of the term in the work of c. A. Strong, a 
Critical Realist, and he goes on to say: 
Writers so different as Bergson ••• and Husserl ••• 
are essentially concerned wi tb the problem of the 
self as datum. The view has obvious relations to 
the thought of Augustine, Descartes, Scbopenbauer, 
and many others.2 
A similar usage can also be found in the thought of D. C. 
Williams who may be classified as a materialist.3 Writing 
in another connection about this theory of the given, 
Brightman points out other views similar to it. He says: 
It corresponds to the field of attention, to 
James's stream of consciousness (although treated 
as a unified Gestalt), to the specious present, 
and to Royce's span of consciousness. It is re-
lated to Whitehead's actual occasion and to 
1. See, for example, G. A. Wilson, SAW, Part IY; Leighton, 
MC, 305-317; Brightman, POI, 13-31. 
2. Brightman, POI, 14n. The note is number 11 on page 220. 
3. See Williams, Art. (1933). 
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Dewey's situation.1 
Nevertheless, there has not as yet been any systemativ 
treatment of this view of the given which would compare 
with the analysis of the given found in Stace, Price, or 
Lewis. However, the view has been presented in connection 
with wider problems, most notably in the writings of E. s. 
Brightman. This writer bas held to the theory of the datum 
self consistently, and it is an integral part of his epi-
stemology and metaphysics, though there have been termimCJi!J_• 
ogtcal variations in his exposi t1on of the theory from time 
to time.2 The meaning or a theory is more important than 
the words used to describe it. Hence, terminological varia-
tions need prove no great hindrance, provided there is clar-
ity as to what the variations are. 
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The chief sources for the datum self theory are such 
writings of Brightman as A Pbilosophv of Ideals (1928), A 
Pllilosophy of Religion (1940), and Nature and Values (1945), 
plus a number of important articles in various philosophical 
journals from 1929 through 1951. The view may also be de-
rived, in part, from articles by such writers as P. A. Bertocci, 
J. s. Moore, D. H. Parker, W. H. Werkmeister, and D. C. 
Williams, who accept the theory with varying m~difications. 
Relevant writinga by these thinkers will be specifically 
1. Brightman, POR, 348n. 
2. In Brightman, POI, the terms "datum self" and "datum mind" 
are used interchangeably (e.g. 20, 71). In Brightman, POR, 
348, the term "Situation Experienced" is introduced as a 
synonym for datum self. Other variations will be noted 
below. 
noted in the ens~!ng exposition. 
An additional preliminary remark must be made here. 
Brightman has developed a theory of a finite God which in-
cludes in its terminology the expression "The Given." 1 The 
present discussion regarding the datum self as given, is a 
question of epistemological theory, and has no direct rela-
tion to "The Given." However, it can be said that the theory 
of "The Given" concerning God is derived from the theory 
that the datum self is the epistemic given. Reference will 
be made to this in the section dealing with implications, 
below. 
2. Exposition of the View. 
The theory that the given is a datum self has not been 
worked over in any systemati~ treatise on epistemology or 
2 
metaphysics as yet. Consequently, no single thread of argu-
ment is available for exposition. Nevertheless, the view 
may be presented here in some detail and with considerable 
cogency, because it has appeared as an important aspect of 
a total system of pbiloeophy in a signifioant body of litera• 
ture. 
1. See Brightman, POR, Chapter Ten. 
2. The writer or the dissertation has been informed in con-
versation and correspondence that the first chapter of a 
systematic treatise on metaphysics, now in preiaration by 
E. S. Brightman, will be entitled "Dar Schein. It will 
deal with the theory of the datum self. 
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i. The given is a self. 
That the given is a self is the fundamental charac-
teristic of the view here being examined. It may be under-
stood as a self because all the evidence available is con-
scious evidence. It is impossible to employ the term evi-
dence without reference to consciousness. As .Brightman says: 
"All of the actual data empirically available are conscious 
experiences •••• We may call the present experience of any 
one of us the datum self (or the empirical situation) ." 1 
Elsewhere he notes that "all the evidence for a person 1 s 
knowledge of any object and all the verification of any 
hypothesis are to be found within the experience of some 
2 person." Evidence is always conscious evidence and it is 
always rooted in experience. And experience is always iden-
tified with self. "Every item of consciousness is owned and 
belongs to a whole, There are no floatin~ experiences, but 
only selves."3 Werkmeister says in a similar vEt:lm that 
"experience ••• is self-revealing. "4 
This view thus far is compatible w1 th the statement of 
Wood that there is "strictly speaking, no consciousness .Qf 
content, but merely the conscious presence of conscious 
content."5 Brightman begins with the psychological facts 
and notes that all those facts are psychically owned facts. 
l •. Brightman, POR, 227, 
2. Brightman, NV, 56. 
3· Brightman, POR, 351. 
4. Werkmeister, BSK, 82. (cr. also his view of first-person 
experience, discussed on page 240 of this dissertation.) 
5. Wood, AK, 20, (Wood does not call this conscious content 
a self, however.) 
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He does not maintain that an epistemological analysis of the 
evidence would differ radicaliy from a psychological account. 
In one place be points out that one who held his view 
would not speak of an'epistemological subject' 
for he would not wish to give the impression 
that this subject is a1different being from the psychological subject. 
All of the psychological and epistemological evidence can 
be identified with a self. The self "is the only given em-
pirical fact, for all present facts of every kind are given 
in someone's personal consciousness."2 On this aame point, 
G. A. Wilson has said: "The self is the most intimate fact 
in our experience •••• Tbe se~f, always present, becomes elu-
sive."3 
In an effort to make this position regarding the given 
clearer, Brightman has varied his terminology somewhat. The 
datum self theory of the given claims to be an accurate re-
port of what the facts are and cannot be sustained by strict, 
logical argument, for the datum self, if a correct report 
of the given, is the presupposition of all arguments. It 
is the immediate certainty. To deny it is to deny the 
denier. "The self is the datum and all thinking is elabora-
tion of the datum by itself •••• Tbe self is the datum, and 
the self is the final court of appeal."4 The theory of the 
given as datum self can be substantiated by introducing 
1. Brightman, Art. (1932)2, 182. 
2. Brightman, Art. (1933), 221. 
3. Wilson, SAW, 274. Italics added. 
4. Brightman, Art. (1929), 50lf. 
228 
synonyms and explanatory phrases for it. Some which have 
1 2 been used are these: "conscious experience," "datum mind," 
"the empirical situation," 3 "an actual ent1ty,"4 "Situation 
5 6' Experienced," and "total experience." In a discussion 
article dealing with this very problem of synonyms, Bright-
man asked D. C. 'll'illlams this enlightening question: 
Is there any objection to treating as synonyms 
the following expressions: fhe given, present 
consciousness, specious present, time-span 
(Royce's term emnhasizinp;, of course, the tem-
poral structure of the present self), present 
self-,xperience, field of attention, datum 
self? 
In discussing Brightman's view of the self, P. A. 
Bertocci has contributed a clarifying sentence about the 
relation of the given or consciousness to the self. 
All conscious experience is owned, ••• the word 
"mine" expresses the intrinsic property of any 
conscious experience, and ••• there are no sup- 8 
posed bits of consciousness which aren't selves. 
This leads to the next observation which may be made on 
the datum self theory. 
1. Brightman, ITP, 
2. Brightman, POI, 
3. Brightman, Art. 
4. Bri~htman, POR, 
head s usage.) 
(1925), • 
19, 20. 
(1939), 134. 
228. (To be 
5. Brightman, POR, 348 and note. 
88, as well as Art. (1951), 5. 
6. Brightman, ITP, (1951), 90. 
7. Brightman, Art. (1934), 267. 
.in his Art. (1946), 366. 
8. Bertocc1, Art. (1950), 22. 
See his POR 358. 
differentiated from White-
See also his ITP (1951), 
Some of these are repeated 
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ii. The given is equal to experience not a constituent of it. 
In his treatment of the g1vea from an essentially phe-
nomenalist standpoint, c. I. Lewis maintained that the given 
"is admittedly an excised element or abstraction, ••• but an 
identifiable constituent in experience."1 Though there are 
certain similarities between phenomenalism and the datum 
self theory, this is not one of them. The proponent of the 
theory that the datum self is given might well ask Lewis 
what the given is "excised" from. If the given is part of 
"experience," is not "experience" more fundamental than the 
given?2 Brightman would bold that the given is no part of 
experience, but is the whole of it. Indeed, the two may be 
identified. "Thought must start in its first stage with 
experience as given (the datum) ."3 Again, "A datum is 
always mental, someone'e conscious experience. For episte-
. 4 
mology, the datum is all actual present consciousness. 11 
That the given is equal to experience on this view is 
also apparent in the use of the term "Situation Experienced" 
as a synonym for datum self. "No situation is a. Situation 
Experienced unless it is actually present in consciousness."5 
There are also Situations Believed-in which would include 
1. Lewis, MWO, 66. 
2. The view of the phenomenalist on this has been discussed 
in Chapter IV of this dissertation. See Section 2, iii. 
For criticisms, consult Section 5, vi. 
3. Brightman, ITP (1951) 41. 
4. Brightman, Art. (1946), 366. 
5. Brightman, POR, 347. cr. Whitehead's contrastin!" and un-
clear view that "consciousness presunposes experience, a>1d 
not experience consciousness" (FR, 83J. Note also: "con• 
sc1ousnees 1s the crown of experience" (PR, 408). 
everything not found in Situations Experienced. 1 The former 
are not part of the latter, and the latter are identical 
with the given, being no part of any substance or tertium 
quid, but fundamental in themselves. 
It is easy to miss the point because of language dif-
ficulties. Leighton, for instance, speaks of the self as 
"the most significant datum of experience." 2 But he does 
not mean that there are other aspects of experience besides 
a self, for the self is experience. Such expressions as 
"given to experience" and "given in consciousness" are simi-
larly misleading for the datum self theory. 3 It may be said 
that they are misleading on any theory for the term "given" 
itself seems to imply something basic which cannot be fur-
ther reduced. Some of the difficulties with the sense-data 
view of H. H. Price can be traced to this d1fficulty.4 
Since the given is equal to experience and not a part 
of it, its indubitable character follows. Exactly what the 
content of the given is, depends on a careful psychological 
descriptive analysis, but that there is a given iB an incon• 
trovertible fact. This characteristic of indubitability 
has been ably stressed by Price in his Perception, but his 
limitation of the given to sense-data has been seriously 
1. Compare Werkmeister's idea of a "subject pole" and an 
"object pole," BSK, 83. 
2. Leighton, MO, 311. 
3. J. s. Moore, for example, proposes: "For epistemology, 
the datum is all that is directly presented in conscious-
ness." See his Art. (1949), 62. 
4. See Price, PER, 3. "This peculiar and ultimate mllnner 
of being present to consciousness is called being given, 
and that which is thus present is called a datum." 
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questioned. 1 In one of his earlier works, Brightman stres-
sed the givenB characteristic of certainty, in language 
which be bas since modified. 
Consciousness is given as· an unescapable 
fact •••• We may even go further and say that 
not only is mind immediate, but also nothing 
but mind is immediate. All ;that ever can be 
immediately present is mind. 
Allotber uncompromising statement may be noted. "The most 
c•srtain fact, and the only absolutely certain empirical 
fact, then, is my own self-exper1ence." 3 Or, "the datum-
mind is certain; 1 je pense, done Je suis.'"4 
It may be said, in summary, that epistemological in-
quiry must begin with the immediately certain facts, but 
these immediately certain facts are the same as experience. 
Experience is given. That which is not experienced cannot 
be given. The given is identidal with experience, and this 
basal given may be called a self,5 
iii. The given is problematic and innocent. 
It has been noted in the previous point that the given 
is equal to experience and that consequently, it is a cer-
tainty. But if it is a certainty, bow can one say that it 
l. See Chapter III of this dissertation, expecially, Sec-
tion 5, 11. 
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::~. Brightman, POI, 13. 
3~ Brightman, POI, 18. 
lj., Brightman, POI, 19. 
~;. J, S. Moore, in Art. (1949), 62, has auestioned the vali-
dity of Brightman's claim that the datum is men tal and iden-
tical with the content of experience. He says: "This is 
something to be proved (or disproved) rather than assumed." 
is problematic, let alone "innocent?" It may be answered 
that the given is problematic in the sense that it is 
merely a starting point for thought and investigation. 
Though its presumed content will be examined in some de-
tail below, it can be said, that the given, without the ef-
fort of thought, is virtually chaos, indeed, a problem. Its 
existence is not problematic but its nature is. As G. A. 
Wilson has suggested: 
The sense world begins in a welter of incipient 
experience (sense-data, impressions, the thought-
distinguished beginnings of reaction to stimula-
tions}. These are not yet an ordered world •••• 
Out of this chaos, the silf constructs a more or 
less articulated cosmos. 
This statement bas the implication that the self is an agent 
distinguished from the given, it is true, but the main point 
is that the beginnings in knowledge are difficult and mean 
little as they are found. 
D. c. Williams, to whom the expression "innocence" is 
due, has well stated the problematic character of the given 
in these wordS: "The given is inscrutable in that it is 
not and never will acquire an infallible account of 1tself."2 
It does not contain :neaning, as it comes.3 Brightman, too, 
bas elaborated on the problematic character of the given. 
1. Wilson, SAW, 278. 
2. Williams, Art. ( lWZ, 628. . 
3. For a view directly o~posed to this see Adams' article, 
"Immediacy and Meaning in Phil. Rev. • 37(1928), 109-132. 
Note also the reference to it on page 211 of this disser-
tation. 
He points out that Loewenberg in a helpful article1 bas 
shown that much of the confusion regarding the given con-
sists in employing the term datum."to mean both what thought 
must start with and what it must stop w1th."a I.oewenberg 
goes on to suggest that the datum is not a thing or a qual-
ity, but a problem.3 And Brightman comments: 
One of the most certain truths about imme-
diate experience is that we do not know what 
it means until after investigation, if then. 
The datum is, indeed, a problem. It contains 
conflicts and4obstructions; it is incomplete and confused. 
The datu.ol is not a problem in the sense that tbere·is auy~ 
~uestion about the given's certainty. "It is not the being 
of the datum which is ever doubtful, but the manner of its 
being, the circumstances under which it appears, the speci-
fic characters and qualities it owns." 5 The problem arises 
when one wants to find out the meaning of the certain, but 
confused facts. 6 
That the datum is innocent has been urged by Williams 
in an article entitled, "The Innocence of the Given."7 By 
applying the term "innocent" to the given, Williams means 
1. Loewenberg, Art. (1927). 
2. Brightman, POI, 16. 
3. The same point is made in Loewenberg, Art. (1930). 
4. Brightman, POI, 17. 
5~ Loewenberg, Art. (1930), 65. 
6. Compare Werkmeister, ESK, 83. "The empirical 'self' or 
·~erson', however, is ••• as much of a problem as is the 
'empirical thing' or the whole 'external world. •" 
1. In Jour. Phil., 30(1933), 617-628. 
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that it is undifferentiated and does not include knowledge. 
He says: "The given is as such mere fact, innocent of self-
knowledge, to be known, if at all, indirectly, inductively, 
and inconclusively."1 Furthermore, it may be added that 
the introspective endeavors of the phenomenologists, criti-
cal epistemology, and a measure of philosophical tradition 
"all testify that the given is innocent and ambiguous, with 
the inscrutable ultimacy of sheer fact." 2 Brightman agrees, 
in essence, with this view of the innocence of the given, but 
suggests that at least the term self may be applied to it. 
He adds: "It is true that to call the given a self means 
that the innocent self bas eaten the fruit of the tree of 
knowledge."3 Writing some years later, be implies a ques-
tion as to whether or not the datum could be innocent: 
A first inspection of any situation experienced 
if 1t could be made w1 th that perfect "innocenge'' 
of which Donald C. Williams has well written, 4 would reveal little, if anything, about its nature. 
D. A. Piatt has challenged this view of the innocence of 
the given in an article entitled, "That Will-o'-the-Wisp, 
the Innocent, Inscrutable Given."5 
1. Williams, Art. (1933)~, 617. 
2. Williams, Art. (1933)2, 627. 
3. Brigbtmanl Art. ( 1934), 267. Note also his statement in 
Art. (1943J 1 45: "Immediate experience as such is 'inno-
cent' of knowledge (as D. c. Williams rightly holds)." 
4. Brightman, NV, 52. Italics added. 
5. In Jour. fb11., 32(1935), 337•350. 
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iv. Knowledge is not found in the datum self. 
That knowledge is not round in the datum self has 
already been implied under the previous bead. But more must 
be said on this matter. It may first be noted that on this 
point there is agreement in the thought of the phenomenalists 
and the datum self theorists. 1 The datum is viewed as raw 
material and the source of kno•ledge, but it does not con-
tain any knowledge, not even knowledge or itself. 2 
The chief reason for this is implicit in the very defi-
nition of the datum self. The datum ·self is an empirical 
situation or a Situation Experienced. It is identical with 
the immediate. It is full of confusion and disorder, but 
yet there are no errors in it. When one sees a blotch of 
color and calls 1t gray, though later, through testing, finds 
out that it is red, the error is not in the conscious exper-
ience Of the blotch or color, but in what is said about the 
experienced blotch. The immediate facts are before us, our 
interpretation of them yields knowledge or falsehood. The 
immediate facts may be called awareness, Mere awareness of 
a blotch of color is not knowledge, rather, a datum for 
knowledge. According to D. H. Parker, "mere presence of an 
item, such as sound does not constitute knowledge of the 
item. u3 Where there is awareness of nothing at all there is 
4 unawareness or unconsciousness, as Ducasse bas pointed out. 
1. See Chapter IV, Section 2 1 v, 2. See Brightman, Art. (1944} 0 
3. larker, Art. (1945)2, 479. 
4. Ducasse, Art. ( 1936), 191. 
of this dissertation. 
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There is no knowledge in the state of immediacy or in the 
given. Indeed, it has been said that "the meaning of the 
word, 'to know' can never be wholly present in the given."1 
Knowing takes place in the given, but it is always a refer-
ence to something not given, to something beyond the imme-
diate. 
Immediacy as such is not knowledge, and yet all 
the knowledge we ever bad, if it is our knowledge, 
must be at some time actual and immediate exper~ 
ience; nevertheless, it is not knowledge because 
it is immediate. It i~ knowledge because it is 
coherent and adequate. 
Consciousness on this view, is an inescapable, immediate 
fact. It is immediate and given in a sense quite different 
from objects of science. "The objects of physics and chem-
istry do not appear to be immediate or given in the same 
sense as mind is immediate and given."3 Accordingly, it is 
better to avoid the term immediate in connection with ob-
jects. In his more recent terminology, Brightman would say 
that the objects of scientific and other studies are Situa-
tions Believed-in. One does not experience an object but 
be believes in it "when it makes a perceptible difference to 
his conscious experience."4 
It can be said, in addition, that the existence of 
1. Brightman, Art. 19 , 2 • 
2. Brightman, Art. 1943), 45f. See Boas~ interesting article, 
"The Truth of Immediate Knowledge" 1n Jour. Phil., 23(19a5), · 
5-10. 
3 •• Br1ghtman, POI, 13. 
4. Brightman, POR, 347. 
everything save the immediate conscious awareness, or the 
datum self, is never directly given, but must be inferred. 
As Miss Schipper has pointed out, "an existent order cannot 
be even partially given in experience." 1 And Brightman says 
approvingly that "Santayana and Kant are right in supoosing 
that existence (barring only the temporal 'existence' of the 
given experience) is not given."2 
It follows from the above, that knowledge of other 
selves as well as knowledge of one's own self is not given. 
The existence of other selves must be inferred from evidence 
in the datum self. Other selves are Situations Believed-in, 
not Situations Experienced.3 But how can it be said that 
one does not know his own self? The datum self, of course, 
is an immediate fact, but the datum self is of short dura-
tion compared to the whole history of a person, or what could 
be called a whole self. Though the datum self is an imme-
diate conscious experience of "x" duration, it does not know 
itself as such. One gains knowledge of himsel~ in the ordi-
4 
nary sense of the word, by reference to past datum selves 
and anticipation of future datum selves. As Brightman has 
pointed out: "The self is what is directly experienced, 
although indirectly known." 5 It may in addition be noted 
that: 
1~ Schipper, Art. (1942)l 388. 
2. Brightman, Art. (1934J, 267. 
also POR, 348n. 
For a similar comment see 
3. Of. Brightman, POR, 347-349. 
4. The "whole self" or pEprson, to be 
5. Brightman, Art. (1944), 696. exact. 
knowledge of the self is a coherent ac-
count of those present, past, and future 
experiences which are unified into one 
self by the self-identifying experie~ces 
of memory, anticipation and purpose. · 
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The distinction sometimes made between knowledge-by-acquaint-
ance and knowledge-by-description, has relevance here, but 
is basically confusing. "Knowledge" having to do wi tb ac-
quaintance is by definition immediate, conscious experience, 
or the given. Knowledge by description corresponds to Si•-
uations Believed-in. But it bas been noted that the term 
knowledge does not apply to any immediate experience, or 
the datum self. The empirical situation is only a starting 
point for knowledge. Since these things are so, it can 
readily be seen why Brightman answered a question about 
knowledge-by-acquaintance2 in these words: 
I reply: NO: strictly there is no knowledge-
by-acquaintance of anything. Although all 
direct experience (acquaintance) is experience 
of the self, that experience as such is not 
knowledge; but the self consists entirely of 
what at some time is direct experience, and 
knowledge of the self is ••• knowledge of3what is or was or will be direct experience. 
It cannot be readily seen why he later applies the term knowl• 
edge to acquaintance. 11 Acquaintance, then, is direct or im-
mediate or intuitive knowledge." 4 
1. Brightman, Art. (1944), 696. 
2. The question was raised by R. W. Sellars, Art. (1944), 
538 and note. It was: "Do we have knowledge-by-acquaint-
ance of the selfY" The question was put to Bri~btman and 
Parker. For Parker's answer, see his article, Knowledge 
by Acquaintance," Jour. Phil., 54(1945), 1·18. 
3. Brightman, Art •. (1944), 694f. 4, Brightman, rrP(l951),88. 
v. The datum self is the starting point for knowledge. 
By definition, as well as by actual empirical obser-
vation, knowledge is not to be found in the datum self. 
However, the datum self is the starting point for all 
knowledge. All the views studied thus far maintain that 
their particular theory of the given is a correct report of 
the starting point for knowledge. The datum self theory 
suggests that the true starting point is neither essences, 
indUbitable sense-data, nor phenomena, but the self. Be-
cause of this, it may be called a subjectivistic approach, 
but this is no problem if one is able to provide some means 
for getting outside the subject. 
This viewpoint has been well stated in an important 
work of Werkmeister. He says: 
In the last analysis, each and every one of 
us faces the problem of knowledge alone, as it 
rises in his own first-person experience. Only 
mz first-person experience is the basis for 
whatever knowledge l attain, and only ~ first- 1 person experience is the basis for vour knowledge. 
First-person experience, or the datum self is the starting 
point for knowledge. Werkmeister later develops this into 
a "methodological solips1sm"2 and presents an initial view 
not unlike that of Stace, who was considered in the chapter 
on "Phenomena as Given." 3 
1. Werkmeister, BSK, 4. 
2. Werkmeister, BSK, 8lf. 
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3. On Stace's view, note especially Chapter IV, Sadlon 3, iii 
of this dissertation. See also Stace, TKE, Chapters III~V. 
The same position has been maintained by Brightman, 
though he does not make use of the expression "methodolog-
ical solipsism." For Brightman the fundamental fact is the 
self, or given, and this undeniable certainty is the source 
for knowledge. Sense-data, feelings, imaginings, and so 
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on, are immediately present. What they mean is to be in-
ferred. The objects of knowledge are not found in the datum 
self, but the evidence for objects is. "In any case, it is 
the present consciousness which is the sole possible start-
ing point, and the sole possible source of evidence for any 
statements about the absent ."1 This present consciousness, 
or datum self is a complex entity comprising many elements. 
2 It includes both sense qualities and reasoning processes. 
Isabel Stearns bas noted, in concurrence with Brightman and 
Werkmeister: 
Ultimately, the ground of knowledge and action 
is to be found neither in the sensuous nor in 
the rational by itself, but in that perceptual3 mixture apart from which no knowing can begin. 
It is important to ask here bow the datum self theorist 
is able to get knowledge of objects and persons who are not 
present in the datum self but Situations Believed-in. The 
charge of solipsism could well be raised, it would seem. 
It can be answered, that knowledge of the world outside of 
l. Brightman, ITP (1951), 12. See also the statement on page 
13 of the same volume: "All knowledge starts in the here 
and now of a present existing person." 
2. The content of the siven will be discussed in vi below. 
3. Stearns, Art. (1942), 360. Of. Whitehead's idea of actual 
occasions. "Each atom is a system of all things" (:re., 53). 
the given is possible through reason. 1 Brightman holds to 
the right to believe in other persons and an objeetlve order 
because his view "postulates confldenee in reason and in 
any hypotheses necessary rationally to order and interpret 
2 
experience." Veridical knowledge is attainable on the 
basis of a coherent hypothesis. 
' 
The supposal' of a body and a world as hypo-
thetical entitles, belief in which is well 
grounded in a coherent interpretation of my 
own actual empirical s1t~at1on, is warranted 
by the appeal to reason. 
The precise machinery of coherence, exactly how one arrives 
at knowledge of the external world, is not investigated in 
any great detail. This is also true of the essence theory 
and the phenomenalist account of the g1ven.4 The sense~data 
theorists, however, attempt a detailed analysis of pre-
clsely how perceptual knowledge is possible on the basis of 
the g1ven.5 Perhaps the former views mentioned would push 
the problem concerning the details of obtaining knowledge 
to the problem of truth criterion and its implications. It 
would seem that this is especially the case with the datum 
self theory. How veridical knowledge is attained on the 
perceptual level is a sample of how knowledge of all sorts 
1. In POI, 23, Brightman says: "self-transcendence and rea-
son are windows through which the monad sees its environ-
ment." See also NV, 51, for an answer to solipsism. 
2. Brightman, Art. (1933), 221. 
3. Brightman, Art. (1939),137. 
4. Wood in AK, is the exception. 
5. Cf. Price, PER. 
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is attainable. As Brightman bas noted: "The fact that 
every hypothetical entity is logically derivative from 
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actual anti ties is undeniable." 1 If knowing is to be counted 
trustworthy, a hypothetical entity must be coherent with 
all the facts made available in the datum self. 2 
vi. The content of the given examined. 
Thus far the given has been defined as a datum self 
and certain of its general characteristics have been noted. 
An analysis of the elements included in the datum self is 
now in order. What is the content of the "inexhaustible 
manifold of the given?"3 As will be seen, the given on this 
view is highly complex. The datum self includes both es-
sences and sense-data in its scope, and it involves phenoa-
ena, though it is more than phenomena. 
Brightman has listed several characteristics of the 
datum (or minimum) self which will serve, in part, as a 
4 pattern for exposition here. Besides the fact that the 
given is a self, the following elements may be noted: 
(a) Qualia. Qualia is a name for sense qualities such 
1. Brightman, POR, 228. An "hypothetical entity" is the 
same as an object in the external world, or a Situation 
Believed-in. This would include anything from a croco-
dile's tooth, to God. An actual entity, as has been noted, 
is a synonym for the datum self. cr. Whiteheads "actuaL occasions!' 
2. See also Brightman, POI, 19. "Every answer of science 
or religion, poetry or philosophy, must be tested by its 
relevance and adequacy to the datum-mind." For the best 
statement about the coherence criterion see the same au-
thor's NV, 106f. For a definition of "verification" see 
his Art. \1946), 369. 
3. Wekkmeister, BSKi 66. 4. cr. Brightman, POR, 35lf'. 
as bitter, cool, musty, etc. gualia also include qualities 
of feeling such as anger or joy. A guale is an intuition, 
or "any relatively simple aspect, or group of aspects, of 
the datum attended to, apart from any relations to a rea-
soning proeess." 1 
(b) Time and space. In a world of process "all selves 
must necessarily experience time." 2 Werkmeister makes a 
clear ease here speaking of spatiality and temporality and 
noting that they rather than space and time are part of 
the given for "objective space and time ••• are constructs 
involving much more than experienced spatiality and ex-
perienced temporality."3 Brightman would no doubt concur in 
this more precise distinction. 
(c) Transcendence of space and time, This is a very 
important element in the datum self for it is one of the 
means whereby knowledge of the outside world is inferred, 
Brightman says: 
Every moment of experience points beyond itself. 
If that were not true • neither memory nor reason 
could function,4neither environment nor society could be known, 
The transcendence of space may be illustrated by the self's 
ability to seek out distant points. The transcendence of 
time is dependent on the fact of self-identifying memory. 
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1. Brightman, Art. (1946), 368. Cf. Lewis, MWO, 60f, and 121. 
2. Brightman, POR, 351. 
3. Werkmeister, BSK, 95. Compare Stace's extension-spread 
and duration-spread. TKE, 36. 
4. Brightman, Art. ( 194 3), 48. 
The unity which is rooted in memory "implies the very im-
portant trait of time transcendence. "1 The self is indeed 
able to get beyond, or transcend the datum and can know 
not only the external world but the whole self. 
This fact of self-transcendence can be equated with 
the idea of objective reference and resembles food's idea of 
intentionality or "external projection. "2 
(d) Process and conation. The datum self is in a pro-
cess of change and is goal seeking. "To be a self is to 
experience a desire for future experience, 
ing of food and the continuance of life." 3 
conation is somewhat related to the idea of 
if only the eat-
The idea of 
attention. 4 
(e) Awareness of meaning. It cannot be said that 
there is meaning in the datum self in the sense of knOwl-
edge. This was discussed above in the section dealing with 
the problematic and innocent character of the given. What 
is meant here is that the datum self is aware of order and 
relations. As Brightman says: "The simplest self treats 
its experiences as signs of further experience; thus it is 
inc.an elementary way aware of meaning."5 It seems that 
Werkmeister has put this somewhat more clearly when he says: 
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1. Brightman, POI, 21. 
2. Of. Wood, AK, 66. In Brightman, ITP (1951), 95, one finds: 
"The fact of objective reference is a fundamental trait of 
mind." See also, NV, 51. "Reference is rooted in the evi-
dence of the present conscious mind." 
3. Brightman, POR, 351. 
4. See Brightman, Art. (1946), 367. Three kinds of attention 
are noted, voluntary, involuntary, and nonvoluntary. 
5. Brightman, POR, 351. · 
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The whole of experience is ••• permeated 
with ••• elements of order. It stands re-
vealed as a manifold of specific 'contents' 
which is yet not a mere chaos of unrelated 
'elements.' First-ferson experience is 
stratified. It is shot through' with the 
interlin]l:ed 1 dimensions of otherness. 1 1. 
(b) Response to environment. It may also be said that 
the datum self in some way responds to its environment, 
though the environment is never given directly •. The self 
does respond to the stimuli of the environment and these 
stimuli are given.2 
In a general sense, it can be said that the given in-
cludes "all gualia, desires, preferences, choices, judg-
ments, reasonings, memories, feelings, emotions." 3 It also 
includes beliefs, hopes, anticipations, and imaginations.4 
It is important to bear in mind that the elements of the 
given do not occur separately, but in wholes. This point 
bas been brought out in the following statement: "The in-
gredients do not occur separately like grains of pepper, but 
are given in a gestalt which is a true whole."5 
vii. The datum self and the whole self distinguished. 
The theory that the datum self is given does not hold 
that the datum self is all that there is to genuine selfbood. 
The datum self is, on the contrary, a fragment of the true 
1. Werkmeister, BSK, 87. 
2. cr. Brightman, POR, 351. 
3. Brightman, Art. (1946), 366. 
386. 
Cf. Schipper, Art. (1942), 
4. Brightman, Art. (1939), 134r. 
5. Brightman, Art. (1934), 265. cr. Brightman, Art. (1946), 
367. 
self and there are many datum selves associated with each 
true or unified self. This distinction has been imnlied 
1 by Lewis, and was somewhat unclearly set forth by Leighton 
in his Man and Cosmos. 
·~ile the self has immediate self-knowledge 
in feeling, it is true that the self that is 
known cannot be the whole self to which be-
long the feelings, thoughts and will attri-
butes. The self as known is distinct from 
the self as knower and is but a fragrrrentary 
expression of the whole self. The self kn~wn 
directly is but a passing phase of itself. 
There is confusion here in the use of the term knowledp:e 
according to the more recent datum self theory, but the 
emphasis on the difference between the "fragmentary ex-
pression" and the "whole self" is indicative of the issue.3 
As has been brought out above, the whole self is di-
rectly experienced, but indirectly known. It may be said 
that the whole self is known by self-transcendence.4 This 
means, that in any datum self, as such, memory linkages are 
noted which indicate that that very datum self is nothing 
more than a temporal sequence in a larger more inclusive 
5 
self. The given is transcended and recognizes its status 
as an aspect of a larger whole. But the whole self never 
1. Cf. Lewis, MWO, 58. 
2. Leighton, MC, 305. 
3. J. A. Martin in EPR, 30, bas also noted that the whole 
self is "never more than inferred" on Brightman's view. 
4. See Brightman, POI, 22. 
5. Note the statement: '"~en memory functions it is a 
bridge which leads from the present datum to the whole 
mind." (Brightman, POI, 20.) 
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bas the status of givenness. It "consists of constituents 
all of which are at some time given. "1 The distinction may 
be summed up in this statement from Brightman: 
The whole self is present datum plus the pa2t 
data which are in principle capable of being 
related to the present datum by memory link-
ages (which identify the past data as belong-
ing to the same self), plus the future data 
for which what is now present will be regarded 
as a past remembered datum •••• Tbe experience 
of the datum self involves the truth that there 
is a whole self,2 
Unlike the datum self, which is in a way, a segnent, 
the whole self is a process of "perpetual change and act1-
vity."3 The whole self is not characterized as a static 
substance, but as a changing being whose very being consists 
in activity. It is an indivisible whole, private, ever-
changing, and in communication with other selves.4 It knows 
itself as private because of the immediate data of self-
identifying memory. It is not a statio entity, but a dy-
namic aotivity,5 and its nature is revealed in the datum 
self and by reflection about the datum self. It can be said 
that another meaning of "whole self" is nerson. 6 
1. Brightman, Art. 1944 , 695. 
2. Brightman, Art. ( 1946 , 370. Of. Bri ph tman, POR, 358 • 
. "Every datum self contains signs of a iar!"er self to 
which it belongs." 
3. Bri gb tman, Art. ( 1946) , 366f. 
4. See Brightman, POI, 18. 
5. The element of ohan~>:e bas been stres~ed by Stearns, Art. 
(1942), 361. -
6. See Brightman, NV, 52f. 
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3. Implications ol the View that the Datu.m Self' is Given. 
The datum self' theqry of the given makes no claims that 
it is free of' epistemological or metaphysical entanglements. 
or the previous theories considered, the phenomenalist view 
sought to be completely free from metaphysical implications, 
but that it has not succeeded in this aim has been suggested 
earlier.1 Both the essence and sense-data theories imply 
certain ontologies, though not without some questions of' 
interpretation.2 Those who hold the datum self' theory hold 
that in the datum self one has veritably, the clue to the 
solution of all epistemological and metaphysical problema. 
Indeed, the theory of tbe datum self' is at once an episte-
nological and metaphysical question. As Brightman has said: 
"To me there are no metaphysical problems more fundamental 
than those concerning the self'. The self' is fundamental be-
cause 1t is the very nature and structure of' all experience." 3 
The implications of' the datum self' theory, then, are more 
far reaching, perhaps, than those of the other views consi-
dered. Four specific areas will be considered: i. Implica-
tions for epistemology, iLf'or theory of' mind, iii. for onto-
logy, and iv. for the philosophy of' religion. Presumably, a 
whole system of' philosophy could be worked out with the datum 
self' as the initial clue. 
1. See Chapter IV, Section 4 of' this dissertation. 
2. See Chapter II, Section 4 and Chapter IIl, Section 4 of' 
this dissertation. 
3. Brightman, Art. (1951}, 4. 
i. Implications of the datum self theory for the theory of 
knowledge. 
All of the theories of the g1ven so far examined, with 
the 4ebatable exception of the sense-data Tiew, have sup• 
ported epistemic dualism. The whole idea of a given 1m-
plies a non-given somewhat which can be known on the basis 
of the given. The datum self theory also implies an epi-
stemic dualism, an unequivocal one. The datum self includes 
sense qualia, temporality, certain relations, etc, but 1t 
does not include objects. Nor does it include other selves, 
or even one's own self. Knowledge is always referential, 
and all knowledge 1s referential. That which is immediate 
may be very striking and affect a datum considerably, but, 
as immediate, there is no knowledge. 
This epistemological implication has been brought 
250 
out quite clearly in a short treatment of the term "judgment" 
by Brightman. He points out that any act of judging, though 
present in a datum self, is always about something outside 
the datum self. "Judgment implies epistemological dualism: 
that is, the act of judging or of knowing is never identical 
with the object judged or known." 1 
Furthermore, it may be noted that that aspect of the 
given denominated self-transcendence, 1s an additional clue 
to epistemic dualis~. The datum self is able to refer to 
the past through memory linkages, and 1t can comprehend 
1. Brightman, Art. (1946), 369. 
distant points in space. It bas been sa1d that reference 
to external objects 1s a fundamental characteristic of 
mind. In b1s Nature and Values, Brightman says that "ref-
erence is rooted in the evidence of the present conscious 
mind." 1 In somewhat different language, Werkmeister makes 
the same point: "Taking notice of 'this' particular con-
tent of experience involves at once and inescapably a dis-
crimination between 'this' and 'non-this' or that. It in-
volves ••• a recognition of an 'otberness.'"2 Indeed, it may 
be noted that the datum self theory of the given necessi-
tates an epistemic dualism. The more recent terms, "Situa-
tion Experienced" and "Situation Believed-in 1" are a state-
ment of that dualism. 3 
When the view of epistemic dualism is accepted, a 
question often raised is: bow can veridical knowledge take 
place? The question is usually raised by epistemic monists, 
who themselves have trouble w1tb the problem of error. The 
datum self theorist holds that veridical knowledge is pos-
sible on the basis of reason. One begins with the evidence 
in a datum self, reasons about that evidence and infers an 
external object. There may be evidence in the Situation 
Experienced for either a Situation Believed-in or a Situa-
tion Disbelieved-in. Reason 1s the key to unlock the door 
1. Brightman, NV, 51. 
2. Werkmeister, BSK, 86. 
3. For a fuller treatment of epistemic dualism, grounded in 
the theory of the datum self as given, see Brightman, ITP, 
(1951), 84-95. 
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to veridical knowledge; reason, that is, working over the 
datum. We know we have veridical knowledge when it is veri-
fied. Brightman defines verification as "the discovery of 
aspects of the datum which are fully coherent with the hy-
pothesis, together with evidence of the absence of contra-
1 dictory data." Werkmeister bas gone into this problem in 
somewhat more detail. 2 
ii. Implications for the theory of mind. 
It may be questioned whether there are any implica-
tiona in the datum self theory for the philosophy of mind, 
because the datum self theory is a theory of mind. In the 
early stages of its development, the terms datum self and 
datum mind were used interohangeably.3 Later the term mind 
was not used so much but it may still be taken as a synonym 
for self. 
It is not possible to equate the term datum self with 
mind, but it can be said that the mind and the "whole self" 
or person are one and the same. All datum selves are mental 
and the mind is meaningless apart from datum selves. Mind 
is not given in the strictest sense any more than the whole 
self is given, but mind is intimately related to the given. 
The negative implications of the datum self theory for 
mind are, in some ways, more striking than the positive ones, 
1. Brightman, Art. (1946), 369. 
2. See his ideas of 'joint prominence,' 'factors of confif. 
uration,' 'joint motion,' etc. Werkmeister, BSK, 97-10 • 
3. See Brightman, POI, Chapter I, entitled, ''Mind." 
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though they are not as significant. If the datu'll self theory 
be true, all views which explain mind in terms other than 
consciousness are rejected. This would include metaphysical 
behaviont&m and its shadow, epiphenomenalism. The soul 
substance theory would also be discarded for the self is 
active consciousness not static being. Moreover, there is 
no evidence in the datum self for any metaphysical soul. 
Associationistic views would be ruled out for the datum self, 
despite its sometimes chaotic character, is nevertheless 
"a unified complexity of consciousness." 1 It is a given 
unity, not solely a given complexity+ Similarly, the view 
of mind as an emergent would be discounted,for the datum 
self and the body are not equally immediate. The mind is 
a Situation Experienced, the body, a Situation Believed-in. 
iii. Ontological implications. 
If everything given is mental in character, as the 
datum self theorist holds, it would seem to follow that 
ontological idealism is imulied. Indeed, this is the way 
Berkeley defended his idealistic metaphysics. But the datum 
self theorist, exemplified by Brightman, does not move so 
quickly from the mental character of the given to the mental 
character of objects. Berkeley, it will be recalled, is 
an epistemic monist regarding the world of "things." But 
Brightman is an epistemic dualist. He is also an ontological 
idealist, but this idealism is the result of thought seeking 
1. Brightman, POR, 351. 
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to account for the presence of .mental data. It is not 
found in the data themselves, but in scrutiny of the meaning 
of the data. He has said: "Ferry rightly urges that ideal-
ism or personalism cannot be inferred from this fact alone." 1 
(The fact being that data appear as mental.) 
That ontological possibilities are left open is clearly 
brought out in the discussion of the given which took place 
between Williams and Brightman in 1934. Williams reports 
one of the conclusions: 
I grant that our principle invalidates all 
off-hand immediate attemvts to prove, 'by 
epistemological gesture, that the given does 
not consist of the visible facets of a spir-
itual reality, and I grant that the denial of 
'exclusive particularity' 2is no positive evi-dence for direct realism. 
It is further indicated in a more recent article by Bright-
man. In defining nature, this writer says: "Nature 11ay 
conceivably be wholly data (as I believe) or partly data 
(as naturalists believe) or not data at all (as Santayana 
and Democritus held) ."3 The ontological possibilities may 
not be directly established. 
There is no magic way of showing in a sentence 
or two whether the idealism which holds that 
there is nothing essentially ungiven in the 
universe or the realism which holds that most 
of the universe is now and always will be un-
g1ven, is a better account of reality. They 
1. Brightman, Art. (1933), 221. The 11 fact 11 meant is that all 
evidence is in consciousness. 
2. Williams, Art. (1934)1, 269. 
3. Brightman, Art. (1946), 371. 
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are competing hypotheses not to ~ disposed 
of by an epistemological gesture. 
The question can be answered on the grounds of a rational 
interpretation of the facts. 
On the other hand, that ontological implications are 
indirectly possible on the theory of the datum self is evi-
danced in the statement that the problem of the given 
"treats of the fundamental epistemological situation, which 
is just as truly the fundamental metaphysical situation. "2 
In a later article, Brightman notes that the view of the 
given which he shares with Williams, is said by Williams 
not to provide an adequate basis for personal idealism. 
The rest of the article attempts "to exhibit grounds for 
disagreement with that jud@lllent."3 The disagreement is 
based on the thought that a coherent interpretation of the 
given will result in idealism. It bas been said that "if 
all experience is personal, perhaps the energies which pro-
4 dues and sustain it are also personal." It is quite poe-
Bible to establish this hypothesis as a coherent probability. 
iv. Implications for the philoso~hy of religion. 
The datum self theory of the given has implications for 
almost any branch of philosophical investigation, since it 
is a fundamental basis for the acquisition of knowledge. 
All of the implications cannot be explored in a dissertation 
1. Brightman, Art. (1934), 264. 3• Brightman, Art. (1939), 137. 
2. Brightman, Art. (1934), 263. 4. Brightman, NV, 57. 
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of this scope, The problem of epistemology, mind, and on-
tology are directly related to one's theory of the given. 
This is not obviously the case with the philosophy of re-
ltg1on. Possible implications for that branch of philo-
sophy are considered here because of a terminological af-
finity.1 As was noted in the introduction to this chapter, 
one of the chief proponents of the theory that the given 
equals a datum self, also holds to a theory of "The Given" 
regarding the divine being and his power. 
It is said that God is confronted with given factors, 
or "The Given," which limit him in his creative endaavor. 2 
Now this theory has some interesting relations to the datum 
self theory of the epistemic given, 
It can be noted that the theory of "The Given" which 
limits God's power, has in part been derived from the datum 
self view. Brightman has said in one of his discussions on 
theological questions that "the faith w1 th which reli~ous 
idealism confronts experience suggests that the small seg-
ment of the universe which we call ourselves is truly a 
sample of what the whole universe is." 3 Since this is the 
case, the given of human beings is analogous to the given 
in God. The respective "givens" are not the same, but there 
1. J. A. Martin bas said that Brightman's concept of the da-
tum self "has far-reaching consequences for his entire 
philosophical position, and especially for his philosophy 
of religion." ZPR, 30, 
2, Cf. Brightman, POR, Chapters Nine and Ten, 
3. Brightman, PR, 83. The whole discussion here is eminently 
lucid. 
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are s1m1lar1t1es. As the datum self finds qualia, reason-
ings, anticipations, temporal! ty, and so on ,, the given in 
God may also. "The Given" in God "may be conceived as a 
conscious datum or perception, analogous to human sanae 
experience, yet not produced by any stimulus or cause ex-
1 ternal to God." As there are passive factors in the datum 
self, there are passive factors in God. As there are acti-
vities in the datum self, so there is also divine activity.2 
The theory of "The Given" does not stand or fall with ac-
ceptance or rejection of the datum self theory, but it may 
be seen in a clearer perspective when the relation is made.3 
4. Criticisms of the Given as a Datum Self. 
The cri tloisms whioh follow are not wholly derived from 
books and articles whioh discuss the datum self theory in 
particular. Several general criticisms which apply to it 
have been noted and have proved fruitful in weighing the 
merits or the view. The extensive debates in the litera-
ture cannot all be presented here. The most pertinent 
have been referred to in the footnotes. A3 will be seen, 
many of the criticisms turn on the matter of the definitions 
of suoh terms as knowledge and experience. 
1. Brightman, PG, 183. 
2. See Brightman, POR, 364. 
3. For a treatment of the theory of "The Given" and some of 
its critics, see Brightman, Art. (1932)1. 
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i. Alleged unempirical character of the view. 
It is instructive to note that each theory of the given 
examined in this dissertation including the datum self 
theory, bas been criticized for not being empirical. One 
is empirical when he reports the facts as they are. There 
is doubt among philosophers as to just what facts are and 
what facts there are •. All theories of the given purport 
to be correct reports of the facts, but important weaknesses 
have been noted. Some may also be found in the datum self 
view, critics have maintained. 
Several thinkers maintain that the given is a fruitless 
principle and that to seek out the given in the knowing si-
tuation is well-nigh impossiblecempirically. Referring 
specifically to Brightman's theory as set forth in his A 
fh1losophv of Religion, W. G. DeBurgb holds that difficulties 
in philosophy all come from 
the vain search for an irrefragable datum of 
experience to serve as the groundwork for 
reasoned knowledge. Data may exist for the 
special sciences, though even these are crit-
ical of the 'given' factsf but philosophy knows 
nothing of such entities. 
lfo "given" is empirically available. 2 H. F. Hallett sug-
gests that the prime error basic to all disputes found be-
tween idealists and empiricists is to hold that content is 
given from things and form is made available from thought. 
1. DeBurgh, Art. (1940), 483. 
2. Demos, in Art. (1932) maintains that data are not born 
but made and speaks of the heresy of rigid data. 
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"For knowledge everything must be given, either given prima 
facie, or verified as given secretly, or given by implica-
tion."1 He doubts whether it is correct to begin philoso-
phizing by laying down a criterion of givenness. 2 
Loewenberg, in less decislTe language, similarly sug-
gests the unempirical character of a theory of the given: 
The appeal to experience is here unavailing; 
never are bare qualities and unqualified enti-
ties 'given' if given be understood as 'pre-
sented.' They are 'taken' by an act of diffi-
cult abstraction from a concrete situation in 
which they are always found together.3 
It may be said that this criticism bas a great deal of 
weight for the essence and sense-data theories, but that 
Brightman's theory of the datum self is not challenged. 
This is so because the datum self theory begins with a con-
crete situation in which qualities are found together. The 
datum self is a concrete situation. It is not an act "of 
difficult abstraction." 
Writing specifically on Brightman's view of the datum 
self, J. A. Martin bas offered some penetrating comments on 
its •upposed empirical character. The fundamental question, 
he says, is whether it is legitimate to view original ex-
perience as an experience of one's own consciousness. The 
1. Hallett, Art. (1938), 1 9. 
2. Of. Schiller's article, "Data, Datives, and Ablatives" in 
Jour. Phil. 30(1933)2, and 'ioodbridge's, ''Mind Discerned" 
in Jour. Phil. 18(1921), 337-347. Both suggest giving up 
the bunt for the given or any absolute data. 
3. Loewenberg, Art. (1930), 64. 
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datum self theory does this and hence may be charged wi tb 
the "psycbologistic fallacy" which rests "largely upon a 
confusion of the experient, experiencing, and the experi~ 
enc~." 1 Martin holds that Brightman is "definitely 1m-
empirical" in his view because of this confusion. And by 
way of offering an alternative, be writes: 
Empirically, consciousness seems rather to be 
one element ~ certain kinds of experience. 
For, even though 'experience' implies experients, 
there seems to be no good reason for holding that 
affective and other elements are not truly ex-
perience until they emerge in consciousness, and 
much less reason for holding that the original 
'datum,' epistemological or ontolo~ical, of ex-
perience is simply the experients. 
But this argument has little more than verbal force. In-
stead of offering an alternative, Martin plunges us deeper 
intm the problem. He makes "experience" a larger, more 
inclusive category than consciousness and in doing so takes 
away its meaning. It is difficult to see bow affective 
elements which mean nothing apart from conscious awareness, 
can nevertheless be considered experience. Let Martin de-
fine his term "experience" and his criticism will have some 
meaning for conscious aelves. It might also be said that 
no reason is needed for holding that the original datum is 
simply the experient. That is a basal fact, a starting point 
without which there could be no knowleds-. 
This confUsion about the term experience and the 
1. Martin, EPR, 32. 2. Martin, EPR, 32. 
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extension of its meaning to an unreasonable number of ad-
jacent oases is characteristic of Dewey's views on episte-
mology and the knowledge situation. Problems are increased, 
not solved, by all-inclusive definitions. 1 
The charge that the theory of the given as datum self 
is unempirical is also made by dualistic realists. In an 
article investigating the origin and Umi tat1ons of the 
concept of the given, Wild has implicitly criticized the 
modern theory of the datum self in the context of his dis-
261 
cussion of Berkeley. He says that Berkeley and his followers 
"have preferred to close their eyes to the given facts, rather 
than modify their apriori conception of what the facts must 
b .,2 e. ln another connection he makes a criticism which in-
volves all the theories of the given studied in this dfsser-
tation. He says: 
Any theory of experience which maintains that 
only certain thin~s are g1venr while others are 
'meaningless' or nonsensual, thereby simply 
betrays the limitations of its own preconceptions 
and has no real right to the word empirical,} 
Of course, Wild would solve the problem of the given by 
saying that everything is given and that any distinction 
1, Dewey's view of experience, the given, and knowledge, has 
been succinctly set forth in Morris, STM, 290-320, For a 
statement about epistemological method see Dewey, Art. 
(1922) •. His article: "How lis Mind to be Known?" in Jour. 
Phil., 39(1942), is also instructive. For one forthri~ht 
criticism of Dewey's attitude on epistemology see Sellars, 
Art. (1924)' 391. 
2. Wild, Art. (1940), 79. 
}. Wild, Art. (1940), 82. 
between something given and something known is a false one. 
When he takes this view, he is opening himself up to the 
very problems that theories of the given set out to solve, 
notably the problem of error. 1 Read has claimed that the 
issue disturbing Wild is the question of substance. The 
Berkeleians as well as other empiricists deny substance on 
the grounds that it is an hypostatization. Wild accepts 
it and cannot admit any split between a substance and its 
qualities in the knowledge situation. 2 
Other dualistic realists who implicitly oppose the 
datum self theory of the given are J. Maritain who holds 
that "the senses actually reach existence," 3 and J. Ryan 
who asserts that "knowledge is a fact. "4 The idea· of the 
given, says Ryan, is unempirical. "Experience whibh points 
to the reality of obJects present to me in idea may be 
false, but that again is theory, certainly not a datum." 5 
It can be said that these criticisms overlook the psycho-
logical facts basic to consciousness. 
ii. Charges that the self is not given. 
In some ways, this criticism is an extension of the 
foregoing one. If the datum self theory is unempirical, 
1. Burnham and Wheelwright have intimated that there would 
be no problem of ~istemology at all if we weren't con-
fronted with error. (IPA, 38). 
2. See Read, Art. (1941), 404f. Note also, Wild's answer 
to Read, Art. (1941), 410-413. 
3. Maritain, Art. (1943), 298. 
4. Ryan, Art. (1926), 414. 
5. Ryan, Art. (1926), 403. 
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then, it follows, that the self cannot be given. BUt 
weaknesses have been shown ~n the lines of the op~onents 
of the datum self view. The arguments that the self is not 
1 given must be considered in their own light. 
Williams, who accepts a theory of the given in many 
respects similar to the datum self view, contends that 
viewing the self as given may be questioned. 
Althou~ it is no more than doubtful whether 
the self ••• is or can be given to the individual 
consciousness, it is quite certain that it 
never cou~d be given that what was given was 
the self. 
Like other cri t1cisms which seem to presupuose that the self 
is some metaphysical substance other than exuerience, 3 this 
charge can be answered in its own words. The datum self 
theory holds that the self is the whole of "individual con-
sciousness" and cannot be given .12 it. The self equals 
the given equals consciousness. It is part of nothing, but 
is itself given. There is some question as to whether the 
self as given can be denied without being assumed. Critics 
1. Brightman bas recognized a possible danger in calling 
the given a self because it opens itself to the "fallacy 
or initial predication" charged by nee-realism. See his 
Art • ( 19 34) , 267. 
2~ Williams, Art. (1933)2, 
3. See, for example, Broad, MPN, 390f. "I do not know how 
to define a 'mind,' ••• " etc. Broad is apparently in such 
fear of a substantive view that he offers no view. Kri-
korian in an article, "Empiricism and Mind" in Jour • Phil., 
46(1949), admits that he fails to find during "my pur-
fosive or mental activities any distinctive mental act or 
self'" (691). He is looking for a metaphysical substance 
rather than recognizing the given fact of selfbood. 
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of the datum self theory define the self in such an apri-
ori way that it never could be given. What is needed is 
an empirical definition of the self which may at once be a 
metaphysical reality. 
Martin has challenged the idea of the datum self mostly 
as regards ita status in the context of knowing. He does 
not offer positive arguments against it. After admitting 
that the question is one of definition, he says: 
Even if it were granted that the 'datum-self' 
is temporally prior in the order of cognition, 
it would not necessarily follow that it is of 
primal significance i~ the general order of 
experience or nature. 
It may be noted again, that Martin implies that the datum 
self theory, if granted, is in "tbe general order of ex-
perience." But on Brightman's view, the datum self is 
identified with experience, and the priority of experience 
is an immediately available certainty. Ita "primal signi-
ficance" need not "follow" but must be recognized. 
Among others who have raised questions about the self 
as given, though 
are 
not referring to the datum self theory 
Dewey,2 Gurwitsch,3 Jonea,4 Tower, 5 and specifically 
Woodbridge.6 Stearns offers an interesting variant 
1. Martin, EPR, 33. 
2. See Dewey, EN, 231. 
3. See Gurwitach, Art. (1940), 327 and 329. 
4. See Jones' article, "The Self in Sensory Cognition" in 
Mind, 58(1949). 
5. See Tower, Art. (1931), 598ff. 
6. See Woodbridge's article, "The Problem of Consciousness 
Again," in Jour. Phil., 33(1936). 
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regarding knowledge of the self as existing.1 
iii. The egocentric predicament. 
2 Ever since R. B. Perry suggested in 1912, that one of 
the cardinal weaknesses of idealism was the egocentric pre-
dicament, this criticism has been appearing with unfailing 
regularity in philosophical literature. It is almost a 
"fad" criticism of idealism, despite decisive refutations. 
The criticism may be applied to the datum self theory or 
the given. 
The view that the datum self is given and that all 
knowledge is related to the datum self suggests for some 
thinkers that all being must be similar to the self, or 
must be knowable, as the self is knowable. To be knowable 
it must be mental in character, for the self is mental. 
No evidence presented in the datum self could ever be non-
mental, for the very fact of its presence indicates its 
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mental character. Brightman has indicated the view in these 
words: "Nature may conceivably be wholly data (as I believe) ."3 
The facts are that everything is mental. 
Now the critics have aaintained that though all the 
evidence is found in a self and is thus, in a way, mental, 
there is no warrant for concluding that existence is basi-
cally mental. Knowers are in an egocentric predicament but 
that doesn't allow them to say that all reality is like mind. 
1. Stearns, Art. (1942), 363r. 
2. In his PPT, 129-132. It is also stated in his Art. (1910). 
Cf. also Holt, et al, NR, 11. 
3. Brightman, Art. (1946), 371. 
Bittle bas said: 
The element common to all forms of idealism 
is the tenet that reality lies within the con-
sciousness of the perceiver and the mind can-
not transcend its own conscious states •••• Tbe 
egocentric predicament •• 1is responsible for the fallacy of idealism. 
Williams, too, has called attention to the weakness of "taose 
views 
which infer from the circumstance that a per-
son can be acquainted only with the content of 
a mind, namely, bts mind, to the conclusion 
that tbe quality, configuration, context or 
relation, which is characteristic of m~nda, 
is a necessary condition of existence. 
And Morris has maintained that tbe argument against idealism 
as based on the egocentric predicament is sound. He points 
out A. W. Moore's observation that the fallacy of accident 
, 
is all that is involved and adds that Hoernle, Mc'raggart, 
and N. K. Smith admit the validity of the criticism.3 
Other thinkers, especially those::holding to the cen-
trality of the self in knowing, are not prepared to admit 
the validity of the criticism. J. s. Moore, for instance, 
offers a critique which maintains that all being "is es-
sentially a factor in conscious experience, either as ob-
ject or as subject ."4 Later he writes that such a statement 
1. Bittle, RAM, 161f. 
2. Williami, Art. (1933) 1 , 173. 
3. Morris, STM, 74 and note. 
4. J. s. Moore, Art. (1938), 152. The title of the article 
is "The Significance of the Egocentric Situation." 
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is not merely a statement about the idealist 1 s conception 
of Reality, "but 1t is the only intelligible conception of 
1 it." Other.s have attacked the question 2 differently. 
Brightman has· challenged the valldi ty of the egocen-
3 tric predicament argument in several places. Most re-
oently, he has said: 
All experience is experience, whether it 
centers on my feelings, my perceptions, my 
interests in astronomy, or God. To call.a 
situation a predicament, as does R. B. Perry 
when he speaks of the 'ego-centric predicament,' 
is no more than to coin an epithet to discredit 
a. fact. The fact that all experience is self-
experience, that all my experience is mine, is 
no less a fact because it is inconv~nient for 
certain theories or may be misused. 
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The datum self theory of the given may indeed involve a 
predicament for the self, but predicaments are not situations 
in which one must remain; they make possible new opportunities. 
Though the data of knowledge are present in the "predicament" 
there are also present certain transcending factors, such 
as objective reference. These make knowled~e possible and 
save the view from the charge of solipsism or subjectivism. 
But there have been critics who have charged that the 
datum self theory leads to solipsism. They must be briefly 
noted. 
1. J. s. Moore, Art. (1949), 61. 
2. See Wilson, SAW, 134, and Werkmeister, BSK, 113. 
3. See his POI, 209; PR, 29; POR, 228; NV, 124n; ITP (1951), 
297. 
4. Brightman, Art. (1951), 4. 
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iv. Alleged subjectivism and solipsism. 
The criticism that the datum self theory leads to 
subjectivism or even solipsism is somewhat related to the 
criticism just discussed. It is held by the critics that 
the datum self theory shuts out the possibility of knowl-
edge of anything but the subject. Two striking statements 
may be quoted to set up the problem. In his Essays in 
Experimental Logic, Dewey says: "It is an insoluble prob-
lem ••• how a subjective experience can beget objective knowl-
edge. nl And Whitehead similarly remarks that "if experience 
be not based upon an objective content, there can be no es-
cape from a solipsist subjectivism."2 
These are samples of the criticisms offered against 
Berkeley's view and those who follow in his tradition. 
Such criticisms are also offered by the Critical Realists3 
as well as by critics of phenomenalism. 4 They do not pre-
sent an especially difficult problem for the datum self 
theories to surmount. In fact, Brightman bas recognized the 
possibility of the charge of solipsism and has answered it 
in several plac~5 The gist of the answer is that the fac-
tual starting point for knowledge, the datum self contains 
1. Dewey, EEL, 71. 
2. Whitehead, PR, 231. Both this quotation and the preced-
ing one from Dewey were suggested by Williams, Art. (1934) 2 , 
430f. ~WHitehead's view ofpresentational 1mmediacy(PR, 125). 
3. See Chapter II, Section 2,i, of this dissertation, for the 
argument of the Critical Realist. 
4. See Chapter 'Ill, Section 3, iii, and Section 5, iv of this 
dissertation, for instances of alleged subjectivism in the 
phenomenalist view. See also Hicks, CR, 251-267. 
5. For example. POI, 23 ;· Art. ( 194 3), 61; and NV, 51. 
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within it not only sensations, memories, feelings, and so 
on, but also the factor of objective reference. 1 This rae-
tor enables the self to point beyond itself to that which 
is outside it, or the external world. Objective reference 
is sometimes known as self-transcendence and is particularly 
evident in situations concerning the past. As the past is 
never present but referred to, so objects or selves are 
never present but referred to. The fact of reference is 
fundamental. 
If we do not grant that mind can refer be-
yond itself to something other than experience 
of the moment, we cannot give any coherent ac-
count of the experience itself •••• That reference 
is rooted in the evidence of the present con-
scious mind.2 
A further remark must be made on the charge of solip-
sism. Werkmeister who holds a view very much like the datum 
self theory admits that he is a methodological solipsist but 
claims that this does not involve him in a metaphysical 
solipsism. Methodological solipsism is a fitting name for 
the view because it commences with an analysis and interpre-
tation of first-person experience, but it is not metaphysical 
solipsism because it does not imply "an a priori and final 
restriction to the realm or first-person experience." 3 Ele-
ments of objectivity can be found within the experience 
itself. This is essentially Brightman's point about objective 
1. Compare Wood1 s idea or intentionality, AK, 5 and passim. 
2. Brightman, NV, 51. 
3. Werkmeister, BSK, 81. 
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reference. 
It might be interesting to raise the question about the 
psychological nature of the objective referent but tbat is 
beyond the scope of this dissertation. 1 
v. The complex processes involved in obtaining knowledge 
are not given. 
The datum self theory stresses immediate facts, yet 
it implies an epistemic dualism in which all knowledge, even 
of the self as a whole is inferential. No knowledge is to 
be found in the given. But all knowledge must begin with 
the empirical situation. A prime emphasis is placed on an 
accurate report of the evidence. But, it may be asked, is 
there evidence in the given of the highly complex infer-
ential process whereby objects, other selves, and one's own 
self is known? Can the act of inference by which a man 
knows his wife be found psychologically? There is logically 
a need for a theory of inference, but is there any given 
evidence of inference?~ 
It can be said that some inferential acts may be intro-
spectively observed, as in the case of inferring the exist-
ence of a wax dummy originally taken to be a living being. 
Here, an actual observable process takes place in the datum 
1. A rewarding treatment of this question may be found in 2 Brightman's discussion of ~rentano. See his Art. (1932) , 
184-192. 
2. Ryle in Art. (1940), 326, has pointed out Blanshard's 
view that "implicit inference is present in the most unre-
flective acts of perceptual acceptance." But this is not 
given inference. 
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self. However, this does not at all seem to be the case 
in knowing apples or friends. There is no psychological 
evidence of inferential knowing in almost all instances 
of tbe knowledge of objects or selves. But if all knowl-
edge must begin with the given, how can the datum self view 
justify the patent absence of given acts of inference?1 
Some might find an answer to this question implied in 
a statement by Bowne concerning a similar problem. Bowne 
writes: 
Thus in the most elementary experience--so 
elementary, indeed, as to seem to lie below 
thought altogether--we find a subtle logical 
activity implicit. The work is not reflec~ 
tively done, but it is really done, neverthe-
less. The mind does not yet possess reason, 
but reason possesses the mind.2 
In modern terms, this would be about the sa~e as saying 
something is taking place in the given which is not given. 
If it is answered that the idea of inference is none other 
than a coherent account of the knowing procedure, the re-
buttal might well inquire why a presumably given knowing 
procedure must itself be understood inferentially. Infer-
ential knowing is in the given but there is no evidence for 
it. Can there be anything in the datum self for which there 
is no evidence? Or can it be said that the act of knowing 
itself is evidence warranting the inference that inference 
1. Hicks has raised a point similar to this in a discussion 
of Stace's view regarding knowledge of other selves. See 
Hicks, CR, 259-262. 
2 • Bowne , TTK, 44 • 
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takes . place • 
vi. Veridical knowledge allegedly impossible. 
This criticism relates to the charge of subjectivism 
as well as to the attack on the empirical character of the 
datum self theory. It will be noted that each theory of 
the given discussed in this dissertation has been chal-
lenged on the grounds of how veridical knowledge is pos-
sible. Of course, the key word here is veridical. Some 
kind of knowledge is possible on any view, but it aay be 
false or unwarranted knadedge. The essence theory of the 
given is perhaps the least clear and convincing on how valid 
knowledge is possible, relegating it largely to what San-
tayana has called "animal faith," although Drake has stressed 
a semi-pragmatic type of verification.1 When examined in 
its elements, the question of veridical knowledge on any 
of these theories of the given really becomes a question of 
the type of logic or the criterion of truth accepted. On 
tbe other band, the type of logic or criterion of truth 
one accepts may well be grounded in his understanding of the 
empirically given. 
In a criticism of the theory of the given by Piatt, 
which almost sounds more like a polemic, the claim is made 
that veridical knowledge is impossible. Piatt has in mind 
Williams's view, but it is so much akin to the datum self 
1. See Chapter II, Section 5, vii of this dissertation. 
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theory, that it is worthy of inclusion here. Piatt, in 
admittedly defending functional realism which is another 
name for pragmatism, refers to "the utter stultification of 
knowledge of nature which issues from the barren and de-
ceitful principle of the given." 1 The basic fallacy in-
volved, he adds, "is the disjunction of given things from 
the dynamic context in which and by which they are given, 
and given as things."2 
This critic ism resembles that which Hahn made against 
Price's view in his Qontextualist1c Theorv of Perception. 3 
The datum self theorist has an answer impl1ci t in his awn 
theory. Piatt speaks of a "dynamic context" in which things 
are given. For~the datum self theorist, there is no divorce 
between the "dynamic context" and the given. The one is 
the other. Indeed, it may well be h•lpful to call the datum 
self a "dynamic context" for that is precisely what it is. 
Of course, by "dynamic context," Piatt means the 'h'orld.of 
nature and experience in general, and if there were such a 
split, veridical knowledge would be ill-founded, perhaps. 
But even if this is granted, the datum self theorist would 
hold that veridical knowledge is possible. 
This is so because the datum self can reason about its 
immediacy and go through processes of coherent testing and 
relating of data. Brightman bas clearly stated the general 
1. Piatt, Art. (1935), 337. 
2. Piatt, Art. (1935), 337. 
3. See Chapter III, Section 5, v. 
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principle in his definition of verification which h'ls 
been cited earlier. Verification is "the discovery of as-
pects of the datum which are fully coherent with the hy-
pothesis, together with evidence of the absence of centra-
l . 
dictory data." Werkmeister takes a similar view which 
has been summarized elsewhere by the present writer in these 
words: 
Werkmeister argues that since meaning is a 
matter of context (Chap• II), and valid knowl-
edge results from a systemic integration of 
first-person experience (Chap. III), the co-
herence theory of truth, 'systemic entail-
ment,' must be accepted. The moving force 
behind all formal and empirical sciences is 
the ideal of an integrated and c~osed system. 
Systemic integration provides the clue to 
our understan~ing of the basis and structure 
of knowledge. 
A related accoUnt of bow veridical knowledge is possible, 
and in which datum self theorists would concur can be found 
in Blanshard's great two-volume work, The Nature of Thought. 
For him; "Coherence is our sole criterion of truth." 3 
But to say that veridical knowledge is noseible on the 
datum self theory because reason, and more especially, co-
herence, makes it so, is not an altogether adequate answer. 
One major gap in the writings of the datum self theorists 
is that they do not go into the details of veridical know-
ing as have other theorists.4 Investigation into the 
1. Brightman, Art. (1946), 369. 
2. Steinkraus, Art. (1949), 43. 
3. Blanshard, NT, II, 259. 
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4. Werkmeister comes the closest to doing this in BSK, 81-124. 
machinery of veridical knowing would make their case consi-
derably more clear and less open to the sweeping attacks 
of opponents, answerable though those attacks may be. 
vii. Further problems. 
Two further questions of some relevance may be raised. 
The first has to do with the reU.tion of acquired knowledge 
to the given. Some of the elements in the datum self have 
been noted above. When one is said to have knowledge of 
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some object or person, just what is the status of that knowl• 
edge in the datum self? An example may clarify. Present 
in·,:.a datum self is evidence "A." From it, the datum self 
infers an object, "A'." Is the inferred knowledge of "A'" 
then, given in the datum self? Apparently it is. Can it 
then be said that knowledge is found in the datum self along 
with evidence? Are knowledge-claims as immediate as the 
data which prompt them? Or must knowledge-claims be under-
stood only in relation to a "whole self?" A more specific 
example may be noted. Let us assume that a person is view-
ing landscape "X" through fixed, dime-in-slot binoculars. 
Almost spontaneously the datum self grasps colors and shapes 
and infers from them the existence of a clump of trees, a 
red barn, a hill, and so on. The beauties of the scene and 
the meanings implied are known, when shortly, in to "X" 
comes a fast moving something. Fresh sensory data are made 
available within the context of "X" which is simultaneously 
known. Is this a possibility in any datum self or is the 
knowledge of "X" in this case, in a past datum self 'rlhen 
the new evidence comes in? 
A second question which may be raised here concerns the 
relation of coherent probability to certainty. Veridical 
knowledge is that which is a coherent interpretation of the 
given. The datum self theorists maintain that the datum 
self is an incontrovertible certainty and all knowing must 
begin on its basis. 1 Does that then, imply that coherent 
reasoning requires an initial certainty in order to function 
meaningfully? Is coherent probability (veridical knowledge) 
dependent on antecedent certainty? But can it be said that 
the datum self is an incontrovertible certainty? Price 
held that sense-data were indubitable, yet their existence 
was doubted by certain critics. 
D. C. Williams has made a pertinent comment on this 
~roblem: 
Every philosophy must ultimately suppdse it 
possible to be in error about what is given--
a subject on which Bradley said: 'there is no 
agreement, and little more than a variety of 
conflicting opinion.•2 
Can the datum self theory suppose it is in error about the 
self as given? Or must it be said that the self cannot be 
1. For example, see Brightman, POI, 18: "The most certain 
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fact, and the only absolutely certain empirical fact, then, 
ism~ own self-experience." See also Brightman, Art. (1951), 
4. The ~act that all experience is self-experience ••• etc." 
2. il'illiams, Art. ( 1934) 2, 432. The quotation fro!ll Bradley 
is from Essays on Truth and Reality, 201. 
denied without being assumed, and, therefore that the 
datum self is beyond all question? This see'lls to be the 
point of Brightman 1 s discussion on the "Presuuuosi tiona 
of Experiment ."1 Perhaps the theory that the given is a 
datum self has its roots in the logic of Augustine, Des-
cartes's "cosito ergo sum," and Kant's necessary "Ich 
denke," though the "Ich denke" is not given but always pos-
sible. On the other hand, maybe the experience of the datum 
self. is such a unique empirical fact that 1t stands alone 
as the clue to real! ty needing no "necessary logic" for 
its 
the 
support. 
2 theory. 
Both factors figure ultimately 1n support of 
1. Brightman, Art. (1938). Of. a condensed treatment of the 
same question in FOR, 345. A similar line of reasoning may 
be found in J. s. Moore, Art. (1933). 
2. Werkmeister bas writ ten: "Experience ••• is implicitly 
and unavoidably present in every assertion we make, so 
that even its denial is proof of its actuality. Exper-
ience, in other words, is self-revealing."(BSK, 82). 
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CHAPTJI:R VI 
COMPARISONS AND CONCLUSIONS 
1. General Observations. 
The view that knowledge involves something given is 
almost as old as philosophy itself, though the earliest 
thinkers did not isolate the problem from epistemology 
and deal with it as such. There is hardly a philosophical 
viewpoint which denies that something is given in the 
knowledge situation. But there is considerable disagree~ 
ment as to what that given consists of. Some thinkers 
hold that the term given has no special meaning and merely 
indicates that knowledge of everything is given us, we do 
not make it. Others hold that the given is one aspect of 
the knowledge situation, and from it, knowledge may be 
derived, This dissertation has dealt with the given under-
stood in this latter way, and has noted four differing 
theories as to what the given is in this sense, 
A word must be said about those who deny the problem 
in the sense in which it is here studied. They hold that 
all knowledge is given and that no special problem exists 
regarding bow that knowledge is given. They maintain that 
the theory of the given in the narrow sense is a pseudo 
problem for experience reveals the givenness of knowledge. 
Some of the argument of those holding to the given in this 
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general and broad sense have been discussed in connection 
with the criticisms of the last two chapters. Some of 
those who hold the view are Thomists, 1 New-Realists, 2 
Pragmatists3and certain Idealists.4 It may be said, in 
a general way, that these views put the theory of being 
before the theory of knowing. They hold that reality 
itself is given, and consequently, there is no problem 
as to how it may be known. 
On the other hand, those who hold to the narrower 
theory of the ~iven, say that acquiring knowledge is the 
first problem. We begin with what is given, and from it 
arrive at knowledge of objects. Knowledge itself is not 
given. Reality is mediated through the given. We do not 
know it at once. It may be said that the views which limit 
the theory of the given in this way, make knowing prior to 
being, and indeed, allow for a number of differing ontolo-
gical viewpoints--realism, idealism, and phenomenalism. 
The problem of the given in this narrower sense has 
received its clearest definition in recent years, and the 
contemporary literature on it is increasing somewhat. One 
of the first to recognize the problem in this century was 
Bergson, in his Essai sur lea donnees immediates de la 
1. For example, Bittle, RAM; Hawkins, COE; Maritain, Art. 
(1943). 
2. For example, Holt et al, NR; Perry, PPT. 
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3. For example, Dewey, EN; Hahn CTP; Morris, STM, Chapter VI. 
4. For example, Qynningham, IARP, Part II; A. E. Taylor, EM. 
Cbnsoienoe, in 1910.1 Since that time, the problem of 
what is given in the narrower sense, has played an impor-
tant part in the views of the critical realists, the sense-
data philosophers of England, certain phenomenalists and 
some pluralistic idealists. It is with the exposition and 
evaluation of these four views that this dissertation has 
been primarily concerned. 
Each one of these views, as has been shown, has oar-
tain implications for the various branches of philosophy 
proper. The most relevant and direct implications have 
been dealt with, though there are others that might have 
been noted. It cannot be said that any metaphysical view 
follows necessarily from any one view of the given, but 
certain consequences are more likely than others. The 
essence theory of the Critical Realists makes both idealism 
and realism possibil1 ties, but realism is the most prob-
able conclusion. The sense•data view implies most clearly 
a form of realism. The phenomenalist theory by emphasiz-
ing the role of the knower opens the doors to idealism, 
though it also implies referential realism, if one admits 
that the initial methodological limitation to phenomena 
alone oan be broken down. The datum self theory most 
generally implies some form of idealism • but such an on-
tology does not follow with logical necessity. 
1. The English translation by Pogson has the misleading 
title, Time and Free Will. 
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Perhaps one of the chief reasons for the development 
of various theories of the given, besides the goal of being 
empirical, is the problem of accounting for error. The 
four views herein studied point out the difficulties in 
naive realism or any form of immediatism. Error, itself, 
they uniformly maintain, is not given. One can never be 
in error about what is given for it is a brute fact, a 
starting point for knowing. Error occurs in the act of 
interpreting the given.1 The views which interpret the 
given in the broadest sense, holding that everything is 
given, cannot answer the problem of error in so satisfactory 
a manner. 
One general problem which arises in each of the four 
views studied, is the problem of method. It is not easily 
answered. One can take a psychogenetic approach to his 
presentation of the given or he can take a logical approach. 
In a sense, the two cannot be completely separated, but 
they comprise two directions. The psychogenetic approach, 
urged by Wood and Brightman, seeks to describe precisely 
what the given consists of psychologically--what one finds 
at any moment when he inspects the given. 1riood, though 
admi tt1ng the need for both the logical and psychologic~l 
approaches, says: "Especially is 1t true that the psycho-
lost ot perception provides the only possible point of de-
parture for an epistemology of perception ."2 The logical 
1. Lewis has discussed this with great clarity in MWO, 157-
165. 
2. Wood, AK, 35. 
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approach, so clearly illustrated in Stace, 1 though also 
employed by Price and the Critical Realists, seeks not 
after the basic psychological facta, But after that which 
must necessarily be in order for knowledge to take place. 
Logical analysts admit that their interpretation is an 
abstraction, but that without it, knowledge cannot be 
explained, Something may be said for each emphasis. 
In the first place, the theories using one method, 
also make use of the other, knowingly or unknowingly. The 
logical account must report the psychological facta found 
in the admitted abstraction which the given itself is. 
Tbe psychological account must rely on logical analysis 
in order to find the given which it seeks to describe, 
But this should be clarified, One theory of the given 
which is presumably psychological in its method may serve 
as an illustration-the datum self theory. This theory 
holds that the given is a self which includes feelings, 
reasonings, and imaginings as well as sensations, or qua-
lia, all of which may be psychologically observed. The 
datum self is able to acquire knowledge by an act of self-
transcendence or objective reference, plus the use of 
reason, This knowledge so acquired, of course, must be 
found in a datum self, for it is possible only in datum 
selves. But if the datum self possesses knowledge of ob-
jects as well as feelings, qualia, etc., how can one 
1. Cf. Stace, TKE, 33. 
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psychologically discriminate between the presented content 
and the inferred content? How is it possible to know which 
is which without a logical analysis? By definition, the 
given is that which is presented, but yet the datum self 
or "Situation Experienced" also includes, psychologically, 
knowledge, or "Situations Believed-in." A logical analysis 
must be employed in part, at least. 
But the second possible approach, the lo3ical, must 
also make use of the psychological method in order to des-
cribe the content of that which has been found logically 
indisputable in knowing. Logic can set the bounds; psy-
chology must provide the content. It would a~ost seem 
that logical analysis is prior to psychological analysis, 
for concepts and limiting definitions are used in order to 
describe the factuaUty of the given. But any view which 
seeks to get_ along without a combination of both methods, 
is either blind to its use of the other, or is doomed to 
failure, if it is consistent in its use of one. The essence 
theory comes close to illustrating the last alternative by 
its strong logical emphasis. 
2. Points of Agreement Amon~ the Views Investigated. 
Besides the general observations which have been made 
on the whole problem of the theory of the given, certain 
points of agreement and disagreement, among the four 
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theories investigated, may be brought out. The points 
of ~ajor agreement among the views will be presented first. 
Occasionally, sample references will be given. 
(1) All of the theories studied seek to solve the 
problem of error and unite in opposing naive realism and 
subjectivism as views which fail to solve that problem. 
The essence theory and the sense-data theory are especially 
thoroughgoing in their analysis of these opposing views. 
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(2) The four theories investigated seek an unchallenge-
able certainty in their quest for the given. All maintain 
that whatever the given is, it is a certainty. Drake says 
that essences are "irresistibly taken, in the moment of 
perception. "1 Price holds that sense-data are "indubitable. "2 
Stace maintains that phenomena are "logically ultimate and 
indisputable," 3 and Brightman states that "the only ab-
solutely certain empirical fact, then, is my own self-ex-
perience,"4 or datum self. Each theory maintains that its 
account of the given is a certainty, and yet they disagree 
as to what that certainty is. The fact of self-awareness, 
of the datum self as given, bids fair to be the one view 
which has the strongest empirical rootage. Opponents of 
this view do not accept it for they fear it implies a meta-
physical substantialist view of the self, but this does not 
follow from the datum self theory. 
1. Drake, ECR, 19. 
2. Price, PER, 19. 
3. Stace, TKE, '3· 
4. Brightman, POI, 18. 
The quest for a given which is certain among the 
theories surveyed, resembles the fundamental aim of phe-
nomenology,1 but theorists of the given are not prepared 
to delete from consideration the relevance of their views 
for the wider problems of philosophy. 
(3) The views herein examined, unite in opposing the 
idea that knowledge can be certain. They maintain that 
knowledge is a matter of faith or probability, but not 
certainty. Santayana bas the well-known doctrine of "ani-
mal faitb." 2 Price says that nothing better than percep-
tual assurance em be achieved and perceptual assurance 
"is a form of rational bel1er."3 Lewis maintains that 
"all empirical knowledge is probable only."4 And Brightman 
holds that knowledge amounts to coherent probability. 5 
Perhaps the four theories could agree in spirit with this 
utterance of Price: "Nature is no prodigal; she is not 
likely to have allowed us any more immediate knowledge than 
6 is absolutely necessary." It is precisely on this point 
of probability versus certainty, that the various theories 
of the given have been attacked. Certain critics say that 
if one holds to a theory of the given, distinguishing it 
from knowledge, knowledge itself is impossible,7 These 
critics presuppose that knowledge is the same as certainty, 
however. 
1. Cf, Farber, Art. (1941), 
2, See Santayana, SAF. 
3. Price, PER, 193. 
4. Lewis, MWO, 37. 
,5. Bri~btman, POR, 19i• 
5. Price, Art. (1926) • 178. 
7, Wild, Art. (1940), 
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(4) All four theories provide some means for "getting 
out" of the given. Drake provides the essence view with 
a theory of projection1 which is similar to Wood's idea 
2 
of "external projection" or "intentionality," Brightman's 
view of objective referance or self-transcendence is like-
wise akin to these posi tiona. 3 Price's idea of "perceptual 
acceptance" resembles them, in part only. 4 But all are 
proposed means for escaping the confines of the given. 
(5) All theories stress the privacy of mental states, 
There is no overlapping 
sciousness, Stace 
does Brightman.6 
makes 
con-of "g1 vena" or of individual 
this point very clearly5 and so 
It is found explicitly in the sense-
data theory of Price7 and is implied in the essence theory 
when Drake says: "Our existing mental life is never iden-
tical, our minds never overlap,"8 
(6) Virtually all of the theories presented are 
epiatemically dualistic, though Price veers in the direction 
of monistic realism. The phenomenalists and the datum 
self theorists make the dichotomy moat explicit. The ea-
sence doctrine is not quite so decided. 
3. Certain Points of Disagreement. 
Though the four contemporary theories of the given 
are alike in some important respects, they are also 
l, Drake, MPN, 142. 
2. Wood, AK, 66. 
3. Brightman, POI, 22. 
4. Price, PER, Chapter VI. 
5. Stace, TKE, Chapter V. 
6, Brightman, POR, 352. 
7. Price, PER, 274. 
8. Drake, ECR, 27. 
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different on some major questions. 
(1) On the question of what the given is, of course, 
there is disagreement. In part, this disagreement has to 
do with the question of how much is given. The sense-data 
theory takes the narrowest view, the datum self theory, the 
most inclusive interpretation. The phenomenalist view 
includes more in its description than either the essence 
or the sense-data theories, but does not hold that the self 
is given. 
This question of how much is given, may also be char-
acterized in other terminology. The last two views dis-
cussed are more holistic than the first, which could be 
termed analytic •. But when the meaning of the term essence 
is expanded, as Santayana expands it,1 it includes much 
more than is originally the case. Nevertheless, essences 
are abstracted from mental states and the view is still 
more analytic than holistic. 
(2) Andther point of disagreement which follows from 
this first one is the relation of the given to experience. 
Admittedly there is a terminological problem here, but 
the views can nevertheless be adduced. The essence, sense-
data, and phenomenalists theories maintain that the given 
is to be distinguished from experience and can be construed 
as a part of experience. For example, Lewis says that the 
2 given is "an identifiable constituent of experience." 
1. Cf. Santayana, RE. 
2. Lewis, MWO, 66. 
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The datum self theory, on the other hand, identifies the 
given with experience. Both givenness and experience are 
basal facts. The one is not prior to the other. If the 
two can be separated, a careful discussion of the term 
experience is required, but this is not found in the first 
three viewpoints. If the given is given to experience and 
experience is distinguished from the given, it would seem 
that experience is the one certainty which is truly given. 
The datum self theory recognizes this. The others do not. 
(3) The various views disagree on the relation between 
epistemology and ontology. The Phenomenalist view is most 
clear in its claim to be free of ontological consequences, 
even regarding the status of the given itself. The datum 
self theory says that ontological implications cannot be 
avoided and claims that the datum self is the clue to onto-
logical reality, not a neutral something. The sense-data 
theory, as Price has presented it, admits that ontological 
realism is the most likely ontological implicat1on. 1 And 
the essence theory postulates realism early in its develop-
ment~·.holding that the ontological view can be supported 
2 by the epistemological one. 
(4) Disagreements are also to be found in the various 
treatments of how the given may be transcended, and how 
veridical knowledge is possible. The essence theory has 
a doctrine of projection based on a more or less instinctive 
l. See Price, PER, Chapter IX. 
2. Drake, EOR, 5f. 
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belief in external objects. The sense-data view reports 
a theory of perceptual acceptance and a theory of families 
of sense-data which lead to percentual assurance. 'I'he uhe-
nomenalists stress pragmatic verifiability (Lewis), mental 
construction (Stace), and intentionality (Wood), while the 
datum self theorist says that the given may be "escaped" 
by means of the fact of self-transcendence exemplified in 
memory. This self-transcendence points to an objective 
world which may be known veridically by applying regson 
to the data, 
' (5) The disagreement concerning method bas been 
stated under the above beading, "General Observations." 
It need not be dealt with again. 
4. Conclusions of the Dissertation as a Whole. 
1. The problem of the epistemic given ~ay be traced to 
ancient thought and is suggested by Augustine, but it finds 
its first modern statement in Descartes. In recent times 
the problem has been dealt with more widely. 
2. The theory of the given one holds, has relevance 
for most of the disciplines of philosophy, especially epi-
stemology, theory of mind, and ontology. 
3. General critics of the theory of the given, as here 
investigated, deny the problem on the basis of metaphysical 
presuppositions. The four theories here studied seek to 
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derive, in varying degrees, a metaphysics from their stu~v 
of the knowledge situation. The methodology of knowledge 
is prior to a theort of reality. 
4. The essence theory of the given offers a logical 
solution to the error problem and accounts for such facts 
as hallucination and mirage, but the term essence is highly 
ambiguous and the relation between essences and physical 
objects is not made known. Furthermore, how essences are 
related to knowing selves, is not established and the view 
as a whole is based on veiled and unwarranted assumptions, 
5. The sense-data theory of the given differs from the 
sensum theory, and is a result of. careful analysis. It 
offers a detailed exposition of how knowledge is attained, 
introducing such highly original concepts as "families of 
sense-data." Nevertheless, it makes certain ontological 
assumptions, is abstract, and falsely distinguishes between 
the given and consciousness. 
6, The phenomenalist view is psychogenetic in its ap-
proach and holistic in its interpretation of what is given, 
but it makes an unwarranted distinction between the given 
·and consciousness and has certain internal inconsistencies, 
It avows ontological neutralism, like phenomenology, but 
cannot do so consistently, particularly on the nature of 
the self. 
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7. The datum self theory resembles the phenomenalist 
view in method and content, admits the criticisms against 
a substantialist view of the self, but nevertheless main-
tains that the empirical self is given. The given and ex-
perience are one. Though' the view does not adequately 
explain the machinery of knowing, or the relation between 
qualia and received knowledge in the datum self, it is 
the most satisfactory view offered thus far. 
a. An investigation of theories of the given indicates 
the complexity of the knowledge problem and indicates that 
knowledge is not found with certainty, but inferred accord-
ing to the laws of coherent probability. We know our hands, 
our total selves, our neighbors, and God, by faith, faith 
grounded in the certainties of self experience and the 
principles of a coherence logic. 
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ABSTRACT 
1'nie problem of knowledge in contemporary thought 
is unusually complex. This dissertation seeks to isolate 
but one of the fundamental questions of epistemology and 
investigate 1t in the literature of Britain and America 
sinoe 1920, The problem is: the nature of the given in 
the knowledge situation. After noting certain historical 
roots of the theory, four contemporary theories of the 
given are examined, Their implications are brought out, 
and critical evaluations are made. 
Tbe literature on the problem as a whole is relatively 
meager. One book by R. D. Mack deals with the given in 
Bradley, Whitehead, and Dewey. Many thinkers consider 
the problem seriously in developing their epistemolo@;ies 
and several important articles about it have appeared in 
the journals. Some have denied the uniqueness of the ques-
tion by saying that everything is given. 
The first chapter is an historical orientation and 
calls attention to the growth of the problem until the 
time of its clearest statement. The given was little 
recognized in Ancient and Medieval thought, though certain 
early thinkers distinguish experience as a source of 
knowledge. Descartes with his coglto gives the problem 
a sharper focus and the British Empiricists who succeed 
him, devote much of their investigation to the nature 
318 
of what is given in knowing though the term itself is 
foreign to them. In Kant and Hegel, the problem appears 
in a fresh treatment. And in later theorists, there are 
varying statements of it. Avenarius, Bergson, Bradley, 
Ward, Peirce, James, Bowne, and Royce are examples. In 
contem9orary thought, the problem is faced by the Nee-
Realists, the Critical Realists, the Sense~data empiri-
cists, the Phenomenalists, certain Idealists, and there 
are significant relations with the Phenomenological move-
ment. 
Chapter II is an investigation of one contemporary 
view, that essences are given. Critical Realists hold 
this, but not uniformly. The essence theory of the given 
rejects subjectivism and Nee-realism, for they cannot ac-
count for error; it holds that essences as data do not 
exist; that they all have the same status; that their ap-
pearance is dependent on mental states, though they may 
be identical while mental states are separate. Critical 
Realists differ on the nature and locus of essences, some 
viewing them as character-complexes, others as logical 
entities. The essence view has been associated with 
Platonic Realism, Scholasticism, Locke, Berkeley, Prag-
matism, and even Absolutism, thus indicating a measure 
of ambiguity. It can be criticized for being unempirical; 
for its denial of existence to essences; for vagueness on 
the relation of essences to physical objects and the knower; 
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and for unwarranted assumptions. Answers have been given 
to soma of these charges in vigorous debates in the phil-
osophical jourmals. 
Chapter III is an analysis and evaluation of the 
theory that sense-data are given as it is particularly 
found in the epistemology of H. H. Price •. According to 
this theory, sense-data are indubitably present and are 
neutral, though some have questioned this on the grounds 
that the very act of at ten t1on to the given modifies it. 
Naive realism and the causal theory of perception must 
both be rejected on the sense-data theory. Sense-data 
are not universals or substances; they have limited tem-
poral duration; are unchanging, but may be construed as 
events. They are not physical, but may be viewed as both 
psychical and cerebral, or perhaps, vital. Sense-data may 
be related in "families," thus providing for the knowabi-
lity of material existence. 
The sense-data theory is similar to the sensum theory, 
but should be distinguished from it for the latter does 
not develop the idea of the givenness of sensa. Sensa are 
subjective variables; sense-data are indubitables. The 
sensum view seems to introduce a tertium quid; the. sense-
data view does not. 
Critics have chs.rged the sense-data view with being 
psychologically false and have doubted the "indubitability" 
of sense-data. It has also been urged that sense-data 
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are changing and that the problem is linguistic, but Price 
has anticipated these criticisms. To account for veri-
dical knowl.edge is difficult on the view and the distinc-
tion made between the given and consciousness is unsound. 
Chapter IV is an investigation and evaluation of the 
phenomenalist theory of the given. The specific thinkers 
to whom most consideration is given, are C. I. Lewis, w. T. 
Stace, and L. Wood. In their primary concern for the given 
itself, they make no ontological commitments. and approach 
a phenomenological method. Phenomenalists reject the 
Bergsonian and Neo-realistic concepts of an all-inclusive 
given, and they oppose the essence and sense-data theories 
for their ambiguity and unpsychological character. They 
maintain that the given is an undeniable startintz-point in 
knowledge; that the given is an abstraction from experience; 
that 1t is unalterable; and that it is the source and 
ground of knowledge, though not knowledge. The content 
of the given is complex including quality, intensity, 
spatial extent, temporal duration, and certain fundamental 
relations, as well as activities of consciousness, but it 
does not include the self. The metaphysical status of 
the given on this view is avowedly neutral, neither 
mental nor physical. 
Phenomenalists differ in their stress on the type 
of analysis employed, logical or psychological, and on 
the degree of subjectivity in their approaches. They have 
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been criticized for the very idea of separating a <riven 
from the totality of knowledge; for beinft unemntrtcal; 
for the presumed fruitlessness of their search for a 
given; and for 11aking veridic!il knowledqoe imnof'sible, 
Furthermore, certain instances of internal inconsistencv 
may be noted an1 the disttnctian between the <liven and 
consciousness cannot be established emuirically. 
Chapter V is an exnositian and evaluation of the 
theory that the datum self is qoiven, aP defended sneci-
fically in the writings of E.S. Bri~htman, The view 
holds that the <liven is a self, for owned experience is 
a basal fact, Also, it is maintained that the siven is 
equal to exnerience and not a constituent of it. It has 
a problematic and innocent character. Knowledqoe may be 
found in it, even knowledge of the self. The datum self 
is the starting point for knawled"'e, and includes as its 
content such aspects as qualia, the exnerience of time 
and space, the transcendence of time and snace, process 
and striving, and nrimitive awareness of meaning, The 
datum self must be distin~ished from the whole self, 
This theory inTolves euiste'!lic dualism, 'lnd the view of 
self-psychology regarding mind as well as ontological 
idealism, though these do not necessarily follow. 
The d3tum self theory has been criticized for bein"' 
unempirical but that criticism is l~rgely verbal. It has 
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been held that the self is not given and that the view 
leads one to the egocentric predicament but the self can-
not be denied without being assumed and predicaments are 
opportunities. Solipsism, though charged against the view, 
is avoided because of the self-transcendence of the datum 
self and its ability to reason about the external world. 
The complex processes involved in obtaining knowledge are 
not given, though consistency would demand that they be. 
Veridical knowledge is apparently impossible, 1t is 
charged, and the relation between knowledge and qualia in 
the datum self is not made clear. 
The final chapter, after making some general obser-
vations about the theory of the given in the history of 
thought, notes difficulties in the psychological and 
logical methods, and suggests a combination of the two as 
most acceptable. Major points of agreement and disagree-
ment among the four theories examined are brought out and 
the dissertation comes to these conclusions: 
1. The problem of the epistemic given may be traced to 
ancient thought and is suggested by Au~stine, but it finds 
its first modern statement in Descartes. In recent times 
the problem has been dealt with more widely. 
2.- The theory of the given one holds, has relevance for 
most of the disciplines of philosophy, especially episte-
mology, theory of mind, and ontology. 
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3. General critics of the theory of the given, as here 
investigated, deny the problem on the basis of metaphysical 
presuppoai tiona. The four theories here a tudied seek to 
derive, in varying degrees, a metaphysics from their study 
of the knowledge ai tuation. The methodology of knowledge 
is prior to a theory of reality. 
4. The essence theory of the given offers a logical 
solution to the error problem and accounts for such facts 
as hallucination and mirage, but the term essence is highly 
ambiguous and the relation between essences and physical 
objects is not made known. Furthermore, ho~1 essences a~e 
related to knowing selves is not established and the view 
as a whole is based on veiled and unwarranted assumntions. 
5. The sense-data theory of the given differs from the 
sensum theory, and is a result of careful analysis. It 
offers a det~iled exposition of how knowled~e is attained, 
introducing such highly original concepts as "families of 
sense-data." Nevertheless, it makes certain ontological 
·assumptions, is abstract, and falsely distinguishes be-
tween the given and consciousness. 
6. The phenomenalist view is psychogenetic in its ap-
proach and holistic in its interpretation of what is 
given, but it makes an unwarranted distinction between the 
given and consciousness and has certain internal inconsis-
tencies. It avows ontological neutralism, like phenomenol-
ogy, but cannot do so consistently, particularly on the 
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nature of the self. 
7. The datum self theory resembles the phenomenalist 
view in method and content, admits the cri tic1sms against 
a substantialist view of the self, but nevertheless main-
tains that the empirical self is given. The given and ex-
perience are one. Though the view does not adequately 
explain the machinery of knowing, or the relation between 
qualia and received knowledge in the datum self, it is 
the most satisfactory view offered thus far. 
8. An investigation of theories of the given indicates 
the complexity of the knowledge problem and indicates that 
knowledge is not found with certainty, but inferred accord-
ing to the laws of coherent probability. We know our hands, 
our total selves, our neighbors, and God, by faith, faith 
grounded in the certainties of self experience and the 
principles of a coherence logic. 
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